P.Q. 17

     In view of the disaster to P.Q. 17 the Admiralty proposed to suspend the Arctic convoys at least till the Northern ice-packs melted and receded and until perpetual daylight passed.  I felt this would be a very grave decision, and was inclined not to lower but on the contrary to raise the stakes, on the principle of 'In defeat defiance.'

     Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord                                                                 15 July 42

          Let the following be examined:

          Suspend the sailing of P.Q. 18 as now proposed from 18th instant.  See what happens to our

     Malta operation.  If all goes well, bring Indomitable, Victorious, Argus, and Eagle north to Scapa,

     together with all available 'Didos' and at least twenty-five destroyers.  Let the two 16-inch

     battleships go right through under this air umbrella and destroyer screen, keeping southward, not

     hugging the ice, but seeking the clearest weather, and thus fight it out with the enemy.  If we can

     move our armada in convoy under an umbrella of at least a hundred fighter aircraft we ought to be

     able to fight our way through and out again, and if a fleet action results so much the better.

     I could not however persuade my Admiralty friends to take this kind of line, which of course involved engaging a vital force to us out of proportion to the actual military importance of the Arctic convoys.  I had therefore to send the following telegram to Stalin, about which I obtained the approval of the President beforehand.

     Prime Minister to Premier Stalin                                                                                          17 July 42

          We began running small convoys to North Russia in August 1941, and until December the

     Germans did not take any steps to interfere with them.  From February 1942 the size of the convoys

     was increased, and the Germans then moved a considerable force of U-boats and a large number of

     aircraft to North Norway and made determined attacks on the convoys.  By giving the convoys the

     strongest possible escorts of destroyers and anti-submarine craft the convoys got through with

     varying but not prohibitive losses.  It is evident that the Germans were dissatisfied with the results

     which were being achieved by means of aircraft and U-boats alone, because they began to use their

     surface forces against the convoys.  Luckily for us however at the outset they made use of their

     heavy surface forces to the westward of Bear Island and their submarines to the eastward.  The

     Home Fleet was thus in a position to prevent an attack by enemy surface forces.  Before the May

     convoy was sent off the Admiralty warned us that the losses would be very severe if, as was

     expected, the Germans employed their surface forces to the eastward of Bear Island.  We decided

     however to sail the convoy.  An attack by surface ships did not materialize, and the convoy got

     through with a loss of one-sixth, chiefly from air attack.  In the case of P.Q. 17 however the

     Germans at last used their forces in a manner we had always feared.  They concentrated their U

     boats to the westward of Bear Island and reserved their surface forces for attack to the eastward of

     Bear Island.  The final story of P. Q. 17 convoy is not yet clear.  At the moment only four ships

     have arrived at Archangel, but six others are in Nova Zembla harbors.  The latter may however be

     attacked from the air at any time.  At the best therefore only one-third will have survived.

          I must explain the dangers and difficulties of these convoy operations when the enemy's battle

     squadron takes its station in the extreme north.  We do not think it right to risk our Home Fleet west

     of Bear Island or where it can be brought under the attack of the powerful German shore-based

     aircraft.  If one or two of our very few most powerful battleships were to be lost or even seriously

     damaged while Tirpitz and her consorts, soon to be joined by Scharnhorst, remained in action, the

     whole command of the Atlantic would be [temporarily] lost.  Beside affecting the food supplies by

     which we live, our war effort would be crippled; and above all the great convoys of American

     troops across the ocean, rising presently to as many as 80,000 in a month, would be prevented and

     the building up of a really strong Second Front in 1943 rendered impossible.

          My naval advisers tell me that if they had the handling of the German surface, submarine, and air

     forces, in present circumstances, they would guarantee the complete destruction of any convoy to

     North Russia.  They have not been able so far to hold out any hopes that convoys attempting to

     make the passage in perpetual daylight would fare better than P. Q. 17  It is therefore with the

     greatest regret that we have reached the conclusion that to attempt to run the next convoy, P. Q. 18,

     would bring no benefit to you and would only involve dead loss to the common cause.  At the same

     time, I give you my assurance that if we can devise arrangements which give a reasonable chance of

     at least a fair portion of the contents of the convoys reaching you we will start them again at once. 

     The crux of the problem is to make the Barents Sea as dangerous for German warships as they make

     it for ours.  This is what we should aim at doing with our joint resources.  I should like to send a

     senior officer of the R. A. F. to North Russia to confer with your officers and make a plan.

          Meanwhile we are prepared to dispatch immediately to the Persian Gulf some of the ships which

     were to have sailed in the P.Q. convoy. . . .

          You have referred to combined operations in the North.  The obstacles to sending further

     convoys at the present time equally prevent our sending land forces and air forces for operations in

     Northern Norway.  But our officers should forthwith consider together what combined operations

     may be possible in or after October, when there is a reasonable amount of darkness.  It would be

     better if you could send your officers here, but if this is impossible ours will come to you.

          In addition to a combined operation in the North, we are studying how to help on your southern

     flank.  If we can beat back Rommel we might be able to send powerful air forces in the autumn to

     operate on the left of your line.  The difficulties of maintaining these forces over the trans-Persian

     route without reducing your supplies will clearly be considerable, but I hope to put detailed

     proposals before you in the near future.  We must however first beat Rommel.  The battle is now

     intense. . . . 

          I am sure it would be in our common interest, Premier Stalin, to have three divisions of Poles you

     so kindly offered to join their compatriots in Palestine, where we can arm them fully.  These would

     play a most important part in future fighting, as well as keeping the Turks in good heart by the sense

     of growing numbers to the southward.  I hope this project of yours, which we greatly value, will not

     fall to the ground on account of the Poles wanting to bring with the troops a considerable mass of

     their women and children, who are largely dependent on the rations of the Polish soldiers.  The

     feeding of these dependents will be a considerable burden to us.  We think it well worth while

     bearing that burden for the sake of forming this Polish army, which will be used faithfully for our

     common advantage. We are very hard up for food ourselves in the Levant area, but there is enough

     in India if we can bring it [from] there.

          If we do not get the Poles we should have to fill their places by drawing on the preparations now

     going forward on a vast scale for the Anglo-American mass invasion of the COntinent.  These

     preparations have already led the Germans to withdraw two heavy bomber groups from South

     Russia to France.  Believe me, there is nothing that is useful and sensible that we and the Americans

     will not do to help you in your grand struggle.  The President and I are ceaselessly searching for

     means to overcome the extraordinary difficulties which geography, salt water, and the enemy's air

     power interpose.  I have shown this telegram to the President.

     I need scarcely say I got a rough and surly answer.

          Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill                                                                               23 July 42

          I received your message of 17 July.  Two conclusions could be drawn from it.  First, the British

     Government refuses to continue the sending of was materials to the Soviet Union via the Northern

     route.  Second, in spite of the agreed communiqué concerning the urgent tasks of creating a Second

     Front in 1942 the British Government postpones this matter until 1943.

          2.  Our naval experts consider the reasons put forward by the British naval experts to justify the

     cessation of convoys to the northern ports of the U.S.S.R. wholly unconvincing.  They are of the

     opinion that with goodwill and readiness to fulfill the contracted obligations these convoys could be

     regularly undertaken and heavy losses could be inflicted on the enemy.  Our experts find it also

     difficult to understand and to explain the order given by the Admiralty that the escorting vessels of

     the P.Q. 17 should return, whereas the cargo boats should disperse and try to reach the Soviet ports

     one by one without any protection at all.  Of course I do not think that regular convoys to the Soviet

     northern ports could be effected without risk or losses.  But in war-time no important undertaking

     could be effected without risks or losses.  In any case, I never expected that the British Government

     would stop dispatch of war materials to us just at the very moment when the Soviet Union in view

     of the serious situation on the Soviet-German front requires these materials more than ever.  It is

     obvious that the transport via Persian Gulf could in no way compensate for the cessation of convoys

     to the northern ports.

          3.  With regard to the second question, i.e., the question of creating a Second Front in Europe, I

     am afraid it is not being treated with the seriousness it deserves.  Taking fully into account the

     present position on the Soviet-German front, I must state in the most emphatic manner that the

     Soviet Government cannot acquiesce in the postponement of a Second front in Europe until 1943.

          I hope you will not feel offended that I [have] expressed frankly and honestly my own opinion as

     well as the opinion of my colleagues on the question raised in your message.

     These contentions are not well-founded.  So far from breaking 'contracted obligations' to deliver the war supplies at Soviet ports, it had been particularly stipulated at the time of making the agreement that the Russians were to be responsible for conveying them to Russia.  All that we did beyond this was a good-will effort.  As to the allegations of a breach of faith about the Second Front in 1942, our aide-mémoire was a solid defense.  I did not however think it worth while to argue out all this with the Soviet Government, who had been willing until they were themselves attacked to see us totally destroyed and share the booty with Hitler, and who even in our common struggle could hardly spare a word of sympathy for the heavy British and American losses incurred in trying to send them aid.

     The President agreed with this view.

     President to Formal Naval Person                                                                                      29 July 42

          I agree with you that your reply to Stalin must be handled with great care.  We have got always

     to bear in mind the personality of our ally and the very difficult and dangerous situation that

     confronts him.  No one can be expected to approach the war from a world point of view whose

     country had been invaded.  I think we should try to put ourselves in his place.  I think he should be

     told in the first place, quite specifically that we have determined upon a course of action in 1942.  I

     think that, without advising him of the precise nature of our proposed operations, the fact that they

     are going to be made should be told him without any qualifications.  

          While I think that you should not raise any false hopes in Stalin relative to the Northern convoy,

     nevertheless I agree with you that we should run one if there is any possibility of success, in spite of

     the great risk involved.

          I am still hopeful that we can put air-power directly on the Russian front, and I am discussing that

     matter here.  I believe it would be unwise to promise this air-power only on condition that the battle

     in Egypt goes well.  Russia's need is urgent and immediate,  I have a feeling it would mean a great

     deal to the Russian Army and the Russian people if they knew some of our Air FOrce was fighting

     with them in a very direct manner.

          While we may believe that the present and proposed use of our combined Air Forces is

     strategically the best, nevertheless I feel that Stalin does not agree with this.  Stalin, I imagine, is in

     no mood to engage in a theoretical strategical discussion, and I am sure that other than our major

     operation the enterprise that would suit him the best is direct air support on the southern end of his

     front.

     I therefore let Stalin's bitter message pass without any specific rejoinder.  After all, the Russian armies were suffering fearfully and the campaign was at its crisis.

*     *     *

     At a conference of the German Naval Commander-In-Chief with the Fuehrer on 26 August, 1942 Admiral Raeder stated:

          Evidently the Ally convoy did not sail.  We can thus assume that our submarines and aircraft,

     which totally destroyed the last convoy, have forced the enemy to give up this route temporarily, or

     even fundamentally to change his whole system of supply lines.  Supplies to northern ports of

     Russia remain decisive for the whole conduct of the war waged by the Anglo-Saxons.  They must

     preserve Russia's strength in order to keep German forces occupied.  The enemy will most probably

     continue to ship supplies to Northern Russia, and the Naval Staff must therefore maintain

     submarines along the same routes.  The greater part of the Fleet will also be stationed in Northern

     Norway.  The reason for this, besides making attacks on convoys possible, in the constant threat of

     an enemy invasion.  Only by keeping the Fleet in Norwegian waters can we hope to meet this

     danger successfully.  Besides, it is especially important, in view of the whole Axis strategy, that the

     German 'Fleet in Being' tie down the British Home Fleet, especially after the heavy Anglo

     American losses in the Mediterranean and the Pacific.  The Japanese are likewise aware of the

     importance of this measure. In addition, the danger of enemy mines in home waters had constantly

     increased, so that the naval forces should be shifted only for repairs and training purposes.

*     *     *

     It was not until September that another convoy set off for North Russia.  By now the scheme of defense had been revised, and the convoy was accompanied by a close escort of sixteen destroyers, as well as the first of the new escort carriers, the Avenger, with twelve fighter aircraft.  As before, strong support was provided by the fleet.  This time however the German surface ships made no attempt to intervene, but left the task of attack to aircraft and U-boats.  The result was a particularly fierce battle in the air, in which twenty-four enemy aircraft were destroyed out of about a hundred which came in to the attack.  Ten merchant ships were lost in these actions and two more by U-boats, but twenty-seven ships successfully fought their way through.

*     *     *

     Not only did almost the whole responsibility for the defense of these convoys fall upon us, but up to the end of 1942 . . . we provided from our strained resources by far the greater number of aircraft and more tanks for Russia.  The figures are a conclusive answer to those who suggest that our efforts to help Russia in her struggle were lukewarm.  We gave our heart's blood resolutely to our valiant, suffering Ally.

*     *     *

     The year 1942 was not to close without its flash of triumph upon the thankless task the Royal Navy had discharged, and we must trench upon the future.  After the passage of P.Q. 18 in September 1942 convoys to North Russia were again suspended.  Later major operations in North Africa were to claim the whole strength of our naval forces in home waters.  But supplies accumulated for delivery to Russia, and the means of protecting future convoys were closely studied.  It was not until late in December that the next convoy set out on its hazardous voyage.  It sailed in two parts, each escorted by six or seven destroyers, and covered by the Home Fleet.  The first group arrived safely.  The second had a more eventful passage.  On the morning of 31 December Captain R. Sherbrooke, in the destroyer Onslow, commanding the escort, was about a hundred and fifty miles northeast of the NOrth Cape when he sighted three enemy destroyers.  He immediately turned to engage them.  As the action began the German heavy cruiser Hipper appeared upon the scene.  The British destroyers  held off this powerful ship for nearly an hour.  The gun-flashes of the action drew to the scene Admiral Burnett with two British cruisers, Sheffield and Jamaica, form twenty-five miles away.  This force, racing southwards, ran into the German pocket-battleship Lützow, which, after a short engagement, disappeared to the westward in the twilight.  The German admiral, thinking that the British cruisers were the vanguard of a battle squadron, retired hastily.  During this brief engagement the Sheffield sank a German destroyer at close range.  A running fight followed.  The two German heavy ships and their six escorting destroyers struck at the convoy which Sherbrooke guarded.  But this stroke failed.

     The convoy arrived safely in Russian waters with the loss of one destroyer and no more than slight damage to one merchant ship.  Captain Sherbrooke, who had been severely wounded in the early stages but continued to fight his ship and personally to direct operations, despite the loss of an eye, was awarded the Victoria Cross for his leadership.

     Within the German High Command the repercussions of this affair were far-reaching.  Owing to delays in the transmission of signals the High Command first learnt of the episode from an English news broadcast.  Hitler was enraged.  While waiting impatiently for the outcome of the fight his anger was fostered by Goering, who complained bitterly of wasting squadrons of the German Air Force on guarding the capital ships of the Navy, which he suggested should be scrapped.  Admiral Raeder was ordered to report immediately.  On 6 January a naval conference was held.  Hitler launched a tirade upon the past record of the German Navy.  'It should not be considered a degradation if the Fuhrer decides to scrap the larger ships.  This would be true only if he were removing a fighting unit which had retianed it's full usefulness.  A parallel to this in the Army would be the removal of all calvary divisions.'  Raeder was ordered to report in writing why he objected to putting the capital ships out of commission.  When Hitler received this memorandum he treated it with derision, and ordered Doenitz, the designated successor to Raeder, to make a plan to meet his demands.  A bitter conflict between Goering and Raeder raged round Hitler over the future of the German Navy compared with that of the Luftwaffe.  But Raeder stuck grimly to the defense of the surface which he had commanded since 1928.  Time and again he had demanded the formation of a separate Fleet Air arm, and had been opposed successfully by Goering's insistence that the Air FOrce could accomplish more at sea than the Navy.  Goering won, and on 30 January Raeder resigned.  He was replaced by Doenitz, the ambitious Admiral of the U-boats.  All effective new construction was henceforth to be monopolized by them.

     Thus this brilliant action fought by the Royal Navy to protect an allied convoy to Russia at the end of the year led directly to a major crisis in the enemy's Naval policy, and ended the dream of another German High Seas Fleet.

--Sir Winston Churchill
From: The United States Navy in World War II
Part II: Chapter 5: P.Q. 17

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

HMS Indomitable: 

Career (United Kingdom)
Class and type:	Illustrious-class aircraft carrier
Name:	HMS Indomitable
Ordered:	6 July 1937
Builder:	Vickers-Armstrong, Barrow-in-Furness
Laid down:	10 November 1937
Launched:	26 March 1940
Commissioned:	10 October 1941
Fate:	Sold for scrap in 1955
Status:	Scrapped
General characteristics
Displacement:	23,000 tons standard, 29,730 tons loaded
Length:	230.0 metres (754.0 ft)
Beam:	29.2 metres (95.5 ft)
Draught:	8.8 metres (29.0 ft)
Propulsion:	Parson geared steam turbines six boilers three shafts 111,000 shp
Speed:	30.5 knots (56 km/h)
Range:	11,000 nautical miles (20,000 km) at 14 knots (26 km/h)
Complement:	1,392 2,100 (later)
Armament:	16 × 4.5 inch AA 48 × 2 pounder AA 10 × 20mm AA
Aircraft carried:	1943: 55 Seafire and Albacore 1945: 45 Hellcat and Avenger
Notes:	Pennant number 92

HMS Indomitable (pennant number 92) was a modified Illustrious-classaircraft carrier of the Royal Navy. The Illustrious class was developed in the1937 Naval Programme. She had been configured to the original specifications of the Illustrious class, but was soon redesigned to enable her to operate far more aircraft than her sister ships were able to. 

HMS Victorious:

HMS Victorious in 1959
Career (United Kingdom)
Name:	HMS Victorious
Ordered:	13 Jan 1937
Builder:	Vickers-Armstrong
Cost:	£4.05million
Laid down:	4 May 1937
Launched:	14 September 1939
Commissioned:	14 May 1941
Decommissioned:	13 March 1968
Refit:	1950 - 1957
Identification:	Pennant number: R38
Fate:	Scrapped 1969
Badge:
General characteristics
Class & type:	Illustrious-class aircraft carrier
Displacement:	As built: 29,500 tons Post-refit: 35,500 tons full load
Length:	As built: 673 ft (205 m) Post-1957 refit 753 ft (230 m) waterline, 781 ft (238 m) overall
Beam:	As built: 95 ft (29 m) Post-1957 refit 103 ft (31.4 m)
Draught:	As built: 28 ft (8.5 m) Post-1957 refit 31 ft (9 m)
Propulsion:	3 Parsons geared turbines 6 Admiralty 3-drum boilers 111,000 shp, 3 shafts
Speed:	30.5 knots (56 km/h)
Range:	11,000 nautical miles (20,000 km) at 14 knots (26 km/h)
Complement:	2,200 (including air group)
Armament:	16 × 4.5 inch (8 × 2) 48 × 2 pdr (6 × 8) 21 × 40 mm AA (2 × 4, 2 × 2, 9 × 1) 45 × 20 mm AA (45 × 1)
Armour:	flight deck: 3" hangar deck: 2" side belt 4" hangar sides: 4"
Aircraft carried:	During World War II: included: Albacore, Avenger,Barracuda, Corsair, Fulmar, Seafire,Sea Hurricane, Swordfish, Wildcat,F6F Hellcat 1941: 36 Fulmar/Albacore 1945: 54 Corsair/Avenger Post-refit aircraft included: Gannet, Scimitar, Sea Fury, Sea Hawk, Sea Vixen, Buccaneer
Motto:	Per coelum et aequorem victrix (Through air and sea victorious)
Honours & awards:	Cape of Good Hope 1795 - St Lucia 1796 - Egypt 1801 - Walcheren 1809 - Rivoli Action 1812 - BismarckAction 1941 - Norway 1941-42 - Arctic 1941-42 - Malta Convoys 1942 - Biscay 1942 - Sabang 1944 - Palembang 1945 - Okinawa 1945 - Japan 1945
Notes:	Pennant numbers: 38, R38, 38

HMS Victorious, ordered under the 1936 Naval Programme, was the thirdIllustrious-class aircraft carrier after Illustrious and Formidable. She was laid down at the Vickers-Armstrong shipyard at Newcastle-Upon-Tyne in 1937 and launched two years later in 1939. However, her commissioning was delayed until 1941 due to the greater need for escort vessels for service in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Her service in 1941 and 1942 included famous actions against the battleshipBismarck, several Arctic convoys and the Pedestal convoy to Malta. She was loaned to the United States Navy for a brief period in 1943 and served in the south west Pacific as USS Robin. Victorious contributed to several attacks on the Tirpitz. The elimination of the German naval threat allowed her redeployment first to the Eastern Fleet at Colombo and then to the Pacific for the final actions of the war against Japan.

After the war, her service was broken by periods in reserve and an extensive rebuild in the 1950s. The reduction of Britain's naval commitment in the late 1960s prompted her final withdrawal from service and she was scrapped in 1969.

In early June 1941, while part of the escort for troop convoy WS 8X, a Swordfish of 825 Squadron from Victorious located the German supply shipGonzenheim north of the Azores. The Gonzenheim had been intended to support the Bismarck but was subsequently scuttled when approached by British warships.^[2] On 5 June, she was detached to Gibraltar and, with Ark Royal and a naval escort, "flew-off" Hawker Hurricane aircraft to reinforce thebesieged British Mediterranean base of Malta (Operation Tracer). Victoriousreturned to the naval base at Scapa Flow with captured crewmen from theGonzenheim.^[1]

In late July 1941, she escorted HMS Adventure via the Arctic, to Murmanskwith a load of mines On the 31st she took part in the raid on Kirkenes and Petsamo during which thirteen of her aircraft were lost.^[1]

At the end of August, Victorious escorted the first of the allied convoys toArchangel (Operation Dervish) in company with a force of cruisers and destroyers and then covered the return passage of HMS Arguswhich had delivered Hurricane fighters to Murmansk (Operation Strength). During early September, she launched more air attacks, this time against Tromsø (twice), Vestfjorden and against shipping off Bodø.^[1] On 13 September, aircraft from Victorious sank the Norwegian Hurtigruten coastal steamer Barøy.^[3]

In October 1941, decrypted German Enigma signals indicated a break-out into the Atlantic by the German warships Scheer and Tirpitz.Victorious was deployed with the Home Fleet for their interception, this included a patrol in the Denmark Strait with battleshipsHMS King George V, USS Idaho and USS Mississippi and cruisers USS Wichita and USS Tuscaloosa. Note that this joint Anglo-American operation pre-dated the formal state of war between the United States and Germany. These operations continued until mid November, when Hitler cancelled the German operation. Victorious then continued with the Home Fleet until March 1942.^[1]

Victorious returned to the Arctic Convoys in March and April 1942 helping to provide cover for convoys PQ 12, QP 8, PQ 13, QP 9,PQ 14 and QP 10. During these operations, she also made an unsuccessful air strike on the Tirpitz, losing two aircraft. From the end of April, until June, Anglo-American forces (including the US ships Washington, Tuscaloosa and Wichita) covered convoys PQ 16, QP 12, PQ 17 and QP 13, after which Victorious returned to Scapa Flow.^[1]

The Arctic convoys had been suspended temporarily after the heavy losses suffered by Convoy PQ 17 when twenty-three out of thirty-six ships were sunk. This was after the convoy had been scattered in the belief that an attack was imminent by the German warshipsAdmiral Hipper, Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and Tirpitz.

HMS Argus: 

Argus in harbour in 1918, painted in dazzle camouflage, with aRevenge-class battleship in the background.
Career (United Kingdom)
Name:	HMS Argus
Namesake:	Argus Panoptes
Builder:	William Beardmore, Dalmuir
Yard number:	519
Identification:	Pennant number: I49
Nickname:	Hat Box Flatiron
Laid down:	1914
Acquired:	September 1916
Launched:	2 December 1917
Commissioned:	16 September 1918
Decommissioned:	About 1929
Recommissioned:	30 July 1938
Reclassified:	As accommodation ship, December 1944
Fate:	Sold for scrap, 5 December 1946
General characteristics (as built)
Type:	Aircraft carrier
Displacement:	14,450 long tons (14,680 t) (standard load) 15,775 long tons (16,028 t) (deep load)
Length:	565 ft (172.2 m) (o/a)
Beam:	68 ft (20.7 m)
Draught:	23 ft 3 in (7.1 m) (deep load)
Installed power:	20,000 shp (15,000 kW) 12 × cylindrical Scotch boilers
Propulsion:	4 × shafts 4 × Parsons steam turbines
Speed:	20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph)
Range:	3,600 nmi (6,700 km; 4,100 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph)
Complement:	495
Armament:	4 × 4 in (102 mm) anti-aircraft (AA) guns 2 × low-angle 4-inch guns
Aircraft carried:	15–18

HMS Argus was a British aircraft carrier that served in the Royal Navy from 1918 to 1944. She was converted from an ocean liner that was under construction when the First World War began, and became the first example of what is now the standard pattern of aircraft carrier, with a full-length flight deck that allowed wheeled aircraft to take off and land. After commissioning, the ship was heavily involved for several years in the development of the optimum design for other aircraft carriers. Argus also evaluated various types of arresting gear, general procedures needed to operate a number of aircraft in concert, and fleet tactics. The ship was too top-heavy as originally built and had to be modified to improve her stability in the mid-1920s. She spent one brief deployment on the China Station in the late 1920s before being placed inreserve for budgetary reasons.

Argus was recommissioned and partially modernised shortly before the Second World War and served as a training ship for deck-landing practice until June 1940. The following month she made the first of her many ferry trips to the Western Mediterranean to fly off fighters to Malta; she was largely occupied in this task for the next two years. The ship also delivered aircraft toMurmansk in Russia, Takoradi on the Gold Coast, and Reykjavík in Iceland. By 1942, the Royal Navy was very short of aircraft carriers and Argus was pressed into front-line service despite her lack of speed and armament. In June, she participated in Operation Harpoon, providing air cover for the Malta-bound convoy. In November, the ship provided air cover during Operation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa, and was lightly damaged by a bomb. After returning to the UK for repairs, Argus was used again for deck-landing practice until late September 1944. In December, she became anaccommodation ship and was listed for disposal in mid-1946. Argus was sold in late 1946 and scrapped the following year.

HMS Eagle: 

Aerial view of Eagle in the 1930s
Career (United Kingdom)
Name:	HMS Eagle
Ordered:	29 July 1912
Builder:	Armstrong Whitworth
Yard number:	858
Laid down:	20 February 1913
Launched:	8 June 1918
Acquired:	Purchased, 28 February 1918
Commissioned:	20 February 1924
Identification:	Pennant number: 94
Fate:	Sunk by U-73, 11 August 1942
General characteristics (as completed in 1924)
Type:	Aircraft carrier
Displacement:	21,850 long tons (22,200 t) standard
Length:	667 ft 6 in (203.5 m)
Beam:	115 ft (35.1 m)
Draught:	26 ft 8 in (8.1 m) (deep load)
Installed power:	50,000 shp (37,000 kW)
Propulsion:	4 shafts 4 geared steam turbine sets 32 water-tube boilers
Speed:	24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph)
Range:	4,800 nmi (8,900 km; 5,500 mi) at 16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph)
Complement:	791
Armament:	9 × 6-inch guns 5 × 4-inch anti-aircraft guns
Armour:	Belt: 4.5 in (114 mm) Deck: 1–1.5 in (25–38 mm) Bulkheads: 4 in (102 mm)
Aircraft carried:	25–30

HMS Eagle was an early aircraft carrier of the Royal Navy. Ordered by Chile during the South American dreadnought race as the Almirante Latorre-classbattleship Almirante Cochrane, she was laid down before World War I. In early 1918 she was purchased by Britain for conversion to an aircraft carrier; this work was finished in 1924. Her completion was delayed by labour troubles and the possibility that she might be repurchased by Chile for reconversion into a battleship, as well as the need for comparative trials to determine the optimum layout for aircraft carriers. The ship was initially assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet and then later to the China Station, spending very little time in home waters other than for periodic refits.

Eagle spent the first nine months of World War II in the Indian Oceansearching for German commerce raiders. During the early part of the war, theFleet Air Arm was desperately short of fighters and Eagle was equipped solely with Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers until late 1940. She was transferred to the Mediterranean in May 1940, where she escorted multiple convoys to Maltaand Greece and attacked Italian shipping, naval units and bases in the Eastern Mediterranean. The ship also participated in the Battle of Calabria in July, but her aircraft failed to score any hits when they attempted to torpedo Italian cruisers during the battle. Whenever Eagle was not at sea, her aircraft were disembarked and used ashore.

The ship was relieved by a more modern carrier in March 1941 and ordered to hunt for Axis shipping in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. Her aircraft sank one German blockade runner and disabled a German oil tanker in mid-1941, but did not find any other Axis ships before the ship was ordered home for a refit in October. After completing a major refit in early 1942, the ship made multiple trips delivering fighter aircraft to Malta to boost its air defences in the first half of 1942. Eagle was torpedoed and sunk by the German submarine U-73 on 11 August 1942 while escorting a convoy to Malta duringOperation Pedestal.

Tirpitz:

A recognition drawing of Tirpitz prepared by the US Navy
Career (Nazi Germany)
Namesake:	Alfred von Tirpitz
Builder:	Kriegsmarinewerft Wilhelmshaven
Laid down:	2 November 1936
Launched:	1 April 1939
Commissioned:	25 February 1941
Fate:	Sunk by Royal Air Force bombers on 12 November 1944
General characteristics
Class & type:	Bismarck-class battleship
Displacement:	42,900 t (42,200 long tons; 47,300 short tons) standard 52,600 t (51,800 long tons; 58,000 short tons) full load
Length:	241.6 m (792 ft 8 in) waterline[1] 251 m (823 ft 6 in) overall
Beam:	36 m (118 ft 1 in)
Draft:	9.3 m (30 ft 6 in) standard[a]
Installed power:	163,026 shp (121,568 kW)
Propulsion:	12 Wagner superheated boilers; 3 geared steam turbines; 3 three-blade propellers[1]
Speed:	30 knots (56 km/h; 35 mph)[1]
Range:	8,870 nmi (16,430 km; 10,210 mi) at 19 knots (35 km/h; 22 mph)[1]
Complement:	103 officers 1,962 enlisted men[b]
Sensors and processing systems:	FuMO 23
Armament:	As built: 8 × 38 cm (15 in) SK C/34 (4 × 2) 12 × 15 cm (5.9 in) (6 × 2) 16 × 10.5 cm (4.1 in) SK C/33 (8 × 2) 16 × 3.7 cm (1.5 in) SK C/30 (8 × 2) 12 × 2 cm (0.79 in) FlaK 30 (12 × 1) Modifications: 58 × 2 cm FlaK 30 8 × 53.3 cm (21.0 in) torpedo tubes
Armour:	Belt: 320 mm (13 in) Turrets: 360 mm (14 in) Main deck: 100 to 120 mm (3.9 to 4.7 in) Upper deck: 50 mm (2.0 in)
Aircraft carried:	4 × Arado Ar 196 floatplanes[1]
Aviation facilities:	1 double-ended catapult[1]
Service record
Awards:	3 references in the Wehrmachtbericht

Tirpitz was the second of two Bismarck-class battleships built for the GermanKriegsmarine (War Navy) during World War II. Named after Grand AdmiralAlfred von Tirpitz, the architect of the Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial Navy), the ship was laid down at the Kriegsmarinewerft Wilhelmshaven in November 1936 and her hull was launched two and a half years later. Work was completed in February 1941, when she was commissioned into the German fleet. Like her sister ship Bismarck, Tirpitz was armed with a main battery of eight 38-centimeter (15 in) guns in four twin turrets. After a series of wartime modifications she was 2,000 metric tons (2,000 long tons; 2,200 short tons) heavier than Bismarck.

After completing sea trials in early 1941, Tirpitz briefly served as the centrepiece of the Baltic Fleet, which was intended to prevent a possible break-out attempt by the Soviet Baltic Fleet. In early 1942, the ship sailed to Norway to act as a deterrent against an Allied invasion. While stationed in Norway, Tirpitz was also intended to be used to intercept Allied convoys to the Soviet Union, and two such missions were attempted in 1942. Tirpitzacted as a fleet in being, forcing the British Royal Navy to retain significant naval forces in the area to contain the battleship.^[3]

In September 1943, Tirpitz, along with the battleship Scharnhorst, bombarded Allied positions on the island of Spitzbergen, the only time the ship used her main battery in anger. Shortly thereafter, the ship was damaged in an attack by British mini-submarines and subsequently subjected to a series of large-scale air raids. On 12 November 1944, British Lancaster bombers equipped with 12,000 pounds (5,400 kg) "Tallboy" bombs destroyed the ship; two direct hits and a near miss caused the ship to capsize rapidly. A deck fire spread to the ammunition magazine for one of the main battery turrets, which caused a large explosion. Figures for the number of men killed in the attack range from 950 to 1,204. Between 1948 and 1957 the wreck was broken up by a joint Norwegian and German salvage operation.

Several factors served to restrain Tirpitz's freedom of operation in Norway. The most pressing were shortages of fuel and the withdrawal of the German destroyer forces to support Operation Cerberus, the movement of the battleships Scharnhorst andGneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen up through the English Channel. These caused a planned attack against the outboundconvoy PQ 8 at the end of January to be abandoned.^[24] A planned British air attack at the end of January by four-engined heavy bombers was disrupted by poor weather over the target, which prevented the aircraft from finding the ship.^[25] In early February, Tirpitztook part in the deceptions that distracted the British in the run-up to Operation Cerberus. These included steaming out of the fjord and the appearance of preparations for a sortie into the North Sea.^[26] Later that month, the ship was reinforced by the heavy cruisersAdmiral Scheer and Prinz Eugen and several destroyers. Prinz Eugen had been torpedoed by a British submarine at the entrance to the Fættenfjord, and was therefore temporarily out of action.^[27]

Tirpitz underway, probably in 1941

In March 1942 Tirpitz and Admiral Scheer, along with the destroyers Z14 Friedrich Ihn, Z5 Paul Jakobi, Z7 Hermann Schoemann and Z25 and a pair of torpedo boats,^[21] were intended to attack the homebound convoy QP 8 and the outbound PQ 12 as part ofOperation Sportpalast (Sports Palace).^[24][28] Admiral Scheer,^[24] with a design speed of 26 kn (48 km/h; 30 mph),^[29] was too slow to operate with Tirpitz, and was left in port,^[24] as was the destroyer Paul Jakobi. The two torpedo boats were also released from the operation.^[21] On 5 March, Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft spotted PQ 12 near Jan Mayen Island; the reconnaissance failed to note the battleship HMS Duke of York or the battlecruiser HMS Renown, both of which escorted the convoy, along with four destroyers. Unknown to the Germans, Admiral Tovey provided distant support to the convoys with the battleship HMS King George V, the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, the heavy cruiser HMS Berwick, and six destroyers. Enigma intercepts again forewarned the British of Tirpitz's attack, which allowed them to reroute the convoys. Admiral Tovey attempted to pursue Tirpitz on 9 March,^[24] but Admiral Otto Ciliax, the commander of the German squadron, had decided to return to port the previous evening. An air attack was launched early on the 9th; twelve Fairey Albacore torpedo bombers attacked the ship in three groups, and Tirpitz successfully evaded the torpedoes. Only three men were wounded in the attack.^[30] Tirpitz's anti-aircraft gunners shot down two of the British aircraft.^[31] After the conclusion of the attack, Tirpitz made for Vestfjord, and from there to Trondheim, arriving on the evening of 13 March.^[32] On 30 March, thirty-three Halifax bombers attacked the ship; they scored no hits and five aircraft were shot down.^[33] The RAF launched a pair of unsuccessful strikes in late April. On the night of 27–28 April, thirty-one Halifaxes and twelve Lancasters; five of the bombers were shot down. Another raid, composed of twenty-three Halifaxes and eleven Lancasters, took place the following night. Two of the bombers were shot down by the German anti-aircraft defences.^[34]

The actions of Tirpitz and her escorting destroyers in March used up 8,230 metric tons (8,100 long tons; 9,070 short tons) of fuel oil, which greatly reduced the available fuel supply. It took the Germans three months to replenish the fuel spent in the attempt to intercept the two Allied convoys. Convoy PQ 17, which left Iceland on 27 June bound for the Soviet Union, was the next convoy targeted by Tirpitz and the rest of the German fleet stationed in Norway,^[32] during Operation Rösselsprung (Knight's Move).^[35]Escorting the convoy were the battleships Duke of York and USS Washington and the carrier Victorious.^[32] Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper, and six destroyers sortied from Trondheim, while a second task force consisting of Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and six destroyers operated out of Narvik and Bogenfjord.^[36] Lützow and three of the destroyers struck uncharted rocks while en route to the rendezvous and had to return to port. Shortly after Tirpitz left Norway, the Soviet submarine K-21 fired two or four torpedoes at the ship, all of which missed.^[37][38] The Soviets claimed two hits on the battleship.^[39] Swedish intelligence had meanwhile reported the German departures to the British Admiralty, which ordered the convoy to disperse. Aware that they had been detected, the Germans aborted the operation and turned over the attack to U-boats and the Luftwaffe. The scattered vessels could no longer be protected by the convoy escorts, and the Germans sank 21 of the 34 isolated transports. Tirpitz returned to Altafjord via the Lofoten Islands.^[37]

Tirpitz, escorted by several destroyers, steaming in the Bogenfjord in October 1942

Following Operation Rösselsprung, the Germans moved Tirpitz to Bogenfjord near Narvik. By this time, the ship needed a major overhaul. Hitler had forbidden the ship to make the dangerous return to Germany, and so the overhaul was conducted in Trondheim. On 23 October, the ship left Bogenfjord and returned to Fættenfjord outside Trondheim. The defences of the anchorage were further strengthened; additional antiaircraft guns were installed and double anti-torpedo nets were erected around the vessel. The repairs were conducted in limited phases, such that Tirpitz would remain partially operational for the majority of the overhaul. A caisson was built around the stern to allow the replacement of the ship's rudders.^[37] During the repair process, the British attempted to attack the battleship with two Chariot human torpedoes, but rough seas caused the human torpedoes to break away from the fishing vessel which was towing them, before they could be launched.^[40] By 28 December, the overhaul had been completed, and Tirpitz began sea trials. She conducted gunnery trials on 4 January 1943 in the Trondheimfjord.^[41] On 21 February, Topp was promoted to Rear Admiral and was replaced by Captain Hans Meyer; five days later the battleship Scharnhorst was ordered to reinforce the fleet in Norway. Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz was given command of the warships stationed in Norway.^[42]

By the time Scharnhorst arrived in Norway in March 1943, Allied convoys to the Soviet Union had temporarily ceased. To give the ships an opportunity to work together, Admiral Karl Dönitz, who had replaced Raeder in the aftermath of the Battle of the Barents Seaon 31 December 1942, ordered an attack on the island of Spitzbergen, which housed a British weather station and refuelling base.^[41]Several settlements and outposts on Spitzbergen were defended by a garrison of 152 men from the Norwegian Armed Forces in exile.^[43] The two battleships, escorted by ten destroyers, left port on 6 September; in a ruse de guerre, Tirpitz flew the white ensign on the approach to the island the following day.^[44] During the bombardment, Tirpitz fired 52 main-battery shells and 82 rounds from her 15 cm secondaries.^[45] This was the first and only time the ship fired her main battery at an enemy target.^[41] An assault force destroyed shore installations and captured 74 prisoners.^[43][46] By 11:00, the battleships had destroyed their targets and headed back to their Norwegian ports.

Scharnhorst:

Scharnhorst
Career (Nazi Germany)
Name:	Scharnhorst
Namesake:	Gerhard Johann von Scharnhorst(1755–1813)[1]
Builder:	Kriegsmarinewerft Wilhelmshaven
Laid down:	15 June 1935
Launched:	3 October 1936
Commissioned:	7 January 1939
Motto:	Scharnhorst immer voran[2]
Fate:	Sunk at 72°16′N 28°41′E the Battle of North Cape on 26 December 1943
General characteristics
Class & type:	Scharnhorst-class battleship
Displacement:	Standard: 32,100 long tons (32,600 t) Full load: 38,100 long tons (38,700 t)
Length:	234.9 m (771 ft)
Beam:	30 m (98 ft)
Draft:	9.9 m (32 ft)
Installed power:	151,893 shp (113,267 kW)
Propulsion:	3 Brown, Boveri & Co geared steam turbines
Speed:	31 knots (57 km/h)
Range:	7,100 nmi (13,100 km) at 19 kn (35 km/h)
Complement:	56 officers 1,613 enlisted
Armament:	9 × 28 cm/54.5 (11 inch) SK C/34 12 × 15 cm/55 (5.9") SK C/28 14 × 10.5 cm/65 (4.1 inch) SK C/33 16 × 3.7 cm/L83 (1.5") SK C/30 10 (later 16) × 2 cm/65 (0.79") C/30 or C/38 6 × 533 mm torpedo tubes
Armor:	Belt: 350 mm (14 in) Deck: 50 mm (2.0 in) Turrets: 200 to 360 mm (7.9 to 14.2 in) Conning tower: 350 mm[3]
Aircraft carried:	3 Arado Ar 196A
Aviation facilities:	1 catapult

Scharnhorst was a German capital ship, alternatively described as abattleship and battlecruiser, of the German Kriegsmarine. She was the lead ship of her class, which included one other ship, Gneisenau. The ship was built at the Kriegsmarinewerft dockyard in Wilhelmshaven; she was laid down on 15 June 1935 and launched a year and four months later on 3 October 1936. Completed in January 1939, the ship was armed with a main battery of nine 28 cm (11 in) C/34 guns in three triple turrets, though there were plans to replace these weapons with six 38 cm (15 in) SK C/34 guns in twin turrets.

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau operated together for much of the early portion ofWorld War II, including sorties into the Atlantic to raid British merchant shipping. During her first operation, Scharnhorst sank the auxiliary cruiserHMS Rawalpindi in a short engagement. Scharnhorst and Gneisenauparticipated in Operation Weserübung, the German invasion of Norway. During operations off Norway, the two ships engaged the battlecruiser HMS Renownand sank the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious as well as her escort destroyersAcasta and Ardent. In that engagement Scharnhorst achieved one of the longest-range naval gunfire hits in history.

In early 1942, after repeated British bombing raids, the two ships made a daylight dash up the English Channel from occupied France to Germany. In early 1943, Scharnhorst joined the Bismarck-class battleship Tirpitz in Norway to interdict Allied convoys to the Soviet Union. Scharnhorst and severaldestroyers sortied from Norway to attack a convoy; the Germans were instead intercepted by British naval patrols. During the Battle of the North Cape, theRoyal Navy battleship HMS Duke of York and her escorts sank Scharnhorst. Only 36 men were pulled from the icy seas, out of a crew of 1,968.

With the rapidly deteriorating military situation for the German Army on the Eastern Front, it became increasingly important to interrupt the flow of supplies from the Western Allies to the Soviet Union.^[47] By December 1943, the German Army was forced into continuous retreat. The Luftwaffe had been emasculated in four long years of war, and increasing Allied anti-submarine capabilities were steadily degrading the effectiveness of the U-boats. The only effective weapon at the disposal of the Germans in Norway wasScharnhorst—Tirpitz was badly damaged, and the four remaining heavy cruisers were committed to the Baltic.^[48] During a conference with Hitler on 19–20 December, Großadmiral Karl Dönitz decided to employ Scharnhorst against the next Allied convoy that presented itself. Erich Bey, by now promoted to Konteradmiral, was given command of the task force.^[49]

On 22 December Dönitz ordered Bey to be ready to go to sea on a three-hour notice. Later that day, reconnaissance aircraft located a convoy of some 20 transports escorted by cruisers and destroyers approximately 400 nmi (740 km; 460 mi) west of Tromsø. The convoy was spotted again two days later, and it was determined that the course was definitively toward the Soviet Union. A U-boat reported the convoy's location at 09:00 on 25 December, and Dönitz ordered Scharnhorst into action. In his instructions to Bey, Dönitz advised him to break off the engagement if presented with superior forces, but to remain aggressive. Bey planned to attack the convoy at 10:00 on 26 December if the conditions were favorable for the attack. At this time of year, there was only 45 minutes of full daylight and six hours of twilight, which significantly limited Bey's operational freedom.^[45] The Germans were concerned with developments in Allied radar-directed fire control, which allowed British battleships to fire with great accuracy in the darkness; German radar capabilities lagged behind those of their opponents.^[50]

Duke of York in the Arctic escorting a convoy

Scharnhorst and her five destroyers left port at around 19:00 and were in the open sea four hours later. At 03:19, Bey received instructions from the Fleet Command that Scharnhorstwas to conduct the attack alone if heavy seas interfered with the destroyers' ability to fight. Unbeknown to the Germans, the British were reading the radio transmissions betweenScharnhorst and the Fleet Command; Admirals Robert Burnett and Bruce Fraser were aware of Bey's plan for the attack on the convoy and could position their forces accordingly. At 07:03, Scharnhorst was some 40 nmi (74 km; 46 mi) southwest of Bear Island when she made a turn that would put her in position to attack the convoy at 10:00. Admiral Burnett, commanding the three cruisers Norfolk, Belfast, and Sheffield escorting Convoy JW 55B, placed his ships between the convoy and Scharnhorst's expected direction of attack.^[45]Fraser in the powerful battleship Duke of York, along with a cruiser and four destroyers, moved to a position southwest of Scharnhorst to block a possible escape attempt.^[51]

An hour after making the turn, Bey deployed his destroyers in a line screening Scharnhorst, which remained 10 nmi (19 km; 12 mi) behind. Half an hour later, Scharnhorst's loudspeakers called the crew to battle stations in preparation for the attack.^[52] At 08:40,Belfast picked up Scharnhorst on her radar, though the Germans were unaware that they had been detected. The German radar had been turned off to prevent the British from picking up on the signals. At 09:21, Belfast's lookouts spotted Scharnhorst at a range of 11,000 m (12,000 yd). The cruiser opened fire three minutes later, followed by Norfolk two minutes after. Scharnhorst fired a salvo from turret Caesar before turning and increasing speed to disengage from the cruisers.^[51] She was hit twice by 20.3 cm (8 in) shells; the first failed to explode and caused negligible damage, but the second struck the forward rangefinders and destroyed the radar antenna. The aft radar, which possessed only a limited forward arc, was the ship's only remaining radar capability.^[53]

Scharnhorst turned south and attempted to work around the cruisers, but the superior British radar prevented Bey from successfully carrying out the maneuver.^[54] By 12:00, Scharnhorst was to the northeast of the convoy, but Belfast had reestablished radar contact; it took the cruisers twenty minutes to close the range and begin firing. Scharnhorst detected the cruisers with her aft radar and opened fire with her main battery guns before turning away to disengage a second time. Shortly before 12:25, Scharnhorst hit Norfolk twice with 28 cm shells.^[55] The first shell hit the forward superstructure and disabled Norfolk's gunnery radar. The second 28 cm round struck the ship's "X" barbette and disabled the turret. Scharnhorst then turned again and increased speed, in the hopes of escaping the cruisers and finding the convoy. Burnett chose to keep his distance and shadow Scharnhorst with radar while Fraser made his way to the scene in Duke of York. Meanwhile, the five German destroyers continued searching for the convoy without success. At 13:15, Bey decided to return to base, and at 13:43, he dismissed the destroyers and instructed them to return to port.^[56]

Survivors from Scharnhorstdisembarking in Scapa Flow

At 16:17, Duke of York made radar contact with Scharnhorst; thirty minutes later, Belfastilluminated the German battleship with star shells. At 16:50, Duke of York opened fire at a range of 11,000 m (12,000 yd); Scharnhorst quickly returned the fire. Five minutes after opening fire, one of Duke of York's 14 in (35.6 cm) shells struck Scharnhorst abreast of her forward gun turret. The shell hit jammed the turret's training gears, putting it out of action. Shell splinters started a fire in the ammunition magazine, which forced the Germans to flood both forward magazines to prevent an explosion. Turret Bruno's magazine was quickly drained, though the ship was now fighting with only two-thirds of her main battery.^[57]Shortly thereafter, another 14 in shell struck the ventilation trunk attached to Bruno, which caused the turret to be flooded with noxious propellant gases every time the breeches were opened. A third shell hit the deck next to turret Caesar and caused some flooding; shell splinters caused significant casualties. At 17:30, shells struck the forward 15 cm gun turrets and destroyed them both.^[58]

At around 18:00, another 14 in shell struck the ship on the starboard side, passed through the thin upper belt armor, and exploded in the number 1 boiler room. It caused significant damage to the ship's propulsion system and slowed the ship to 8 kn (15 km/h; 9.2 mph), though temporary repairs allowed Scharnhorst to return to 22 kn (41 km/h; 25 mph). She managed to add 5,000 m (5,500 yd) to the distance between her and Duke of York, while straddling the ship with several salvos. Shell splinters rained on Duke of York and disabled the fire-control radar.^[58]

"Gentlemen, the battle against the Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that any of you who are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, will command your ship as gallantly as the Scharnhorst was commanded today."

Admiral Bruce Fraser^[59]

At 18:42, Duke of York ceased fire, after having fired 52 salvos and scoring at least 13 hits, but Scharnhorst was pulling away. Many of these hits had badly damaged the ship's secondary armament, which left her open to destroyer attacks, which Fraser ordered. The destroyers Scorpion and HNoMS Stordlaunched a total of eight torpedoes at 18:50, four of which hit.^[60] One torpedo exploded abreast of turret Bruno, which caused it to jam. The second torpedo hit the ship on the port side and caused some minor flooding, and the third struck toward the rear of the ship and damaged the port propeller shaft. The fourth hit the ship in the bow. The torpedoes slowed Scharnhorst to 12 kn (22 km/h; 14 mph), which allowed Duke of York to close to 9,100 m (10,000 yd). With only turret Caesar operational, all available men were sent to retrieve ammunition from the forward turrets to keep the last heavy guns supplied.^[61] Fraser then ordered Jamaica and Belfast to move into range and finish the crippled ship off with torpedoes. After several more torpedo hits, Scharnhorst settled further into the water and began to list to starboard. At 19:45, the ship went down by the bows, with her propellers still slowly turning.^[62] British ships began searching for survivors, but were soon ordered away after just a few were pulled out of the water where voices could still be heard calling for help from the darkness.^[63] Of the crew of 1,968 officers and enlisted men, only 36 men survived

HMS Onslow: 

Onslow in 1943
Career (UK)
Name:	HMS Onslow
Ordered:	3 September 1939
Builder:	John Brown & Company, Clydebank
Cost:	£416,942
Laid down:	1 July 1940
Launched:	31 March 1941
Commissioned:	8 October 1941
Decommissioned:	April 1947
Motto:	Festina Lente (Latin:"Make Haste Slowly")
Honours and awards:	Norway 1941-45 Arctic 1941-45 Atlantic 1942 Malta Convoys 1942 Barents Sea 1942 North Africa 1942 Normandy 1944 Biscay 1944
Fate:	Transferred to Pakistan, 1949
Badge:	On a Field White an Eagle Black preying on an anchor gold.
Career (Pakistan)
Name:	PNS Tippu Sultan
Namesake:	Tippu Sultan
Commissioned:	1949
Decommissioned:	1979
Out of service:	1957
Reinstated:	1960
Homeport:	Karachi
Fate:	Scrapped, 1980
General characteristics
Class & type:	O-class destroyer flotilla leader
Displacement:	1,550 long tons (1,570 t)
Length:	345 ft (105 m) o/a
Beam:	35 ft (11 m)
Draught:	13 ft 6 in (4.11 m)
Propulsion:	2 × Parsons geared steam turbines, 40,000 shp 2 Admiralty 3-drum boilers 2 shafts
Speed:	37 knots (43 mph; 69 km/h)
Range:	3,850 nmi (7,130 km) at 20 kn (23 mph; 37 km/h)
Endurance:	472 tons oil
Complement:	176+
Armament:	• 4 × single 4.7-inch (120-mm) QF Mark IX guns on mounting CP Mk.XVIII • 1 × single QF 4 in gun Mk.V on mounting HA Mk.III • 1 × quad QF 2-pdr "pom-pom"mount Mk.VII • 6 × single 20 mm Oerlikon guns • 1 × quad 21 in (533 mm) torpedo tubes for Mk.IX torpedoes • 4 × throwers and 2 × racks for 70depth charges
Service record
Part of:	Home Fleet
Commanders:	Captain Robert St Vincent Sherbrooke
Operations:	Battle of the Barents Sea (1942) Battle of North Cape (1943) Exercise Tiger (1944) Normandy Landings (1944)

HMS Onslow was an O-class destroyer flotilla leader of the Royal Navy She was ordered from John Brown & Company at Clydebank, Glasgow on 3 September 1939. The ship was laid down on 1 July 1940 and launched on 31 March 1941. She was completed on 8 October 1941 at a cost of £416,942.

Attached to the Home Fleet, Onslow served mostly as an escort to Arctic Convoys. She also saw detached service in the Mediterranean during "Operation Harpoon" in 1942, and in the English Channel before and after theNormandy landings in mid-1944. Her most notable action was at the Battle of the Barents Sea in 1942, while escorting Convoy JW 51B to Russia. The convoy escorts held off attacks from the powerful German cruiser Admiral Hipper, with Onslow being heavily damaged and her Captain, Robert St Vincent Sherbrooke severely injured.

Sherbrooke, R., Captain: 

Robert St Vincent Sherbrooke
Nickname	Rupert
Born	8 January 1901 Oxton, Nottinghamshire
Died	13 June 1972 Oxton
Buried at	St Peter and St Paul's Churchyard, Oxton
Allegiance	United Kingdom
Service/branch	Royal Navy
Years of service	1917 - 1954
Rank	Rear Admiral
Unit	HMS Canada HMS Courageous
Commands held	HMS Onslow
Battles/wars	World War I World War II
Awards	Victoria Cross Order of the Bath Distinguished Service Order King Haakon VII's Cross of Liberty
Other work	Lord-Lieutenant of Nottinghamshire

Rear Admiral Robert St Vincent Sherbrooke VC CB DSO DL (Oxton 8 January 1901 – Oxton 13 June 1972) was an English recipient of the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and Commonwealth forces.

Sherbrooke was 41 years old, and a Captain in the Royal Navy during theSecond World War when the following deed took place during the Battle of the Barents Sea for which he was awarded the VC.

On 31 December 1942 off North Cape, Norway in the Barents Sea, Captain Sherbrooke in HMS Onslow was senior officer in command of destroyers escorting an important convoy for North Russia, when he made contact with a vastly superior enemy force—the cruiser Hipperand the pocket battleship Lutzow. Four times the enemy tried to attack the convoy but was forced back each time. Early in the action Captain Sherbrooke was seriously wounded in the face and temporarily blinded. Nevertheless he continued to direct the ships under his command and even when the next senior officer had assumed control, he insisted on receiving all reports of the action until the convoy was out of danger. His actions—and the Nazi ships' failure to neutralize the convoy despite its superior force—were pivotal for Hitler's order to scrap theKriegsmarine in the beginning of 1943.

Hipper: 

German cruiser Admiral Hipper

Admiral Hipper in 1939
Career (Nazi Germany)
Name:	Admiral Hipper
Namesake:	Admiral Franz von Hipper
Builder:	Blohm & Voss, Hamburg
Laid down:	6 July 1935
Launched:	6 February 1937
Commissioned:	29 April 1939
Fate:	Scuttled, 3 May 1945, raised and scrapped in 1948–1952
General characteristics
Class & type:	Admiral Hipper-class cruiser
Displacement:	Design: 16,170 t (15,910 long tons; 17,820 short tons) Full load: 18,200 long tons (18,500 t)
Length:	202.8 m (665 ft 4 in) overall
Beam:	21.3 m (69 ft 11 in)
Draft:	Full load: 7.2 m (24 ft)
Propulsion:	3 × Blohm & Voss steam turbines 3 × three-blade propellers 132,000 shp (98 MW)
Speed:	32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph)
Complement:	42 officers 1,340 enlisted
Armament:	8 × 20.3 cm (8.0 in) guns 12 × 10.5 cm (4.1 in) guns 12 × 3.7 cm (1.5 in) guns 8 × 2 cm (0.79 in) guns (20×1) 6 × 53.3 cm (21 in) torpedo tubes
Armor:	Belt: 70 to 80 mm (2.8 to 3.1 in) Armor deck: 20 to 50 mm (0.79 to 1.97 in) Turret faces: 105 mm (4.1 in)
Aircraft carried:	3 aircraft
Aviation facilities:	1 catapult

Admiral Hipper, the first of five ships of her class, was the lead ship of theAdmiral Hipper–class of heavy cruisers which served with the GermanKriegsmarine during World War II. The ship was laid down at the Blohm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg in July 1935 and launched February 1937; Admiral Hipper entered service shortly before the outbreak of war, in April 1939. The ship was named after Admiral Franz von Hipper, commander of the Germanbattlecruiser squadron during the Battle of Jutland in 1916 and later commander-in-chief of the German High Seas Fleet.

Admiral Hipper saw a significant amount of action during the war. She led the assault on Trondheim during Operation Weserübung; while en route to her objective, she sank the British destroyer HMS Glowworm. In December 1940, she broke out into the Atlantic Ocean to operate against Allied merchant shipping, though this operation ended without significant success. In February 1941, Admiral Hipper sortied again, sinking several merchant vessels before eventually returning to Germany via the Denmark Strait. The ship was then transferred to northern Norway to participate in operations against convoys to the Soviet Union, culminating in the Battle of the Barents Sea on 31 December 1942, where she sank the destroyer Achates and the MinesweeperBramble but was in turn damaged and forced to withdraw by the light cruisersHMS Sheffield and HMS Jamaica.

In December 1942, convoy traffic to the Soviet Union resumed. Großadmiral Erich Raeder, the commander in chief of theKriegsmarine, ordered a plan, Operation Regenbogen, to use the available surface units in Norway to launch an attack on the convoys. The first convoy of the month, JW 51A, passed to the Soviet Union without incident. The second, however, convoy JW 51B, were spotted by the submarine U-354 south of Bear Island. Raeder ordered the forces assigned to Operation Regenbogen into action.^[38]Admiral Hipper, again served as Kummetz's flagship; the squadron comprised Lützow and the destroyers Friederich Eckoldt, Richard Beitzen, Theodor Riedel, Z29, Z30, and Z31.^[39] The force left Altafjord at 18:00 on 30 December, under orders to avoid confrontation with even an equal opponent.^[40]

Kummetz's plan was to divide his force in half; he would take Admiral Hipper and three destroyers north of the convoy to attack it and draw away the escorts. Lützow and the remaining three destroyers would then attack the undefended convoy from the south. At 09:15 on the 31st, the British destroyer Obdurate spotted the three destroyers screening for Admiral Hipper; the Germans opened fire first. Four of the other five destroyers escorting the convoy rushed to join the fight, while Achates laid a smoke screen to cover the convoy.Admiral Hipper fired several salvos at Achates, raining shell splinters on the destroyer that severed steam lines and reduced her speed to 15 kn (28 km/h; 17 mph). Kummetz then turned back north to draw the destroyers away. Captain Robert Sherbrooke, the British escort commander, left two destroyers to cover the convoy while he took the remaining four to pursue Admiral Hipper.^[40]

Rear Admiral Robert Burnett's Force R, centered on the cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica, standing by in distant support of the Allied convoy,^[38] raced to the scene. The cruisers engaged Admiral Hipper, which had been firing to port at the destroyer Obedient. Burnett's ships approached from Admiral Hipper's starboard side and achieved complete surprise.^[41] In the initial series of salvos from the British cruisers, Admiral Hipper was hit three times.^[39] One of the hits damaged the ship's propulsion system; the No. 3 boiler filled with a mix of oil and water, which forced the crew to turn off the starboard turbine engine. This reduced her speed to 23 kn (43 km/h; 26 mph). The other two hits started a fire in her aircraft hangar. She fired a single salvo at the cruisers before turning toward them, her escorting destroyers screening her with smoke.^[42]

After emerging from the smoke screen, Hipper was again engaged by Burnett's cruisers. Owing to the uncertainty over the condition of his flagship and the ferocity of the British defense, Kummetz issued the following order at 10:37: "Break off action and retire to the west."^[43] Mistakenly identifying Sheffield as Admiral Hipper, the destroyer Friederich Eckoldt approached too closely and was sunk.^[44] Meanwhile, Lützow closed to within 3 nmi (5.6 km; 3.5 mi) of the convoy, but due to poor visibility, she held her fire. She then received Kummetz's order, and turned west to rendezvous with Admiral Hipper. Lützow inadvertently came alongside Sheffield andJamaica, and after identifying them as hostile, engaged them. The British cruisers turned toward Lützow and came under fire from both German cruisers. Admiral Hipper's firing was more accurate and quickly straddled Sheffield, though the British cruiser escaped unscathed. Burnett quickly decided to withdraw in the face of superior German firepower; his ships were armed with 6 in (150 mm) guns, while Admiral Hipper and Lützow carried 20.3 cm (8.0 in) and 28 cm (11 in) guns, respectively.^[45]

Based on the order issued at the outset of the operation to avoid action with a force equal in strength to his own, poor visibility, and the damage to his flagship, Kummetz decided to abort the attack. In the course of the battle, the British destroyer Achates was sunk by the damage inflicted by Admiral Hipper. The Germans also sank the minesweeper Bramble and damaged the destroyers Onslow,Obedient, and Obdurate. In return, the British sank Friederich Eckoldt and damaged Admiral Hipper, and forced the Germans to abandon the attack on the convoy.^[39] In the aftermath of the failed operation, a furious Hitler proclaimed that the Kriegsmarine's surface forces would be paid off and dismantled, and their guns used to reinforce the fortifications of the Atlantic Wall. Admiral Karl Dönitz, Raeder's successor, convinced Hitler to retain the surface fleet, however.^[46] After returning to Altafjord, emergency repairs toAdmiral Hipper were effected, which allowed her to return to Bogen Bay on 23 January 1943.^[47] That day, Admiral Hipper, Köln, and the destroyer Richard Beitzen left the Altafjord to return to Germany. The three ships stopped in Narvik on 25 January, and in Trondheim from 30 January to 2 February.^[48] After resuming the voyage south, the ships searched for Norwegian blockade runners in the Skagerrak on 6 February before putting into port at Kiel on 8 February.^[49] On 28 February, the ship was decommissioned in accordance with Hitler's decree.

Burnett, Admiral: 

Sir Robert Burnett
Rear Admiral Sir Robert Burnett sitting at his desk on board theHMS Tyne
Born	22 July 1887 Old Deer, Buchan, Aberdeenshire
Died	2 July 1959 116 Pall Mall, Westminster, London
Allegiance	United Kingdom
Service/branch	Royal Navy
Years of service	1902–1950
Rank	Admiral
Commands held	10th Cruiser Squadron South Atlantic Station Plymouth Command
Battles/wars	First World War Second World War
Awards	Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath Distinguished Service Order Commander of the Venerable Order of Saint John

Admiral Sir Robert Lindsay Burnett, GBE, KCB, CStJ, DSO (22 July 1887 – 2 July 1959) was an officer in the Royal Navy.

Naval career[edit]

Burnett, left, with First Lord of the Admiralty A V Alexander and Admiral Sir John Tovey, C.-in-C. Home Fleet, on boardHMS Belfast in January 1943

Educated at Eastman's Royal Naval Academy and Bedford School,^[1] Burnett joined the Royal Navy in 1902.^[2] He served on theChina Station from 1904 and then with the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets from 1908.^[2] He became an instructor at the Navy Physical Training Schools in 1911.^[2]

He served in the First World Warand saw action at the Battle of Heligoland Bight in 1914 and at theBattle of Dogger Bank in 1915^[1]and served in destroyers in theGrand Fleet.^[2] He was promoted to lieutenant-commander in April 1918,commander in December 1923 and captain in December 1930.^[3]

In 1933 he was made Director of Physical Training and Sports.^[2] He was promoted rear-admiral in January 1941 and appointed flag officer ofminelayers, and from March 1942 flag officer of the Destroyer Flotillas of the Home Fleet.^[2] From January 1943 he was flag officer of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and was promoted to vice-admiral in that role on 9 December 1943. Flying his flag in HMS Belfast, he saw action in the North Sea and in theArctic Ocean off the coast of Norway in convoy escort duty, particularly on 26 December at the Battle of North Cape, where he played a major role in the sinking of the Scharnhorst^[1] (in most accounts of the battle he is described as a Rear Admiral). He was Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic Station from 1944.^[2]

He became Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth in 1947 and retired from active service in May 1950.^[2] He then served as the first director of the White Fish Authority, from its foundation in 1951 until his retirement in November 1954.

HMS Sheffield: 

HMS Sheffield was one of the Southampton sub class of the Town-class cruisers of the Royal Navy during the Second World War. She took part in actions against several major German warships. Unlike most Royal Navy ships of her time, her fittings were constructed from stainless steel instead of the more traditional brass. This was an attempt to reduce the amount of cleaning required on the part of the crew. Her nickname, the "Shiny Sheff", stemmed from this.

Career (UK)
Class and type:	Town-class light cruiser
Name:	HMS Sheffield
Builder:	Vickers Armstrong
Laid down:	31 January 1935
Launched:	23 July 1936
Commissioned:	25 August 1937
Identification:	Pennant number: C24
Fate:	Scrapped at Faslane, 1967
General characteristics
Displacement:	9,100 tons standard 11,350 tons full load
Length:	558 ft (170 m)
Beam:	61 ft 8 in (18.80 m)
Draught:	21 ft 6 in (6.55 m)
Propulsion:	Four-shaft Parsons geared turbines Four Admiralty 3-drum boilers 75,000 shp
Speed:	32 knots (59 km/h)
Complement:	748
Sensors and processing systems:	Type 79Y RADAR from August 1938[1]
Armament:	12 × BL 6 inch Mk XXIII naval guns[triple mounts] 8 × 4" [double mounts] 4 × 3 pdr., 8 x 2 pdr. [quadruple mounts] Torpedo tubes: 6 × 21".

She was occupied on Arctic convoys until hitting a mine off Iceland on 3 March 1942 and was under repair until July. After more Arctic convoys,Sheffield joined the forces supporting the Allied landings in North Africa (Operation Torch) in November. In December, Sheffield andJamaica formed "Force R", under the command of Rear-Admiral Robert Burnett (in Sheffield), which provided cover for Convoy JW 51B. The convoy was attacked by a strong German surface force, but, in the ensuing action (Battle of the Barents Sea), the Germans withdrew and Sheffield sank the German destroyer Friedrich Eckholdt, while damaging the cruiser Admiral Hipper at the same time,Eckholdt mistaking Sheffield for the Hipper. During this engagement, the destroyer HMS Achates (H12) and the minesweeper HMSBramble were sunk by gunfire of the two German vessels.

Ice forms on a 20 inch signal projector during an Arctic convoy to Russia

Flagship of the reserve fleet in the 1960s

In February 1943, Sheffield moved to operate in the Bay of Biscay and, in July and August, she supported the landings at Salerno (Operation Avalanche). Returning yet again to the Arctic, she took part in the sinking of the battleship Scharnhorst off the north coast of Norway, in late December.

In 1944, Sheffield was an escort for the Royal Navy carrier force that executed a series of air attacks on the German battleship Tirpitz, between April and August. These had limited success and responsibility was passed to the Royal Air Force.

A lengthy refit in Boston and in Britain kept Sheffield out of action until after the end of the war.

HMS Jamaica: For other ships of the same name, see HMS Jamaica.

Career (UK)
Class and type:	Crown Colony-class light cruiser
Name:	HMS Jamaica
Namesake:	Jamaica
Ordered:	1938 Naval Programme
Builder:	Vickers-Armstrongs, Barrow-in-Furness
Laid down:	28 April 1939
Launched:	16 November 1940
Commissioned:	29 June 1942
Decommissioned:	20 November 1957
Struck:	1960
Fate:	Sold for scrap, 14 November 1960
General characteristics (as built)
Displacement:	about 8,631 long tons (8,770 t) (standard load) 11,017 long tons (11,194 t) (deep load)
Length:	555 ft 6 in (169.3 m)
Beam:	62 ft (18.9 m)
Draught:	19 ft 10 in (6.0 m)
Installed power:	80,000 shp (60,000 kW)
Propulsion:	4 shafts, Parsons geared steam turbines 4 Admiralty 3-drum water-tube boilers
Speed:	32.25 knots (59.73 km/h; 37.11 mph)
Range:	6,250 nmi (11,580 km; 7,190 mi) at 13 knots (24 km/h; 15 mph)
Complement:	733 (peacetime), 900 (wartime)
Armament:	4 × 3 - 6-inch Mk XXIII guns 4 × 2 - 4-inch MK XVI AA guns 4 × 2 - 2-pounder AA guns 2 × 3 - 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes
Armour:	Engine and boiler rooms: 3.25 in (83 mm) Decks: 2–3.5 in (51–89 mm) Magazines: 2–3.5 in (51–89 mm) Gun turrets: 1–2 in (25–51 mm)
Aircraft carried:	2 × Supermarine Sea Otter
Aviation facilities:	1 × catapult, 2 × hangars
Motto:	Non sibi sed patriae (Latin: "Not for oneself, but for one's country")
Nickname:	'The Fighting J'

HMS Jamaica, a Crown Colony-class cruiser of the Royal Navy, was named after the island of Jamaica, which was a British possession when she was built in the late 1930s. The light cruiser spent almost her entire wartime career on Arctic convoy duties, except for a deployment south for the landings in North Africa in November 1942. She participated in the Battle of the Barents Sea in 1942 and the Battle of North Cape in 1943. Jamaica escorted severalaircraft carriers in 1944 as they flew off airstrikes that attacked the German battleship Tirpitz in northern Norway. Late in the year she had an extensive refit to prepare her for service with the British Pacific Fleet, but the war ended before she reached the Pacific.

Force R sailed from Kola on 27 December to rendezvous with Convoy JW 51B in the Norwegian Sea, but the convoy had been blown southwards by a major storm. Several of its ships had been separated during storm and they confused the radar of Force R's ships as to the true location of the convoy. Thus Force R was 30 miles (48 km) north of the convoy on the morning of 31 December when theheavy cruiser Admiral Hipper attacked the convoy. Admiral Hipper was first held at bay by the British destroyers HMS Onslow,HMS Obedient, HMS Obdurate and HMS Orwell. Initially driven off, Admiral Hipper returned, only to be engaged by Force R shortly before noon and was hit by three 6-inch shells from the cruisers. Two German destroyers, Z16 Friedrich Eckoldt and Z4 Richard Beitzen, misidentified Sheffield as Admiral Hipper and attempted to form up on her. Sheffield sank Friedrich Eckoldt at a range of 2 miles (3.2 km) while Jamaica unsuccessfully engaged Richard Beitzen. Less than an hour later Force R spotted the pocket battleshipLutzow and Admiral Hipper and opened fire. Neither side scored any hits in the darkness before both sides turned away a few minutes later. Force R continued to track the German ships for several hours before they lost contact. Although the destroyer HMS Achatesand the minesweeper HMS Bramble were sunk by the Kriegsmarine, the convoy reached the Kola Inlet intact.^[5] Force R remained at sea to protect Convoy RA 51 that was returning to Great Britain^[6] until relieved by HMS Berwick and HMS Kent.^[7]

Jamaica was relieved of escort duties on her return in January 1943 and had her main gun barrels replaced in March. She rejoined the Home Fleet, but was refitted in Portsmouth from July to September.^[7] Sometime during the year she received six twin power-operated 20-millimetre (0.8 in) AA guns as well as four single guns.^[8] During November she protected the convoys RA 54B, JW 54A, JW 54Band RA 54B, but was not engaged.^[7] On 15 December she was assigned to Force 2, the distant escort for Convoy JW 55A, with the battleship HMS Duke of York and four destroyers. Force 2 was commanded by Admiral Bruce Fraser, Commander-in-Chief of Home Fleet, in Duke of York. For the first time the British distant cover force escorted the convoy all the way to the Kola Inlet. Their passage was uneventful and Force 2 sailed on 18 December to refuel at Iceland. Before he reached his destination, Admiral Fraser receivedUltra information that a sortie by the German battleship Scharnhorst was likely to attack Convoy JW 55B, which was already at sea.^[9]

Battle of North Cape[edit]

Main article: Battle of North Cape

The torpedomen of HMS Jamaicawho finally dispatched the Scharnhorst, at Scapa Flow after the sinking of the German warship on 26 December 1943. The men are still wearing their anti-flash gear.

German aerial reconnaissance spotted the convoy on 22 December, and Scharnhorst, escorted by five destroyers of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, sailed on 25 December to intercept it. The resulting engagement became known as the Battle of North Cape.^[10] The Germans were spotted on the morning of 26 December and were engaged by the covering force that consisted of the cruisers HMS Belfast, HMS Sheffield, HMS Norfolk and four destroyers. Meanwhile HMSJamaica and HMS Duke Of York approached from the south west, barring the Scharnhorst’s path of retreat. The German battleship turned for her base at Altafjord in the early afternoon after two brief encounters with the British cruisers. She was spotted by Duke of York's Type 273 radar at a range of 45,500 yards (41,600 m) and Duke of York opened fire half an hour later. Jamaica fired her first salvo a minute after, and hit Scharnhorst on her third broadside. She was forced to cease fire after 19 volleys as the German ship was faster in the heavy seas than the British ships, and was opening up the range despite heavy damage from the British shells. One shell from Duke of York's last volley penetrated into Scharnhorst's Number One boiler room and effectively destroyed it. This reduced the German ship's speed sufficiently for the British destroyers to catch up and make four torpedo hits using a pincer attack. This slowed the ship again, so that Jamaica and Duke of York also caught up and opened fire at a range of 10,400 yards (9,500 m). They hit the German ship continually, but she was not sinking after 20 minutes of firing so Jamaica was ordered to torpedo her. Two torpedoes from her first volley of three missed and the third misfired, so the cruiser had to turn about to fire her other broadside of three, two of which appeared to hit. Belfast and the destroyers also fired torpedoes before Scharnhorst finally sank.

Lützow:

German cruiser Deutschland

Deutschland in 1935.
Career (Weimar Republic)
Name:	Deutschland
Builder:	Deutsche Werke, Kiel
Laid down:	5 February 1929
Launched:	19 May 1931
Commissioned:	1 April 1933
Fate:	Sunk as target 1947
General characteristics
Class & type:	Deutschland class cruiser
Displacement:	Design: 12,630 t (12,430 long tons; 13,920 short tons) Full load: 14,290 long tons (14,520 t)
Length:	186 m (610 ft 3 in)
Beam:	21.69 m (71 ft 2 in)
Draft:	7.25 m (23 ft 9 in)
Propulsion:	Eight MAN diesel engines Two propellers 52,050 shp (38,810 kW)
Speed:	28 knots (52 km/h)
Range:	10,000 nautical miles (19,000 km; 12,000 mi) at 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph)
Complement:	As built: 33 officers 586 enlisted After 1935: 30 officers 921–1,040 enlisted
Sensors and processing systems:	1940: FMG 39 G(gO) 1941: FMG 39 G(gO) FuMO 26
Armament:	As built: 6 × 28 cm (11 in) in triple turrets 8 × 15 cm (5.9 in) in single turrets 8 × 53.3 cm (21.0 in) torpedo tubes
Armor:	main turrets: 140 mm (5.5 in) belt: 80 mm (3.1 in) deck: 45 mm (1.8 in)
Aircraft carried:	Two Arado Ar 196 seaplanes
Aviation facilities:	One catapult

Deutschland was the lead ship of her class of heavy cruisers (often termed apocket battleship) which served with the Kriegsmarine of Nazi Germany duringWorld War II. Ordered by the Weimar government for the Reichsmarine, she was laid down at the Deutsche Werke shipyard in Kiel in February 1929 and completed by April 1933. Originally classified as an armored ship (Panzerschiff) by the Reichsmarine, in February 1940 the Germans reclassified the remaining two ships of this class as heavy cruisers.^[a] In 1940, she was renamed Lützow, after the Admiral Hipper class heavy cruiserLützow was handed over to the Soviet Union.

The ship saw significant action with the Kriegsmarine, including several non-intervention patrols, during which she was attacked by Republican bombers. At the outbreak of World War II, she was cruising the North Atlantic, prepared to attack Allied merchant traffic. Bad weather hampered her efforts, and she only sank or captured a handful of vessels before returning to Germany. She then participated in Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Norway. Damaged at the Battle of Drøbak Sound, she was recalled to Germany for repairs. While en route, she was torpedoed and seriously damaged by a British submarine.

Repairs were completed by March 1941, Lützow returned to Norway to join the forces arrayed against Allied shipping to the Soviet Union. She ran aground during a planned attack on convoy PQ 17, which necessitated another return to Germany for repairs. She next saw action at the Battle of the Barents Seawith the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, which ended with a failure to destroy the convoy JW 51B. Engine problems forced a series of repairs culminating in a complete overhaul at the end of 1943, after which the ship remained in theBaltic. Sunk in the Kaiserfahrt in April 1945 by Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers, Lützow was used as a gun battery to support German troops fighting the Soviet Army until 4 May 1945, when she was disabled by her crew. Raised by the Soviet Navy in 1947, she was subsequently sunk as a target in the Baltic.

Deployment to Norway[edit]

Lützow left Germany on 15 May 1942 for Norway; by 25 May she had joined Admiral Scheer in Bogen Bay. She was made the flagship of the now Vizeadmiral Kummetz, the commander of Kampfgruppe 2. Fuel shortages restricted operations, although Lützow andAdmiral Scheer were able to conduct limited battle training exercises. Kampfgruppe 2 was assigned to Operation Rösselsprung, a planned attack on the Allied convoy PQ 17, which was headed to the Soviet Union. On 3 July, the force left their anchorages, and in heavy fog Lützow and three destroyers ran aground and suffered significant damage.^[30] The British detected the German departure and ordered the convoy to scatter. Aware that surprise had been lost, the Germans broke off the surface attack and turned the destruction of PQ-17 over to the U-boats and Luftwaffe. Twenty-four of the convoy's thirty-five transports were sunk.^[31] Lützowreturned to Germany for repairs, which lasted until the end of October. She began a brief set of trials starting on 30 October. She returned to Norway in early November with a destroyer escort, arriving in Narvik on the 12th.^[30]

On 30 December, Lützow, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, and six destroyers left Narvik for Operation Regenbogen, an attack on convoy JW 51B, which was reported by German intelligence to be lightly escorted.^[30] Kummetz's plan was to divide his force in half; he would take Admiral Hipper and three destroyers north of the convoy to attack it and draw away the escorts. Lützow and the remaining three destroyers would then attack the undefended convoy from the south. At 09:15 on the 31st, the British destroyerObdurate spotted the three destroyers screening for Admiral Hipper; the Germans opened fire first. Four of the other five destroyers escorting the convoy rushed to join the fight, while Achates laid a smoke screen to cover the convoy. Kummetz then turned back north to draw the destroyers away. Captain Robert Sherbrooke, the British escort commander, left two destroyers to cover the convoy while he took the remaining four to pursue Admiral Hipper.^[32]

Lützow meanwhile steamed toward the convoy from the south, and at 11:42 she opened fire. The harsh conditions negatively affected her shooting, which ceased by 12:03 without any hits.^[33] Rear Admiral Robert Burnett's Force R, centered on the cruisers Sheffieldand Jamaica, standing by in distant support of the Allied convoy,^[34] raced to the scene. The cruisers engaged Admiral Hipper, which had been firing to port at the destroyer Obedient. Burnett's ships approached from Admiral Hipper's starboard side and achieved complete surprise.^[35] Lützow was then ordered to break off the attack on the convoy and reinforce Admiral Hipper.^[33] Lützowinadvertently came alongside Sheffield and Jamaica, and after identifying them as hostile, engaged them, though her fire remained inaccurate. The British cruisers turned toward Lützow and came under fire from both German cruisers. Burnett quickly decided to withdraw in the face of superior German firepower; his ships were armed with 6 in (150 mm) guns, while Admiral Hipper and Lützowcarried 20.3 cm (8.0 in) and 28 cm (11 in) guns, respectively.^[36]

Operations in the Baltic[edit]

Lützow, sunk in the Kaiserfahrt, on 26 April

Hitler was furious over the failure to destroy the convoy, and ordered that all remaining German major warships be broken up for scrap. In protest, Raeder resigned; Hitler replaced him with Admiral Karl Dönitz, who persuaded Hitler to rescind the order to dismantle the Kriegmarine's surface ships. In March, Lützow moved to Altafjord, where she experienced problems with her diesel engines. The propulsion system proved to be so problematic that repairs in Germany were necessary. She briefly returned to Norway, but by the end of September 1943, a thorough overhaul was required. The work was completed in Kiel by January 1944, after which she remained in the Baltic Sea to conduct training cruises for new naval personnel.^[33]

On 13 April 1945, twenty-four Avro Lancaster bombers attacked Lützow and Prinz Eugenwithout success due to cloud cover. The RAF made another failed attack two days later, but on 16 April, a force of eighteen Lancasters scored a single hit and several near misses on Lützow with Tallboy bombs in the Kaiserfahrt.^[37] The water was shallow enough that her main deck was still 2 m (6 ft 7 in) above water, permitting her use as a stationary gun battery against advancing Soviet forces. She continued in this role until 4 May,^[5] by which time she had expended her main battery ammunition. Her crew rigged scuttling charges to destroy the hull, but a fire caused the explosives to detonate prematurely.^[38] The ultimate fate of Lützow was long unclear, as with most of the ships seized by the Soviet Navy. According to historians Erich Gröner and M. J. Whitley, the Soviet Navy raised the ship in September 1947 and broke her up for scrap in 1948–1949.^[5][39] Historians Hildebrand, Röhr and Steinmetz, in their book Die Deutschen Kriegsschiffe, state that she instead sank off Kolberg, claiming that theLützow broken up in the late 1940s was instead the Admiral Hipper-class cruiser Lützow that had been sold to the Soviet Union in 1940.^[40] The historian Hans Georg Prager examined the former Soviet archives in the early 2000s, and discovered that Lützowactually had been sunk in weapons tests in July 1947.

Raeder, Admiral:

Erich Raeder
Großadmiral Erich Raeder
Birth name	Erich Johann Albert Raeder
Born	24 April 1876 Wandsbek
Died	6 November 1960 (aged 84) Kiel
Allegiance	German Empire  Weimar Republic  Nazi Germany
Service/branch	Kaiserliche Marine  Reichsmarine  Kriegsmarine
Years of service	1894–1943
Rank	Großadmiral
Commands held	SMS Cöln
Battles/wars	World War I Raid on Yarmouth Raid on Hartlepool Battle of Dogger Bank Bombardment of Lowestoft Battle of Jutland Action of 19 August 1916 World War II
Awards	Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross

Erich Johann Albert Raeder (24 April 1876 – 6 November 1960) was a navalleader in Germany before and during World War II. Raeder attained the highest possible naval rank—that of Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) — in 1939, becoming the first person to hold that rank since Alfred von Tirpitz. Raeder led the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) for the first half of the war; he resigned in 1943 and was replaced by Karl Dönitz. He was sentenced to life in prison at the Nuremberg Trials, but was released early due to failing health. Raeder is also well known for dismissing Reinhard Heydrich from the German Navy in April 1931 for "conduct unbecoming to an officer and gentleman".

Raeder believed the navy was unprepared for the start of World War by about 5 years. The surface fleet was inadequate to fight the Royal Navy and instead adopted the Guerre de course strategy. He did want the surface fleet to play their part because he feared the budget would be cut after the war. The smaller ships were dispersed around the world to divert the strength of the Royal Navy, while the battleships would carry out raids in the North Sea, with a view to gradually reducing the Royal Navy's strength at home.

Raeder was unhappy with the outcome of the Battle of the River Plate and thought that Hans Langsdorff should not have scuttled his ship to save the crew. Instead, Raeder issued orders that ships were to fight until the last shell and either win or sink with their flag flying. Hermann Boehm was made the scapegoat and was sacked by Raeder.

Admiral Rolf Carls started to give the idea of invading Norway to Raeder in September 1939. Raeder took the idea up in October. Raeder saw the invasion as a means of evading the British blockade. In particular, it would help with the import of Iron Ore from Sweden. Quisling started to assist with the idea in December. The invasion proved costly in surface ships with only 3 cruisers left undamaged. The victory over France gave better Atlantic ports and access to the iron fields of Lorraine i.e. there was no need to invade Norway.

Raeder ordered the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau into action off the North Cape. This has raised some considerable criticism of Raeder, brought about by the fear, of Raeder's, that the war would be won without the navy. The mission was not a great success and Raeder sacked Admiral Marschall.

Raeder needed to take over the French fleet to make good his own losses, but Hitler refused believing the French would refuse and defect to Britain.

On the 11th July 1940, Hitler and Raeder agreed to continue to build the battleships of Plan Z. They were expecting a war with the USA. Raeder also had bases built at Tronheim, St Nazaire and Lorient. At this time, Raeder and other senior officers began submitting memos to invade (among others) the Shetlands, Iceland, the Azores, Iran, Madagascar, Kuwait, Egypt and the Dutch East Indies.

Raeder was opposed to Hitler's plan to invade the UK. Instead he preferred the idea of invading Suez. Hitler could not do so without Italian permission which did not occur until early 1941. Hitler started to think about invading Russia at this time. Raeder agreed at first but changed his mind because he saw the UK as Germany's enemy and feared the USA would join in as well.

In January 1941, Scharhorst and Gneisenau were sent on a successful raid in the Atlantic. On the 18th March, Raeder wanted to start firing on US warships even if unprovoked. He also wanted the Japanese to enter the war. He declined to invade the Azores on the grounds of the surface ship losses the previous year.

In April 1941, Raeder planned to follow up the success of the Scharhorst/Gneisenau mission with an even larger mission involving 2 battleships and 2 cruises under the command of Lutjens. Part of the motivation was political. One of the battle ships was damaged in an air raid and in the end only the Bismark and Prince Eugen wnet out. The mission ended with the sinking of the Bismark. The debacle almost saw the end of using capital ships against merchant shipping. Raeder was personally pleased as it had won some glory. Hitler was not pleased and saw the Bismark as a poor investment. Lutzow was the last attempt to use capital ships as merchant raiders.

In late 1941, Raeder planned the channel dash to send the remaining capital ships to Norway. This was to threaten the Russian convoys, to deter an invasion of Norway and to tie down the Home fleet that may otherwise be used in the Atlantic. Neither Raeder nor Hitler could make their minds up as to what the fleet should be doing.

In early 1942, the U boat war of Karl Dönitz began to overshadow Raeder and a feud between the two began. Raeder did notice the success of the U boats though.

In December 1942, Raeder had uniformed British commandos shot.

After a series of failed operations, especially the Battle of the Barents Sea, Raeder was demoted to Admiral Inspector. This office was only ceremonial. Raeder intended to tell Hitler about the failure of Barents Sea and explain it as series of misunderstandings. However the message was not passed on and Hitler thinking that the battle was a success announced that. When Hitler found out the truth, he summoned Raeder to explain himself. When Raeder turned up, Hitler gave him a piece of his mind and decided he was going to scrap the German surface fleet. On the 30th January 1943 Raeder resigned.

Doenitz, Admiral: 

Karl Dönitz (German: [ˈdøːnɪts] ( listen); 16 September 1891 – 24 December 1980) was a German naval commander during World War II. He started his career in the German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine, or "Imperial Navy") before World War I. In 1918, while he was in command of UB-68, the submarine was sunk by British forces and Dönitz was taken prisoner. While in a prisoner of war camp, he formulated what he later called Rudeltaktik^[2]("pack tactic", commonly called "wolfpack"). At the start of World War II, he was the senior submarine officer in the German Navy. In January 1943, Dönitz achieved the rank of Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) and replaced Grand Admiral Erich Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine).

Karl Dönitz
Großadmiral Karl Dönitz, later Reichspräsidentof Germany
President of Germany
In office 30 April – 23 May 1945
Chancellor	Joseph Goebbels Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk (Leading Minister)
Preceded by	Adolf Hitler (as Führer) Paul von Hindenburg (in title)
Succeeded by	Theodor Heuss (as Bundespräsident) Wilhelm Pieck (as Staatspräsident)
Personal details
Born	16 September 1891 Grünau, German Empire
Died	24 December 1980 (aged 89) Aumühle, West Germany
Nationality	German
Political party	National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) (1944–1945)[1]
Spouse(s)	Ingeborg Weber
Children	3
Religion	Protestant
Signature
Military service
Nickname(s)	Der Löwe (The Lion)
Allegiance	German Empire (1910–1918)  Weimar Republic (1920–1933)  Nazi Germany (1933–1945)
Service/branch	Kaiserliche Marine  Reichsmarine  Kriegsmarine
Years of service	1910–1945
Rank	Großadmiral
Commands	SM UC-25 (February–September 1918) SM UB-68 (September–October 1918) Torpedo Boats (1920s) Emden (1934–1935) 1st U-boat Flotilla (1935–1936) FdU (1936–1939) BdU (1939–1943) OBdM (1943–1945) Supreme Commander of theWehrmacht (April–May 1945)
Battles/wars	World War I Black Sea Campaign Mediterranean U-boat Campaign World War II Battle of the Atlantic Convoy SC 7 OperationPaukenschlag(Drumbeat)
Awards	U-boat War Badge with Diamonds World War I U-Boat War Badge 1939 Clasp to the 1914 Iron Cross 1st Class Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves

On 30 April 1945, after the death of Adolf Hitler and in accordance with Hitler's last will and testament, Dönitz was named Hitler's successor as Staatsoberhaupt (Head of State), with the title of Reichspräsident (President) and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. On 7 May 1945, he ordered Alfred Jodl to sign the German instruments of surrender in Rheims, France.^[3] Dönitz remained as head of the Flensburg Government, as it became known, until it was dissolved by the Allied powers on 23 May.

Commander-in-chief and Grand Admiral

On 30 January 1943, Dönitz replaced Erich Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine) and Grand Admiral (Großadmiral) of the Naval High Command (Oberkommando der Marine). His deputy, Eberhard Godt, took over the operational command of the U-boat force^[13] It was Dönitz who was able to convince Hitler not to scrap the remaining ships of the surface fleet. Despite hoping to continue to use them as a fleet in being, the Kriegsmarine continued to lose what few capital ships it had. In September, the battleship Tirpitz was put out of action for months by a British midget submarine, and was sunk a year later by RAF bombers at anchor in Norway. In December, he ordered the battleship Scharnhorst (under Konteradmiral Erich Bey) to attack Soviet-bound convoys, after reconsidering her success in the early years of the war with sister ship Gneisenau, but she was sunk in the resulting encounter with superior British forces led by the battleship HMS Duke of York.