Sunday, August 3, 2014

ALTHOUGH SPORADIC ACTION CONTINUED THE NEXT DAY...

Although sporadic action continued the next day, the main engagement ended with the sinking of the carrier Lexington.  Both sides withdrew, licking their wounds.  Often called the battle of the blunders, Coral Sea was a tactical victory for the Japanese and a strategic victory for the United States.  More to the point, the invasion of Port Moresby was decisively turned back–and in that one finds a degree of compensation for the loss of the carrier.  On the other side of the coin, the Japanese had lost Shoho and the air groups of the damaged Shokaku and Zuikaku were sorely depleted, thus depriving the enemy of the conceivable "difference" in the upcoming Battle of Midway.
     Now let us discuss the second and greater advance building up at this time, the one into the Central Pacific, which quite rightly alarmed Nimitz even more.  Japan viewed Midway–the outermost link of the Hawaiian chain, and some 1,135 miles from Pearl Harbor–as "a sentry for Hawaii."  It was the king pin in Yamamoto's grand strategy for the conquest of the United States.  Less than six miles in diameter,  Midway was discovered by an American sailing master in 1859 and shortly thereafter was claimed for this country by U.S.S. Lackawanna.  The island is guarded by two islets, Sand and Eastern, through which one approaches a deep green lagoon.  Over the years until 1942 Midway's principal occupants were "gooney birds" (a variety of albatross), Japanese feather hunters, a Pan-American Airways terminal, and the Navy, including a small contingent of Marine fighter planes.  With the island in Japanese hands, Yamamoto's carriers would have a fixed fueling base and a much desired point from which her forces could draw the United States Pacific Fleet into a decisive engagement.

     The Japanese formula or victory was as follows:  1) a diversionary raid by her Second Mobile Force in the Western Aleutians to confuse Nimitz;  2)  an air raid on Midway by the Carrier Striking Force to soften up the island for a 5000-man invasion; and 3)  the Aleutians force to take up a position between Midway and the Aleutians in the event Nimitz came out to fight.  These were the essentials.  Yamamoto assumed that Nimitz would not let Midway go by default, thus giving him a chance to exploit the superior firepower of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
     Correctly anticipating his opposite number's strategy, Nimitz hastily arranged his sea power.  Of his carriers, Yorktown, having returned May 27 damaged from the Coral Sea, was in drydock and was not available until May 31, after fabulously swift repairs by the yard.  Enterprise, just returned from the Doolittle Raid, was available with a trained air group.  Hornet's air group lacked battle experience, while Saratoga was still on the West Coast.  Moreover Halsey, who missed the battle of his life, was in Pearl Harbor hospital with a cast of hives.  (Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, a non-aviator, had an air staff, while Fletcher, also a non-aviator, had none.  Nimitz therefore let the junior admiral exercise independent command.)
     Nimitz formed and positioned a Northern Pacific Force consisting of five heavy and light cruisers and ten destroyers.  He then bolstered Midway's meager defenses with as many guns and planes as he could muster and sent the rest of the United States Pacific Fleet in two task forces to sea: three carriers, eight heavy and light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, twenty-five submarines, and two fleet oilers.  Along the outer Hawaiian chain Nimitz stationed ten picket ships and a Midway Fueling group of two destroyers and an oiler.
     Yamamoto's three forces aggregated five carriers, eleven battleships, including the 18.1 inch Yamato, his flagship, fourteen heavy and light cruisers, fifty-eight destroyers, seventeen submarines and more than two score of the train.  However, a substantial part of this force, including one carrier, was assigned to the Aleutians Diversionary Attack.
     The Battle of Midway is recounted in five parts.

--S.E. Smith
From: The United States Navy in World War II
Preface to Part III: Chapter 7: Midway Preliminaries                         

No comments:

Post a Comment