Yamamoto was suffering from stomach trouble and "seemed in unusually low spirits," but the Main Body as a whole was feeling very snug and secure behind the 18.1-inch guns of Yamato and the 16-inchers of the other fast battleships. All hands were "singing war songs at the top of their lungs," confident of annihilating the Pacific Fleet. Sailors whose duties did not involve much exercise were put through daily calisthenics and there was much sun-bathing topside until the Main Body entered the weather front on the afternoon of 1 June.
Commander Striking Force was feeling none too easy despite his tactical superiority. His carriers had returned to home waters on 23 April after their Indian Ocean raid and so had had barely a month for upkeep and repair of ships, refresher training for anti-aircraft crews and flight training for aviators. That, to be sure, was three weeks more than Fletcher and Spruance had. "We participated in the operation," wrote Nagumo after the battle, "with meager training and without knowledge of the enemy."
Of course he knew where to find Midway, his first objective. Striking Force orders were to "execute an aerial attack on Midway . . . destroying all enemy air forces stationed there" on 4 June, in preperation for the landing on the 5th. This looked like an easy assignment, and the high command was so confident of success that it provided the Occupation Force with new Japanese names for the two islets and for Midway itself, the last meaning "Glorious month of June." So it was, but not for them!
Midway was so crowded with Marines, planes, supply and oil dumps and other installations that there was scarcely room for the "gooney birds," whose hoarse dissent from these goings-on could be heard above the humming of plane motors and the booming of the surf. Captain Simard and staff, Colonel Shannon and his staff had their hands full with defensive preparations such as mining all likely approaches and landing beaches. Radio traffic, most of which had to be coded of decoded, air-search operations, unloading ships, and "housekeeping" on an immense scale kept everyone busy. A demolition plan was tested shortly before the battle, and somewhat too realistically; a sailor threw the wrong switch and 400,000 gallons of aviation gasoline went up in flames. The fire was kept under control and over half a million gallons were left; but thereafter all planes, including B-17's, had to be refueled by hand from 55-gallon drums.
The first consideration was air search. It was imperative that the enemy be discovered at the earliest possible moment in order to prevent him from sneaking within plane-launching distance and "pulling a Pearl Harbor" on Midway. Beginning 30 May, 22 Catalinas searched daily the sector SSW to NNE 700 miles out, and another PBY took off during the graveyard watch in order to be at the expected launching position of the enemy carriers at dawn. As Intelligence had reported that two enemy forces would rendezvous 700 miles west of Midway, there was added a daily search-attack mission by Army Flying Fortresses, to arrive at that point around 1500 each day. Nothing was sighted until 3 June. About 300 miles to the north-westward of Midway there was a "weak front," rendered almost stationary by a large high-pressure area centered northeast of the island, and affording perfect cover for Nagumo's carriers. More than once they could hear the motors of American search planes in the clouds above them; but most of the Midway-based aircraft were not yet equipped with radar and could pick up ships only visually. It was so thick around the Japanese Striking Force at noon 2 June that Admiral Nagumo lost visual contact with his own ships; at 1330, when his staff navigator figured that the designated point for a change of course toward Midway had been reached, the Admiral had to break radio silence to give the order.
Rear Admiral Robert H. English, Commander Submarine Pacific Fleet, had charge of deploying the 25 submarines at his disposal. Twelve boats were collected for a Midway Patrol Group by sending some out from Pearl between 21 and 24 May and pulling in others from the Mandates and elsewhere. These were assigned patrol stations west of Midway. Three more, the "roving short-stops" of the disposition, patrolled a scouting line 200 miles north of the Hawaiian chain and halfway between Midway and Oahu, in case the enemy should attempt a diversionary attack on Pearl Harbor. Four submarines were sent to patrol about 300 miles north of Oahu, and six more supported the Aleutians Force.
Admiral Spruance's Task Force, built around Enterprise and Hornet, departed Pearl 28 May "to hold Midway and inflict maximum damage to the enemy by strong attrition tactics." Admiral Fletcher's Yorktown force sortied at 0900 on the 30th, with orders "to conduct target practice and then support Task Force 16."
Spruance on the last day of May and Fletcher on the first of June met oilers Cimarron and Platte and had their last fueling until after the battle. Spruance then doubled back to meet Fletcher at 1600 June 2 at lat. 32˚N, long. 173˚W, about 325 miles northeast of Midway. The carriers were now beyond the scope of land-based air searches and had to protect themselves. Hornet flew a search mission 150 miles out on 1 June, with no contacts; Enterprise searched the sector west to northwest on the morning of the 2nd, but all planes returned early on account of bad weather. The enemy carriers were still behind their protective weather front.
That day, Admiral Spruance made the following visual signal to the ships of his Task Force:–
An attack for the purpose of capturing Midway is expected. The attacking force may be composed of all combatant types including four or five carriers, transports and train vessels. If presence of Task Force 16 and 17 remains unknown to enemy we should be able to make surprise flank attacks on enemy carriers from position northeast of Midway. Further operations will be based on results of these attacks, damage inflicted by Midway forces, and information of enemy movements. The successful conclusion of the operation now commencing will be of great value to our country. Should carriers become separated during attacks by enemy aircraft, they will endeavor to remain within visual touch.First air contact on the enemy were made by Midway-based planes on the Occupation Force. Ensign Jack Reid was flying a Catalina almost 700 miles from Midway shortly before 0900 3 June. His sector covered the point at which Intelligence expected two Japanese forces to rendezvous; he pilots used to draw straws to see who would fly it at dawn. Reid had run down to the end of his arc, on the westerly bearing from Midway. It was time to turn back, but he decided to go on for a few minutes. Suddenly he sighted 30 miles ahead what appeared to be the main enemy fleet, looking like minature ships in a backyard pond. "Do you see what I do?" he asked his copilot. "You're damned right I do!" was the reply. Popping in and out of clouds, they tracked the force for several hours, and by 1100 were able to report eleven ships making 19 knots to the eastward. This was probably the combined transport and seaplane groups of the Midway Occupation Force, which was then indulging in a final battle drill including the arming of flame throwers. United States Marines will learn with envy that their opposite numbers of the "Kure" Special Navy Landing Force, in one transport, were supplied with ten cases of beer after the drill, and got away with it all.
Captain Simard at Midway reacted immediately to the contact report, sending out nine B-17s. At 1624 the same day, 570 miles out, they found the transports, made three high-level (8,000 to 12,000 feet) bombing attacks and reported having hit "two battleships or heavy cruisers" and two transports; but actually these planes made no hits. Next, four amphibious Catalinas, each armed with one aerial torpedo, were sent to attack this formation. A radar contact at 0115 4 June led them to where the transports were set forth in bright moonlight. At 0143 three torpedoes were dropped and one hit the oiler Akebono Maru. The explosion killed or wounded 23 men and slowed the ship temporarily, but she regained formation.
The battle was on. "The whole course of the war in the Pacific may hinge on the developments of the next two or three days," recorded the CINCPAC annalist on receipt of this news. It did. The action about to be joined was one of the most decisive of the war.
At 1800 3 June, after the first air attacks had been made by Midway-based planes on the Japanese transports, Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet were a good 300 miles ENE of Midway, 400 miles east (and a little south) of the point where Nagumo's carriers were steaming at 25 knots toward their planned plane-launching point. Admiral Fletcher had received the first reports of contact with the Main Body of the Japanese Fleet, he correctly estimated that our planes had seen only a transport group with escort. He trusted his priginal Intelligence report to the effect that an enemy carrier force would be approaching Midway form the northwest, to launch an air attack on the atoll at dawn 4 June. And that is exactly what Nagumo was doing. So Fletcher changed course to the southwestward (210˚) at 1950 3 June with the object of arriving by break of day at a position about 200 miles north of Midway, whence he could fly an attack against Nagumo's carriers, provided their position had been ascertained. He correctly assumed that his presence was still unknown to the enemy, and that he might avoid detection next morning until Nagumo's planes were already winging their way to Midway. Thus, during the night of 3-4 June, the opposing carrier forces were approaching one another on courses which, if maintained, would have crossed a few miles northwest of the atoll.
Thursday, the Fourth of June, a day fatal to Japan's hopes of victory, began to break shortly after four o'clock. By sunrise, at 0457, there was a gentle (force 3) tradewind blowing from the southeast, enough for launching planes against an enemy to the westward without much loss of distance. Everyone hoped it would breeze up, but by 0800 the wind had fallen to mere light airs (4 to 5 knots) which forced the carriers to steam at 21 knots away from the enemy in order to launch or recover. Visibility–35 to 40 miles–was much too good for the carriers' health; the air temperature throughout the day was pleasantly cool, 68˚to 70˚ Fahrenheit.
As it was Yorktown's turn to search, at 0430 she launched ten SBDs to cover the northern semicircle to a radius of 100 miles, a proper precaution against being jumped by the planes of unlocated carriers. At that moment, Nagumo was about 215 miles to the westward, sending off his first strike on Midway. He still had the breaks in the matter of weather: from Kaga's log it is evident that the Striking Force was not yet out of the "front." Yet, despite a low (50 per cent) cloud cover and visibility of only 15 miles, American search planes from Midway managed to spot their fast-approaching enemy.
At 0534 4 June, the long awaited word was received on board Enterprise: "Enemy carriers." This was an intercepted message from a searching PBY to its base at Midway. Next, at 0545 came a plain English dispatch from the same source: "Many enemy planes heading Midway bearing 320˚ distant 150." Then, at 0603, "Two carriers and battleships bearing 320˚ distant 180 (miles from Midway) course 135˚ speed 25." That position was about 20 miles WSW of Task Force 16. These were the forst indications received by any United States command afloat as to where the enemy carriers were. The position given was incorrect by about 40 miles and only two of the four flattops were sighted; but at least Fletcher and Spruance now knew the approximate whereabouts of the Striking Force.
Admiral Fletcher wished to recover recover Yorktown's search mission and await further intelligence before launching a strike, and so passed the ball to Admiral Spruance. At 0607, only four minutes after receiving the last contact report, he ordered Spruance with Enterprise and Hornet to "proceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers when definitely located," and promised to "follow as soon as planes recovered."
Thus, only ten minutes before the air battle over Midway commenced, Fletcher sparked off the train of events that resulted in the loss of four Japanese carriers.
--Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison
From: The United States Navy in World War II
Part III: Chapter 7: Midway Preliminaries
Compiled and edited by: S.E. Smith
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| Samuel Eliot Morison | |
|---|---|
Samuel Eliot Morison in his official U.S. Navy portrait
| |
| Born | July 9, 1887 Boston, Massachusetts |
| Died | May 15, 1976 (aged 88) Boston, Massachusetts |
| Allegiance |  United States of America |
| Service/branch |  United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1942–1946 |
| Rank |  Rear Admiral (Reserve) |
| Battles/wars | World War II |
| Awards | See article |
Samuel Eliot Morison, Rear Admiral, United States Naval Reserve(July 9, 1887 – May 15, 1976) was an American historian noted for his works of maritime history that were both authoritative and highly readable. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1912, and taught history at the university for 40 years. He won Pulitzer Prizes forAdmiral of the Ocean Sea (1942), a biography of Christopher Columbus, and John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography (1959). In 1942, he was commissioned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to write ahistory of United States naval operations in World War II, which was published in 15 volumes between 1947 and 1962. He retired from the navy in 1951 as a rear admiral. Morison wrote the popular Oxford History of the American People (1965), and co-authored the classic textbook The Growth of the American Republic (1930) with Henry Steele Commager. Over the course of his distinguished career, Morison received eleven honorary doctoral degrees, including degrees fromHarvard University (1936), Columbia University (1942), Yale University(1949), and the University of Oxford (1951). Morison also garnered numerous literary prizes, military honors, and national awards from both foreign countries and the United States, including two Pulitzer Prizes, two Bancroft Prizes, the Balzan Prize, the Legion of Merit, and thePresidential Medal of Freedom.
The war years and military service (1942–1952)[edit]
In 1942, Morison met with his friend President Franklin D. Roosevelt and offered to write a history of United States Navyoperations during the war from an insider's perspective by taking part in operations and documenting them. The President and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox agreed to the proposal. On May 5, 1942, Morison was commissioned Lieutenant Commander, US Naval Reserve, and was called at once to active duty.[1] The result of Morison's proposal was the History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, published in 15 volumes between 1947–1962, documenting everything from strategy and tactics to technology and the exploits of individuals—a work which British military historian Sir John Keegan has called the best to come out of that conflict. Issued as The Rising Sun in the Pacific in 1948, Volume 3 won theBancroft Prize in 1949.[1]
Morison went on to the rank of Captain on December 15, 1945. On August 1, 1951, he was transferred to the Honorary Retired List of the Naval Reserve, promoted to Rear Admiral on the basis of combat awards.[1]
In History as a Literary Art: An Appeal to Young Historians (1946), Morison argued that vivid writing springs from the synergy of experience and research:
American historians, in their eagerness to present facts and their laudable concern to tell the truth, have neglected the literary aspects of their craft. They have forgotten that there is an art of writing history.
| Battle of Midway | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II | |||||||
 U.S. Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers from theUSS Hornet about to attack the burning Japanese cruiserMikuma for the third time on 6 June 1942 | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United States |  Empire of Japan | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Chester W. Nimitz Frank Jack Fletcher Raymond A. Spruance |  Isoroku Yamamoto Nobutake Kondō Chūichi Nagumo Tamon Yamaguchi † Ryusaku Yanagimoto † | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 3 carriers ~7 heavy cruisers 1 light cruiser 15 destroyers 233 carrier-based aircraft 127 land-based aircraft 16 submarines[1] | 4 carriers 2 battleships 2 heavy cruisers 1 light cruiser 12 destroyers 248 carrier-based aircraft[2] 16 floatplanes Did not participate in battle: 2 light carriers 5 battleships 6 cruisers ~35 support ships | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1 carrier sunk 1 destroyer sunk ~150 aircraft destroyed 307 killed[3] | 4 carriers sunk 1 heavy cruiser sunk 1 heavy cruiser damaged 248 aircraft destroyed[4] 3,057 killed[5] | ||||||
| ||
| ||
| ||
The Battle of Midway in the Pacific Theater of Operations was one of the most important naval battles of World War II.[6][7][8] Between 4 and 7 June 1942, only six months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, and one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the United States Navy(USN), under Admirals Chester W. Nimitz, Frank Jack Fletcher, andRaymond A. Spruance decisively defeated an attack by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Chuichi Nagumo, and Nobutake Kondo on Midway Atoll, inflicting irreparable damage on the Japanese fleet.[9] Military historian John Keegan called it "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare."[10]It was Japan's first naval defeat since the Battle of Shimonoseki Straitsin 1863.
The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, sought to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese hoped that another demoralizing defeat would force the U.S. to capitulate in the Pacific War and thus ensure Japanese dominance in the Pacific.[11]
The Japanese plan was to lure the United States' aircraft carriers into a trap.[12] The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway as part of an overall plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to theDoolittle air raid on Tokyo. This operation was also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii itself.
The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions.[13] Most significantly, American codebreakers were able to determine the date and location of the attack, enabling the forewarned U.S. Navy to set up an ambush of its own. Four Japanese aircraft carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu, all part of the six-carrier force that had attacked Pearl Harbor six months earlier—and a heavy cruiser were sunk at a cost of one American aircraft carrier and a destroyer. After Midway and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's shipbuilding and pilot training programs were unable to keep pace in replacing their losses, while the U.S. steadily increased its output in both areas.[14]
Contents
[hide]Background[edit]
Japan had attained its initial strategic goals quickly, taking the Philippines, Malaya,Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia); the latter, with its vital oil resources, was particularly important to Japan. Because of this, preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, there were strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, and infighting between the Navy's GHQ andAdmiral Isoroku Yamamoto'sCombined Fleet, such that a follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942.[15] Admiral Yamamoto finally succeeded in winning the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan for the Central Pacific was adopted.[16]
Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he regarded as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign.[nb 1] This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942, in which 16US Army Air Forces B-25 Mitchell bombers launched from USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a severe psychological shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands as well as the accessibility of Japanese territory to American bombers.[17][nb 2]
This, and other successful hit-and-run raids by American carriers in the South Pacific, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle.[18] Yamamoto reasoned that another attack on the main U.S Naval base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, due to the strength of American land-based air power on the Hawaiian Islands, he judged that it was too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly.[19]
Instead, Yamamoto selected Midway, a tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately 1,300 miles (1,100 nautical miles; 2,100 kilometres) from Oahu. [nb 3] Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore be compelled to defend it vigorously.[20] The U.S. did consider Midway vital; after the battle, establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Midway allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and reprovision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometres). In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midway's airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island.[21]
Yamamoto's plan: Operation MI[edit]
Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan was exceedingly complex,[22] requiring the careful and timely coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of open sea. Additionally, his design was predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that USS Enterpriseand USS Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier,USS Lexington had been sunk and USS Yorktown damaged so severely that the Japanese believed she too had been lost. In actuality, Yorktown would be deployed also, after being hastily repaired at Pearl Harbor and would later play a critical role in the discovery and eventual destruction of the Japanese fleet carriers at Midway. Perhaps most critically, much of Yamamoto's planning, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgement of American morale which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months.
Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation.[23] To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his battleships) would be unlikely to be discovered by the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers would trail Vice-Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's carrier striking force by several hundred miles. Japan's heavy surface forces were intended to destroy whatever elements of the U.S. fleet might come to Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun duel;[24] this was typical of the battle doctrine of most major navies.[25]
What Yamamoto did not know was that the U.S. had broken the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans). His emphasis on dispersal also meant that none of his formations could support each other. For instance, the only warships larger than the 12 destroyers that screened Nagumo's fleet were two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser, despite his carriers being expected to carry out the strikes and bear the brunt of American counterattacks. By contrast, the flotillas of Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which would see any action at Midway.[24] Their distance from Nagumo's carriers would also have grave implications during the battle, because the larger warships in Yamamoto and Kondo's forces carried scout planes, an invaluable reconnaissance capability denied to Nagumo.[26][27]
Aleutian invasion[edit]
Main article: Aleutian Islands Campaign
The Japanese operations in the Aleutian Islands (Operation AL) removed yet more ships that could otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. Whereas many earlier historical accounts considered the Aleutians operation as a feint to draw American forces away, early twenty-first century research suggested that AL was supposed to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway.[25] However, a one-day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's task force resulted in Operation AL beginning a day before the Midway attack.[28]
Prelude to battle[edit]
American reinforcements[edit]
To do battle with an enemy expected to muster four or five carriers, AdmiralChester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, needed every available U.S. flight deck. He already had Vice Admiral William Halsey's two-carrier (Enterprise and Hornet) task force at hand, though Halsey was stricken with psoriasis and had to be replaced by Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Halsey's escort commander.[29] Nimitz also hurriedly recalled Rear AdmiralFrank Jack Fletcher's task force, including the carrier Yorktown (which had suffered considerable damage in the Battle of the Coral Sea), from the South West Pacific Area. It reached Pearl Harbor just in time to receive provisions and set sail.
Despite estimates that Yorktown would require several months of repairs atPuget Sound Naval Shipyard, her elevators were intact, and her flight deck largely so.[30] The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around the clock, and in 72 hours she was restored to a battle-ready state,[31] judged good enough for two or three weeks of operations, as Nimitz required.[32] Her flight deck was patched, whole sections of internal frames had been cut out and replaced, and several squadrons of aircraft were drawn from USS Saratoga to augment Yorktown's partially depleted air group; they did not, however, get time to train.[33] [nb 4]
Nimitz disregarded established procedure in getting his third and last available carrier ready for battle. Just three days after putting into dry dock at Pearl Harbor, Yorktown was again under way. Repairs continued even as she sortied, with work crews from the repair ship USS Vestal, herself damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor six months earlier, still aboard.[34]
On Midway, by 4 June the USN had stationed four squadrons of PBYs—31 aircraft in total—for long-range reconnaissance duties, and six brand-new Grumman TBF-1 Avengers, the latter a detachment from Hornet's VT-8.[35] The Marine Corps had 19 Douglas SBD Dauntlesses, seven Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats, 17 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicators, and 21 Brewster F2A-3s. The USAAF contributed a squadron of 17 B-17 Flying Fortresses and eight B-26 Marauders equipped with torpedoes: in total 126 aircraft. Although many of these aircraft, in particular the Brewster F2A-3s, were obsolescent, they were the only aircraft available to the Marine Corps at the time.[36]
Japanese shortcomings[edit]
During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, the Japanese light carrierShōhō had been sunk and the fleet carrier Shōkaku had sustained three bomb hits, and was in drydock undergoing repairs. Although the carrier Zuikakuescaped the battle undamaged, she had lost almost half her air group, and was in port in Kure awaiting replacement planes and pilots. That there were none immediately available was a failure of the IJN crew training program, which already showed signs of being unable to replace losses.[37] Instructors from theYokosuka Air Corps were employed in an effort to make up the shortfall.[37]
Historians Parshall and Tully believe that by combining the surviving aircraft and pilots from Shōkaku and Zuikaku, it is likely that Zuikaku could have been equipped with almost a full composite air group. However, they also note that doing so would have violated Japanese carrier doctrine, which stressed that carriers and their pilots must train as a single unit (in contrast, American training was only conducted at the squadron level). In any event, the Japanese apparently made no serious attempt to get Zuikaku ready for the forthcoming battle.[38]
Thus, Carrier Division 5, consisting of the two most advanced aircraft carriers of the Kido Butai [nb 5] would not be available, which meant that Admiral Nagumo would have to rely on four fleet carriers:Kaga and Akagi forming Carrier Division 1; Hiryū and Sōryū as Carrier Division 2. At least part of this was due to fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941, including raids on Darwin and Colombo.[nb 6]
The main Japanese carrier-borne strike aircraft were the Aichi D3A1 dive bomber and the Nakajima B5N2, which was used either as a torpedo bomber or as a level attack bomber. The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverableMitsubishi A6M2 "Zero". For a variety of reasons, production of the D3A had been drastically reduced, while that of the B5N had been stopped completely and, as a consequence, there were none available to replace losses.[39] In addition, many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941 and, although they were well-maintained, many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable. These factors meant that all carriers of the Kido Butai had fewer aircraft than their normal complement, with few spare aircraft or parts stored in the carriers' hangars.[40][nb 7]
Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle were also in disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarineswas late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected.[41] A second attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engine Kawanishi H8K flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle and detect whether the American carriers were there, part of Operation K, was also thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point—a hitherto deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals - was now occupied by American warships, because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March.[42] Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle.
Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in both American submarine activity and message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. However, Japanese plans were not changed; Yamamoto, at sea on Yamato, assumed that Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo, and did not communicate with him by radio, so as not to expose his position.[43] Nagumo's radio antennas, however, were unable to receive long-wave transmissions from Tokyo.[44]
Allied code-breaking[edit]
Admiral Nimitz had one priceless advantage: cryptanalysts had broken the Japanese Navy's JN-25b code.[45] Since the early spring of 1942, the US had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an operation at objective "AF". It was not known where "AF" was, but Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and his team at Station HYPO were able to confirm that it was Midway by telling the base there by secure undersea cable to radio an uncoded false message stating that the water purification system it depended upon had broken down and that the base needed fresh water.[46] The code breakers then picked up a Japanese message that "AF was short on water."[47] HYPO was also able to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle.[48] Japan had a new codebook, but its introduction had been delayed, enabling HYPO to read messages for several crucial days; the new code, which had not yet been cracked, came into use shortly before the attack began, but the important breaks had already been made.[49][nb 8]
As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a very good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz knew that the Japanese had negated their numerical advantage by dividing their ships into four separate task groups, all too widely separated to be able to support each other.[50][nb 9] Nimitz calculated that the aircraft on his three carriers, plus those on Midway Island, gave the U.S. rough parity with Yamamoto's four carriers, mainly because American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones. The Japanese, by contrast, remained almost totally unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began.[27]
Battle[edit]
Order of battle[edit]
Main article: Midway order of battle
Initial air attacks[edit]
| 4 June |
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| 5 June |
|
At about 09:00 on 3 June, Ensign Jack Reid, piloting a PBY from US Navy patrol squadron VP-44,[51] spotted the Japanese Occupation Force some 500 nautical miles (580 miles; 930 kilometres) to the west-southwest of Midway. He mistakenly reported this group as the Main Force.[52] Nine B-17s took off from Midway at 12:30 for the first air attack. Three hours later, they found the Japanese Tanaka's transport group 570 nautical miles (660 miles; 1,060 kilometres) to the west.[53]
Under heavy anti-aircraft fire, they dropped their bombs. Though hits were reported,[53] none of the bombs actually hit and no significant damage was inflicted.[54] Early the following morning Japanese oil tanker Akebono Marusustained the first hit when a torpedo from an attacking PBY struck her around 01:00. This was the only successful air-launched torpedo attack by the U.S. during the entire battle.[54]
At 04:30 on 4 June, Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway itself, consisting of 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers and 36 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers, escorted by 36 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters. At the same time he launched a defensive combat air patrol (CAP) with his eight search aircraft (one from the heavy cruiser Tonelaunched 30 minutes late due to technical difficulties).
Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force.[55] Yamamoto's faulty dispositions had now become a serious liability.[56]
As Nagumo's bombers and fighters were taking off, 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns. At 05:30, a PBY reported sighting two Japanese carriers with empty decks, indicating an air strike en route.[52]American radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles, and interceptors were scrambled. Unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carrier fleet, their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway.
At 06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base. Midway-based Marine fighters, which included 7 F4Fs and 21 F2As,[57] intercepted the Japanese and suffered heavy losses, though they managed to destroy four B5Ns and at least three A6Ms. Within the first few minutes, three F4Fs and 13 F2As were destroyed, while most of the surviving U.S. planes were damaged, with only two remaining airworthy. American anti-aircraft fire was intense and accurate, destroying four additional Japanese aircraft and damaging many more.[58]
Of the 108 Japanese aircraft involved in this attack, 11 were destroyed, 14 were heavily damaged, and 29 were damaged to some degree. The initial Japanese attack did not succeed in neutralizing Midway: American bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the Japanese invasion force, and most of Midway's land-based defenses were intact. Japanese pilots reported to Nagumo that another aerial attack to soften Midway's defences would be necessary if troops were to go ashore by 7 June.[59]
Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet. These included six Grumman Avengers, detached to Midway from the Hornet's VT-8 (Midway was the first combat mission for the VT-8 airmen, and it was the combat debut of the TBF), Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 (VMSB-241), consisting of 11 SB2U-3s and 16 SBDs, plus four USAAF B-26s, armed with torpedoes, and 15 B-17s. The Japanese repelled these attacks, losing two fighters while destroying five TBFs, two SB2Us, eight SBDs and two B-26s.[60][61] The first Marine aviator to perish in the battle, Major Lofton R. Henderson of VMSB-241, was killed while leading his inexperienced Dauntless squadron into action. The main airfield at Guadalcanal was named Henderson Field after him in August 1942;[62] two civil airports also bear this name.
One B-26, after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire, veered into a steep dive straight toward the Akagi. Making no attempt to pull out of its run, the aircraft narrowly missed crashing directly into the carrier's bridge, which could have killed Nagumo and his command staff. This experience may well have contributed to Nagumo's determination to launch another attack on Midway, in direct violation of Yamamoto's order to keep the reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations.[60]
Nagumo's dilemma[edit]
In accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the time, Admiral Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers. The dive bombers were as yet unarmed. The torpedo bombers were armed with torpedoes should any American warships be located.[64]
At 07:15, Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with contact-fused general purpose bombs for use against land targets. This was a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as of the morning flight leader's recommendation of a second strike. Some sources maintain that this had been under way for about 30 minutes when, at 07:40,[65] the delayed scout plane from Tone signaled that it had sighted a sizeable American naval force to the east, but neglected to describe its composition. Later evidence, however, suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting report until 08:00.[66]
Nagumo quickly reversed his order to re-arm the bombers with general purpose bombs and demanded that the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. However, another 20–40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force. This was one of the carriers from Task Force 16. The other carrier was not sighted.[67]
Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended that Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 18 Aichi D3A1 dive bombers each on Sōryū andHiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft.[68] However, Nagumo's opportunity to hit the American ships[69] was now limited by the imminent return of his Midway strike force. The returning strike force needed to land promptly or it would have to ditch into the sea.[70] Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese never had an opportunity to position ("spot") their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch.
The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive fighters or, in the case of Sōryū, fighters being spotted to augment the task force defenses.[71] Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would have required at least 30 to 45 minutes.[72] Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, Nagumo would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper anti-ship armament; he had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down.[73] Poor discipline caused many of the Japanese bombers to ditch their bombs and attempt to dogfight intercepting F4Fs.[74]
Japanese carrier doctrine preferred the launching of fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks. Without confirmation of whether the American force included carriers (not received until 08:20), Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire.[75] In addition, the arrival of another American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve, which would by then be properly armed with torpedoes.[76]
In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00, so the aircraft that would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. Even if Nagumo had not followed strictly traditional battleship doctrine, he would not have prevented the launch of the American attack.[77]
Attacks on the Japanese fleet[edit]
_during_Battle_of_Midway.jpg)
The Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft against the Japanese. Admiral Fletcher, in overall command aboard Yorktown, and benefiting from PBY sighting reports from the early morning, ordered Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as was practical, while initially holdingYorktown in reserve in case any other Japanese carriers were found.[78](Fletcher's directions to Spruance were relayed via Nimitz who, unlike Yamamoto, had remained ashore.)
Spruance judged that, though the range was extreme, a strike could succeed and gave the order to launch the attack at around 06:00. He then left Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, to work out the details and oversee the launch, which did not go smoothly. The first plane was only able to take off from Spruance's carriers Enterprise and Hornet a few minutes after 07:00. Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights, followed suit at 08:00 fromYorktown.[79]
Admiral Fletcher (commanding the Yorktown task force) along with CaptainElliott Buckmaster (Yorktown's commanding officer) and their staffs had acquired first-hand experience in organizing and launching a full strike against an enemy force in the Coral Sea, but there was no time to pass these lessons on to Enterprise and Hornet which were tasked with launching the first strike.[80]Spruance ordered the striking aircraft to proceed to target immediately, rather than waste time waiting for the strike force to assemble, since neutralizing enemy carriers was the key to the survival of his own task force.[79][80]
Spruance judged that the need to throw something at the enemy as soon as possible was greater than the need to coordinate the attack by aircraft of different types and speeds (fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers). Accordingly, American squadrons were launched piecemeal and proceeded to the target in several different groups. It was accepted that the lack of coordination would diminish the impact of the American attacks and increase their casualties, but Spruance calculated that this was worthwhile, since keeping the Japanese under aerial attack impaired their ability to launch a counterstrike (Japanese tactics preferred fully constituted attacks), and he gambled that he would find Nagumo with his flight decks at their most vulnerable.[79][80]
American carrier aircraft had difficulty locating the target, despite the positions they had been given. The strike from Hornet, led by Commander Stanhope C. Ring, followed an incorrect heading of 263 degrees rather than the 240 degrees indicated by the contact report. As a result, Air Group Eight's dive bombers missed the Japanese carriers.[81][page needed] Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8, from Hornet), led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, broke formation from Ring and followed the correct heading. However, the 10 F4Fs from Hornet had run out of fuel and had to ditch.[82]
Waldron's squadron sighted the enemy carriers and began attacking at 09:20, followed by Torpedo Squadron 6 (VT-6, fromEnterprise) whose Wildcat fighter escorts also ran low on fuel and had to turn back[82] at 09:40.[83] Without fighter escort, all fifteen TBD Devastators of VT-8 were shot down without being able to inflict any damage, with Ensign George Gay the only survivor. VT-6 lost 10 of their 14 Devastators, and 10 of Yorktown's VT-3's 12 Devastators were shot down with no hits to show for their effort, thanks in part to the abysmal performance of their Mark 13 torpedoes.[84]
Senior Navy and Bureau of Ordnance officers never questioned why half a dozen torpedoes, released so close to the Japanese carriers, produced no results.[85] The Japanese combat air patrol, flying Mitsubishi A6M2 Zeros[86] made short work of the unescorted, slow, under-armed TBDs. A few TBDs managed to get within a few ship-lengths range of their targets before dropping their torpedoes—close enough to be able to strafe the enemy ships and force the Japanese carriers to make sharp evasive maneuvers—but all of their torpedoes either missed or failed to explode.[87] Midway was the last time that the TBD Devastator was used in combat.
Despite their failure to score any hits, the American torpedo attacks indirectly achieved three important results. First, they kept the Japanese carriers off balance and unable to prepare and launch their own counterstrike. Second, they pulled the Japanese combat air patrol (CAP) out of position. Third, many of the Zeros ran low on ammunition and fuel.[88] The appearance of a third torpedo plane attack from the southeast by Torpedo Squadron 3 (VT-3 from Yorktown) at 10:00 very quickly drew the majority of the Japanese CAP to the southeast quadrant of the fleet.[89] Better discipline, and the employment of a greater number of Zeroes for the CAP might have enabled Nagumo to prevent (or at least mitigate the damage caused by) the coming American attacks.[90]
By chance, at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese, three squadrons of SBDs from Enterprise and Yorktown(VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3, respectively) were approaching from the southwest and northeast. The Yorktown squadron (VB-3) had flown just behind VT-3 but elected to attack from a different course. The two squadrons from Enterprise were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy. However, squadron commander C. Wade McClusky, Jr.decided to continue the search, and by good fortune spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyer Arashi, steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after having unsuccessfully depth-charged U.S. submarine Nautilus, which had earlier unsuccessfully attacked the battleship Kirishima.[91] Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced.[92]
McClusky's decision to continue the search and his judgment, in the opinion of Admiral Chester Nimitz, "decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway ..."[93] All three American dive-bomber squadrons (VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3) arrived almost simultaneously at the perfect time, locations and altitudes to attack.[94] Most of the Japanese CAP was focusing on the torpedo planes of VT-3 and were out of position, armed Japanese strike aircraft filled the hangar decks, fuel hoses snaked across the decks as refueling operations were hastily being completed, and the repeated change of ordnance meant that bombs and torpedoes were stacked around the hangars, rather than stowed safely in the magazines,[95] making the Japanese carriers extraordinarily vulnerable.
Beginning at 10:22, the two squadrons of Enterprise's air group split up with the intention of sending one squadron each to attack Kaga and Akagi. However, a miscommunication caused both of the squadrons to dive at the Kaga. Recognizing the error, Lieutenant Commander Richard Halsey Best and his two wingmen were able to pull out of their dive and headed north to attack Akagi. Coming under an onslaught of bombs from almost two full squadrons, Kaga sustained four or five direct hits, which caused heavy damage and started multiple fires. One of the bombs landed near the bridge, killing CaptainJisaku Okada and most of the ship's senior officers.[87]
Several minutes later, Best and his two wingmen dove on the Akagi. Although Akagi sustained only one direct hit (almost certainly dropped by Lieutenant Commander Best), it proved to be a fatal blow; the bomb struck the edge of the mid-ship deck elevator and penetrated to the upper hangar deck, where it exploded among the armed and fueled aircraft in the vicinity. Another bomb exploded underwater very close astern; the resulting geyser bent the flight deck upward and caused crucial rudder damage.[nb 10][87]
Simultaneously, Yorktown's VB-3, commanded by Max Leslie, went for Sōryū, scoring at least three hits and causing extensive damage. VT-3 targeted Hiryū, which was hemmed in by Sōryū, Kaga, and Akagi, but achieved no hits.[96]
Within six minutes, Sōryū and Kaga were ablaze from stem to stern, as fires continued to spread through the ships. Akagi, having been struck by only one bomb, took longer to burn, but the resulting fires quickly expanded and soon proved impossible to extinguish; she too was eventually consumed by the flames and had to be abandoned. Despite initial hopes that Akagi could be saved or at least towed back to Japan, all three carriers were eventually abandoned andscuttled.[96][nb 11]
Japanese counterattacks[edit]
Hiryū, the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier, wasted little time in counterattacking. Hiryū's first attack wave, consisting of 18 dive bombers and six fighter escorts, followed the retreating American aircraft and attacked the first carrier they encountered, Yorktown, hitting her with three bombs, which blew a hole in the deck, snuffed out her boilers, and destroyed several anti-aircraft turrets. Despite the damage, repair teams were able to plank over the flight deck and restore power to several boilers within an hour, giving her a speed of 19 knots and enabling her to resume air operations. Twelve Japanese dive bombers and four escorting fighters were lost in this attack.
Approximately one hour later, Hiryū's second attack wave, consisting of ten torpedo bombers and six escorting A6Ms, arrived over the Yorktown; however, the repair efforts had been so effective that the Japanese pilots assumed thatYorktown must be a different, undamaged carrier.[98] In the subsequent attack,Yorktown was struck by two torpedoes; she lost all power and developed a 26-degree list to port, which put her out of action and forced Admiral Fletcher to move his command staff to the heavy cruiser Astoria. Neither of the carriers of Spruance's Task Force 16 was damaged.[99]
News of the two strikes, with the reports each had sunk an American carrier (actually both strikes had damaged, but not sunk, Yorktown), greatly improved morale in the Kido Butai. Its few surviving aircraft were all recovered aboard Hiryū. Despite the heavy losses, the Japanese believed that they could scrape together enough aircraft for one more strike against what was believed to be the only remaining American carrier.[100]
American counterattack[edit]
Late in the afternoon, a Yorktown scout aircraft located Hiryū, prompting Enterprise to launch a final strike of dive bombers (including 10 SBDs from Yorktown). Despite Hiryū being defended by a strong cover of more than a dozen Zero fighters, the attack by Enterprise was successful: four, possibly five bombs hit Hiryū, leaving her ablaze and unable to operate aircraft.Hornet's strike, launched late because of a communications error, concentrated on the remaining escort ships but failed to score any hits.[101]
After futile attempts at controlling the blaze, most of the crew remaining on Hiryū were evacuated and the remainder of the fleet continued sailing northeast in an attempt to intercept the American carriers. Hiryū stayed afloat for several more hours, being discovered early the next morning by an aircraft from the escort carrier Hōshō and prompting hopes she could be saved, or at least towed back to Japan. However, soon after being spotted, Hiryū sank. Rear Admiral Yamaguchi chose to go down with his ship, costing Japan perhaps her best carrier officer.[101]
As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to abandon the derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close with Nagumo during the day and persisted as night fell.[103]
Finally, fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces[103]and believing Yamamoto still intended to invade,[104] Spruance changed course and withdrew to the east, turning back west towards the enemy at midnight.[105]For his part, Yamamoto initially decided to continue the engagement and sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers. Simultaneously, he detached a cruiser raiding force to bombard the island. The Japanese surface forces failed to make contact with the Americans due to Spruance's decision to briefly withdraw eastward, and Yamamoto ordered a general withdrawal to the west.[106] [nb 12]
Spruance failed to regain contact with Yamamoto's forces on 5 June despite extensive searches. Towards the end of the day he launched a search-and-destroy mission to seek out any remnants of Nagumo's carrier force. This late afternoon strike narrowly missed detecting Yamamoto's main body, and failed to score hits on a straggling Japanese destroyer. The strike planes returned to the carriers after nightfall, prompting Spruance to order Enterprise and Hornet to turn on their lights to aid the landings.[108][nb 13]
At 02:15 on the night of 5/6 June, Commander John Murphy's Tambor, lying some 90 nautical miles (100 miles; 170 kilometres) west of Midway, made the second of the submarine force's two major contributions to the battle's outcome, although its impact was heavily blunted by Murphy himself.[109] Sighting several ships, neither Murphy nor his executive officer, Ray Spruance, Jr., could identify them. Uncertain of whether they were friendly or not and unwilling to approach any closer to verify their heading or type, Murphy decided to send a vague report of "four large ships" to Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC). This report was passed on by English to Nimitz, who then sent it to Spruance. Spruance, a former submarine commander, was "understandably furious" at the vagueness of Murphy's report, as it provided him with little more than suspicion and no concrete information on which to make his preparations.[110]Unaware of the exact location of Yamamoto's "Main Body" (a persistent problem since the time PBYs had first sighted the Japanese), Spruance was forced to assume the "four large ships" reported by Tambor represented the main invasion force, and thus he moved to block it while staying some 100 nautical miles (120 miles; 190 kilometres) northeast of Midway.[111]
In reality, the ships sighted by Tambor were the smaller detachment of four cruisers and two destroyers Yamamoto had sent to bombard Midway. At 02:55 these ships received Yamamoto's order to retire and changed course to comply.[111] At about the same time as the course change, Tambor was sighted, and during maneuvers designed to avoid a submarine attack Mogami and Mikuma collided, inflicting serious damage to Mogami's bow. The less severely damaged Mikumaslowed to 12 knots (22 kilometres per hour; 14 miles per hour) to keep pace.[112] Only at 04:12 did the sky brighten enough for Murphy to be certain the ships were Japanese, by which time staying surfaced was hazardous, and he dived to approach for an attack. The attack was unsuccessful, and at around 06:00 he finally reported two westbound Mogami-class cruisers before diving again and playing no further role in the battle.[113] Limping along on a straight course at 12 knots—roughly one-third their top speed and only 1 knot faster than Tambor while submerged—Mogami and Mikuma had been almost perfect targets for a submarine attack; Spruance had Murphy immediately relieved of duty and reassigned to a shore station when Tambor returned to port, citing his confusing contact report, poor torpedo shooting during his attack run and general lack of aggression, especially as compared to Nautilus, the oldest of the 12 boats at Midway and the only one who had successfully placed a torpedo on target (albeit a dud).[109][110]
Over the following two days, first Midway and then Spruance's carriers launched several strikes against the stragglers.Mikuma was eventually sunk by Dauntlesses,[114] while Mogami survived further severe damage to return home for repairs. The destroyers Arashio and Asashio were also bombed and strafed during the last of these attacks.[115] Captain Richard E. Fleming, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator, was killed while executing a glide bomb run on Mikuma and was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.[116]
Meanwhile, salvage efforts on Yorktown were encouraging, and she was taken in tow by USS Vireo. In the late afternoon of 6 June, however, the Japanese submarine I-168, which had managed to slip through the cordon of destroyers (possibly due to the large amount of debris in the water), fired a salvo of torpedoes, two of which struck Yorktown. There were only few casualties aboard, since most of the crew had already been evacuated, but a third torpedo from this salvo struck the destroyer USS Hammann, which had been providing auxiliary power to Yorktown. Hammann broke in two and sank with the loss of 80 lives, mostly due to her own depth charges exploding. With further salvage efforts deemed hopeless, the remaining repair crews were evacuated from Yorktown, which sank just after 05:00 on 7 June.[117]
Japanese casualties[edit]
By the time the battle ended, 3,057 Japanese had died. Casualties aboard the four carriers were: Akagi: 267; Kaga: 811; Hiryu: 392; Soryu: 711; a total of 2,181.[118] The heavy cruisers Mikuma (sunk; 700 casualties) and Mogami(badly damaged; 92) accounted for another 792 deaths.[119]
In addition, the destroyers Arashio (bombed; 35) and Asashio (strafed by aircraft; 21) were both damaged during the air attacks which sank Mikuma and caused further damage to Mogami. Floatplanes were lost from the cruisersChikuma (3) and Tone (2). Dead aboard the destroyers Tanikaze (11), Arashi(1), Kazagumo (1) and the fleet oiler Akebono Maru (10) made up the remaining 23 casualties.[nb 14]
Aftermath[edit]
After winning a clear victory, and as pursuit became too hazardous near Wake,[120] American forces retired. Spruance once again withdrew to the east to refuel his destroyers and rendezvous with the carrier Saratoga, which was ferrying much-needed replacement aircraft. Fletcher transferred his flag toSaratoga and resumed command of the carrier force. The American carriers eventually returned to Pearl Harbor.[121]
Historian Samuel E. Morison wrote in 1949 that Spruance was subjected to much criticism for not pursuing the retreating Japanese, thus allowing their surface fleet to escape.[122] Clay Blair argued in 1975 that had Spruance pressed on, he would have been unable to launch his aircraft after nightfall, and his cruisers would have been overwhelmed by Yamamoto's powerful surface units, including Yamato.[120] Furthermore, as pointed out by Parshall and Tully, the American airgroups had suffered considerable losses, including most of their torpedo bombers. This made it unlikely that they would be effective in an airstrike against the Japanese Battleships, even if they had managed to catch them during daytime.[123] Also, by this time Spruance's destroyers were critically low on fuel.[124][125]
On 10 June, the Imperial Japanese Navy conveyed to the military liaison conference an incomplete picture of the results of the battle. Chūichi Nagumo's detailed battle report was submitted to the high command on 15 June. It was intended only for the highest echelons in the Japanese Navy and government, and was guarded closely throughout the war. In it, one of the more striking revelations is the comment on the Mobile Force Commander's (Nagumo's) estimates: "The enemy is not aware of our plans (we were not discovered till early in the morning of the 5th at the earliest)."[126] In reality, the whole operation had been compromised from the very beginning due to Allied code-breaking efforts that would crucially disadvantage future Japanese operations throughout the war.
The Japanese public and much of the military command structure were kept in the dark about the extent of the defeat: Japanese news announced a great victory. Only Emperor Hirohito and the highest Navy command personnel were accurately informed of the carrier and pilot losses. Consequently, even the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) continued to believe, for at least a short time, that the fleet was in good condition.[127]
On the return of the Japanese fleet to Hashirajima on 14 June the wounded were immediately transferred to naval hospitals; most were classified as "secret patients", placed in isolation wards and quarantined from other patients and their own families to keep this major defeat secret.[128] The remaining officers and men were quickly dispersed to other units of the fleet and, without being allowed to see family or friends, were shipped to units in the South Pacific, where the majority were killed.[129] None of the flag officers or staff of the Combined Fleet was penalized, with Nagumo later being placed in command of the rebuilt carrier force.[130]
The Japanese Navy learned some lessons from Midway: new procedures were adopted whereby more aircraft were refueled and re-armed on the flight deck, rather than in the hangars, and the practice of draining all unused fuel lines was adopted. The new carriers being built were redesigned to incorporate only two flight deck elevators and new firefighting equipment. More carrier crew members were trained in damage-control and firefighting techniques, although the losses later in the war of Shōkaku, Hiyō, and especially Taihō suggest that there were still problems in this area.[131]
Replacement pilots were pushed through an abbreviated training regimen in order to meet the short-term needs of the fleet. However, this led to a sharp decline in the quality of the aviators produced. These inexperienced pilots were fed into front-line units, while the veterans who remained after Midway and the Solomons campaign were forced to share an increased workload as conditions grew more desperate, with few being given a chance to rest in rear areas or in the home islands. As a result, Japanese naval air groups as a whole progressively deteriorated during the war while their American adversaries continued to improve.[132]
American prisoners[edit]
Three U.S. airmen, Ensign Wesley Osmus (pilot, Yorktown), Ensign Frank O'Flaherty (pilot, Enterprise) and Aviation Machinist's Mate B. F. (or B. P.) Bruno Gaido (radioman-gunner of O'Flaherty's SBD) were captured by the Japanese during the battle. Osmus was held on the Arashi, with O'Flaherty and Gaido on the cruiser Nagara (or destroyer Makigumo, sources vary); all three were interrogated, and then killed by being tied to water-filled kerosene cans and thrown overboard to drown.[133] The report filed by Admiral Nagumo tersely states of Ensign Osmus, "He died on 6 June and was buried at sea"; O'Flaherty and Gaido's fates were not mentioned.[nb 15]
Impact[edit]
The Battle of Midway has often been called "the turning point of the Pacific".[134] However, the Japanese continued to try to secure more strategic territory in the South Pacific, and the U.S. did not move from a state of naval parity to one of increasing supremacy until after several more months of hard combat.[135] Thus, although Midway was the Allies' first major victory against the Japanese, it did not radically change the course of the war; instead it was the cumulative effects of the battles of Coral Sea and Midway that reduced Japan's ability to undertake major offensives.[9]
In addition Midway paved the way for the landings on Guadalcanal, and the prolonged attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, both of which finally allowed the Allies to take the strategic initiative and swing onto the offensive for the rest of the Pacific War.[136] Finally, Midway bought the United States valuable time until the first of the new Essex-class fleet carriers became available at the end of 1942.[137]
The battle also showed the worth of pre-war naval cryptanalysis and intelligence-gathering. These efforts continued and were expanded throughout the war in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Successes were numerous and significant. For instance, Navy cryptanalysis made possible the shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto's airplane.
Some authors have stated heavy losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy.[138] Parshall and Tully, however, have stated that the losses in veteran aircrew, while heavy (110, just under 25% of the aircrew embarked on the four carriers),[139] were not crippling to the Japanese naval air-corps as a whole: the Japanese navy had some 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrew at the start of the Pacific war.[140]
A few months after Midway, the JNAF sustained similar casualty rates at both the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of Santa Cruz, and it was these battles, combined with the constant attrition of veterans during the Solomons campaign, which were the catalyst for the sharp downward spiral in operational capability.[141] However, the loss of four large fleet carriers, and over 40% of the carriers' highly trained aircraft mechanics and technicians, plus the essential flight-deck crews and armorers, and the loss of organizational knowledge embodied by such highly trained crew, were heavy blows to the Japanese carrier fleet.[141][nb 16]
After the battle Shōkaku and Zuikaku were the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike-force left for offensive actions. Of Japan's other carriers, Taihō, which was not commissioned until early 1944, would be the only fleet carrier worth teaming with Shōkaku and Zuikaku; Ryūjō and Zuihō were light carriers, while Junyo and Hiyō, although technically classified as fleet carriers, were second-rate ships of comparatively limited effectiveness.[142] By the time of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Japanese had nearly rebuilt their carrier forces in terms of numbers, but their planes, many of which were obsolescent, were largely flown by inexperienced and poorly trained pilots. [nb 17]
In the time it took Japan to build three carriers, the U.S. Navy commissioned more than two dozen fleet and light fleet carriers, and numerous escort carriers.[143] By 1942 the United States was already three years into a shipbuilding program mandated by the Second Vinson Act, intended to make the navy larger than Japan's.[144] The greater number of USN aviators survived the Battle of Midway and subsequent battles of 1942, and combined with growing pilot training programs, the US accumulated a large number of skilled pilots to complement its material advantages in ships and planes.
Discovery of sunken vessels[edit]
Because of the extreme depth of the ocean in the area of the battle (more than 17,000 ft or 5,200 m), researching the battlefield has presented extraordinary difficulties. However, on 19 May 1998, Robert Ballard and a team of scientists and Midway veterans from both sides located and photographed Yorktown. The ship was remarkably intact for a vessel that sank in 1942; much of the original equipment and even the original paint scheme were still visible.[145]
Ballard's subsequent search for the Japanese carriers was ultimately unsuccessful. In September 1999, a joint expedition between Nauticos Corp. and the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office searched for the Japanese aircraft carriers. Using advanced renavigation techniques in conjunction with the ship's log of the submarine USS Nautilus, the expedition located a large piece of wreckage, subsequently identified as having come from the upper hangar deck of Kaga.[146] The main wreck of the Kaga, however, has yet to be located.
Remembrances[edit]
Chicago Municipal Airport, important to the war effort in World War II, was renamedChicago Midway International Airport (or simply Midway Airport) in 1949 in honor of the battle.
Waldron Field, an outlying training landing strip, at Corpus Christi NAS as well Waldron Road leading to the strip, was named in honor of the commander of USSHornet's Torpedo Squadron 8. Yorktown Blvd leading away from the strip was named for the U.S. carrier sunk in the battle.
An escort carrier, USS Midway (CVE-63) was commissioned on 17 August 1943. She was renamed St. Lo on 10 October 1944 to clear the name Midway for a large fleet aircraft carrier, USS Midway (CV-41), commissioned on 10 September 1945, eight days after the Japanese surrender, and now docked in San Diego, California as the USS Midway Museum.
On 13 September 2000, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt designated the lands and waters of Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge as the Battle of Midway National Memorial.
| Kakuji Kakuta | |
|---|---|
Kakuji Kakuta
| |
| Born | September 23, 1890 Niigata Prefecture, Japan |
| Died | August 2, 1944 (aged 53)[1] Tinian, Mariana Islands |
| Allegiance | Empire of Japan |
| Service/branch |  Imperial Japanese Navy |
| Years of service | 1911-1944 |
| Rank | Vice Admiral |
| Commands held | Kiso, Iwate, Yamashiro, Nagato Carrier Division 4 Second Carrier Striking Force First Air Fleet |
| Battles/wars | |
In this Japanese name, the family name is "Kakuta".
Kakuji Kakuta (角田 覚治 Kakuta Kakuji?, 23 September 1890 – 2 August 1944), was an admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy duringWorld War II. He is noted for his role in commanding Japanese naval aviation units in the Pacific War.
Biography[edit]
Kakuta was a native of rural Minamikanbara, Niigata Prefecture, Japan. He graduated from the 39th class of the Imperial Japanese Navy Academy, scoring 45th out of a class of 145 cadets in 1911. He served as midshipman on the cruiser Aso and battlecruiser Ibuki. On commissioning as ensign, he was assigned to the cruiser Chiyoda. Later, as a lieutenant, he served on the battleship Settsu and the cruiserAzuma during World War I. He then served on the battleship Kirishima,destroyer Yanagi, and was chief gunner on the cruisers Suma andTenryū.
Kakuta was appointed as equipment officer on the cruiser Yubari in 1923. He then attended the 23rd class of the Naval Staff College, and was promoted to lieutenant commander upon graduation. In 1926, he served as chief gunner on the cruiser Furutaka and subsequently in a number of staff positions. His first command was the cruiser Kiso, beginning on 10 March 1934. He subsequently commanded cruisersFurutaka and Iwate, and battleships Yamashiro and Nagato. He was promoted to rear admiral on 15 November 1939.
At the start of the Pacific War in December 1941, Kakuta was in command of Carrier Division 4, consisting of the aircraft carrier Ryūjō, which provided air support for landings of Japanese forces in thePhilippines.[2] Kakuta also participated in the Indian Ocean Raid against British bases in India and Ceylon in early 1942.
During the Battle of Midway in June 1942, Kakuta commanded a task force consisting of carriers Ryūjō and Jun'yō that conducted air raids against Dutch Harbor as part of the initial stages of the Aleutian Islands Campaign.
| Chūichi Nagumo | |
|---|---|
Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo
| |
| Born | March 25, 1887 Yonezawa, Yamagata Japan |
| Died | July 6, 1944 (aged 57)[1] Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands |
| Allegiance | Empire of Japan |
| Service/branch | Imperial Japanese Navy |
| Years of service | 1908-1944 |
| Rank | Admiral |
| Unit | Kido Butai |
| Commands held | Aki, Hatsuyuki, Kirishima, Sugi,Kisaragi, Momi, Naka, Takao,Yamashiro 11th Destroyer Division, 8th Cruiser Division, 3rd Cruiser Division, Kido Butai, 1st Carrier Division, First Air Fleet, IJN 3rd Fleet, Sasebo Naval District,Kure Naval District, First Fleet,Central Pacific Area Fleet,Fourteenth Air Fleet[2] |
| Battles/wars | World War II Attack on Pearl Harbor Bombing of Darwin Indian Ocean Raid Battle of Midway Battle of the Eastern Solomons Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands |
| Awards | Order of the Rising Sun (3rd class) Order of the Rising Sun (4th class) Order of the Golden Kite (3rd class) Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure (1st class)[2] |
In this Japanese name, the family name is "Nagumo".
Chūichi Nagumo (南雲 忠一 Nagumo Chūichi?, March 25, 1887 – July 6, 1944) was a Japanese admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy duringWorld War II and onetime commander of the Kido Butai (the carrier battle group).[3] He committed suicide during the Battle of Saipan.
Early life[edit]
Nagumo was born in the city ofYonezawa, Yamagata Prefecture in northern Japan in 1887. He graduated from the 36th class of theImperial Japanese Naval Academy in 1908, with a ranking of 8 out of a class of 191 cadets. As amidshipman, he served in theprotected cruisers Soya and Niitakaand the armored cruiser Nisshin. After his promotion to ensign in 1910, he was assigned to cruiser Asama.
After attending torpedo and naval artillery schools, he was promoted to sub-lieutenant and served in the battleship Aki, followed by thedestroyer Hatsuyuki. In 1914, he was promoted to lieutenant and was assigned to the battlecruiser Kirishima, followed by the destroyer Sugi. He was assigned his first command, the destroyer Kisaragi, on 15 December 1917.
Nagumo graduated from the Naval War College, and was promoted tolieutenant commander in 1920. His specialty was torpedo and destroyer tactics. From 1920 to 1921, he was captain of the destroyer Momi, but was soon sent to shore duty with various assignments by the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff. He became a commander in 1924. From 1925 to 1926, Nagumo accompanied a Japanese mission to study naval warfare strategy, tactics, and equipment in Europe and the United States.
After his return to Japan, Nagumo served as an instructor at the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy from 1927 to 1929. Nagumo was promoted to captain in November 1929 and assumed command of the light cruiser Naka and from 1930 to 1931 was commander of the 11th Destroyer Division. After serving in administrative positions from 1931 to 1933, he assumed command of the heavy cruiser Takao from 1933 to 1934, and the battleshipYamashiro from 1934 to 1935. He was promoted to rear admiral on 1 November 1935.
As a Rear Admiral, Nagumo commanded the 8th Cruiser Division to support Imperial Japanese Army movements in China from the Yellow Sea. As a leading officer of the militaristic Fleet Faction, he also received a boost in his career from political forces.
From 1937 to 1938, he was Commandant of the Torpedo School, and from 1938 to 1939, he was commander of the 3rd Cruiser Division. Nagumo was promoted to vice admiral on 15 November 1939. From November 1940-April 1941, Nagumo was Commandant of the Naval War College.
World War II[edit]
On 10 April 1941, Nagumo was appointed commander-in-chief of the First Air Fleet, the Imperial Japanese Navy′s mainaircraft carrier force, largely due to his seniority. Many contemporaries and historians have doubted his suitability for this command, given his lack of familiarity with naval aviation.
By this time, he had visibly aged, physically and mentally. Physically, he suffered from arthritis, perhaps from his younger days as a kendoka.[4] Mentally, he had become a cautious officer who worked hard going over tactical plans of every operation he was involved in.[citation needed]
Admiral Nishizo Tsukahara had some doubts with his appointment, and commented, "Nagumo was an officer of the old school, a specialist of torpedo and surface maneuvers.... He did not have any idea of the capability and potential of naval aviation." At home, Nagumo did not receive a loving description, either. One of his two sons described him as a brooding father who was obsessed (and later disappointed) with pressuring his sons to follow his footsteps into the navy. By contrast, Nagumo's junior officers in the navy viewed him as precisely the father figure his sons did not.[4]
However, despite his lack of experience, he was a strong advocate of combining sea and air power. Nevertheless, he was opposed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's plan to attack the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor.[5] While commanding the First Air Fleet, Nagumo oversaw the effective attack on Pearl Harbor, but he was later criticized for his failure to launch a third attack,[6] which might have destroyed the fuel oil storage and repair facilities which would have rendered the most important American naval base in the Pacific useless, and the submarine base and intelligence station, which were the main factors in Japan's defeat.[7]
Nagumo was surrounded by able lieutenants such as Minoru Genda and Mitsuo Fuchida. He also fought well in the early 1942 campaigns. He was the fleet commander during the Bombing of Darwin and his Indian Ocean raid on the British Eastern Fleet was a success, sinking an aircraft carrier, two cruisers and two destroyers, and causing Admiral Sir James Somerville to retreat to East Africa.
At the end of his trip into the Indian Ocean, Nagumo's personal score card saw five battleships, one carrier, two cruisers, seven destroyers, dozens of merchantmen, transports, and various other vessels. He was also responsible for downing hundreds of Allied aircraft from six nations. Destruction brought upon Allied ports also disabled or slowed Allied operations. All the while, he had lost no more than a few dozen pilots.[4]
However, at the Battle of Midway, Nagumo's near-perfect record finally came to an end. His Carrier Striking Task Force lost four carriers in what proved to be the turning point of the Pacific War, and the massive losses of carrier aircraft maintenance personnel would prove decisive to the performance of the Japanese navy in later engagements. Although 110 carrier aircrewmen were lost during the battle, their loss was not as cataclysmic as the loss of the four carriers, their aircraft, and the men responsible for their maintenance.[citation needed]
Afterwards, Nagumo was reassigned as commander-in-chief of the Third Fleet and commanded aircraft carriers in theGuadalcanal campaign, but his actions there were largely indecisive, and he slowly frittered away much of Japan's maritime strength.
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