With the early manifestations of the Japanese philosophy, Hakko Ichiu--"Bringing the eight corners of the world under one roof"--we are not concerned. It is sufficient to note that by September 1940, when Japan became a signatory to the Tripartite Treaty and Hitler began to push his Oriental partner into a war with the United States, Japan had already established herself as a first rate military power. For by having thrown off the yoke of the 5-5-3 naval limitations ratio, she had proceeded to build up her combatant strength, while correspondingly increasing pressure on the future Allies for gains in the Pacific. Yet had our future enemy, by her own peculiar standards, been able to avert a major confrontation, there is every likelihood she would have done so. "If I am told to fight regardless of consequence," Fleet Admiral Yamamoto is reported to have told Prince Kanoye, "I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second and third years. The Tripartite Treaty has been concluded and we cannot help it. Now that the situation has come to this pass I hope you will endeavor for avoidance of an American-Japanese war."
As of the fall of 1941, there were six essential Japanese demands and concessions under discussion in Washington:
(1) No further United States assistance to Chang Kai Shek, and to permit Japan to settle her own affairs
with China;
(2) No arms build-up of the United States and British in the Far East;
(3) No interference with Japanese-French relations as to Indochina;
(4) American assistance in obtaining raw materials by the restoration of free trade between the two
countries;
(5) No utilization of Indonesia as a base of operations against any country except China; and
(6) Japan to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.
At this time, the United States Pacific Fleet was berthed at Pearl HArbor, and Admiral Husband Kimmel was appointed Commander-in-Chief to succeed Admiral J.O. Richardson, the latter having objected strenuously to Pearl Harbor as a base for logical reasons. Politically, however, it was felt that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii constituted a "restraining influence on Japan," and there, despite a questionable condition of readiness, it remained. Earlier in the year the "ABC-1 Staff Agreement" was concluded with Britain, an agreement which pledged the United States to defeat Hitler first regardless of wether Japan attacked the United States. In the event of a Pacific war, we would launch a series of tactical offensives, and nothing more. This, too, was the conclusion of the ABD (America, Britain, Dutch) conference, which incidentally placed Admiral Thomas Hart's Asiatic Fleet under British strategic direction upon any outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific.
By January 1941, the situation between Washington and Tokyo had worsened considerably, in spite of the appointment of Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura as Ambassador--a man known to be opposed to an open break with the United States. Nevertheless, as talks continued between the future antagonists, Japan began her build-up of military strength in the Marshalls and Carolines. This also was the month when Ambassador Joseph Grew made a significant entry in his diary: "There is a lot of talk going around town to the effect that the Japanese, in case of a break with the United States, are planning to go all out in a surprise mass attack at Pearl Harbor. Of course I informed our government."
In Grew's memoirs, one sees Japan mediating in an undeclared war between Thailand and French Indochina, and gaining for herself not only a monopoly of Indochina rice but also the airport at Saigon, within striking distance of Singapore. Reaction in the Gallup poll to this latest Japanese coup indicated a bare majority of American voters sanctioned a war with our future antagonist, in order to prevent her from seizing Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. By chance Congress passed the Lend Lease law the next day.
From this time, the pace of Japan's diplomatic machinations quickened perceptibly. On 13, February she concluded a nonagression pact with Russia, the latter signing because a German attack was expected, the former because she wanted to solidify her position on the Manchurian border. Two months later, Japanese merchant ships were ordered out of the Atlantic and between one and two million conscripts were called up. Grew was then informed that Vichy had agreed to a joint protectorate over French Indochina, meaning free Japanese rule over the entire colony and a direct threat to the security of the Philippines. President Roosevelt's response was immediate and forceful: Japanese assets in the United States were promptly frozen, including oil. War was inevitable unless the United States reversed her policy, or Japan halted her southward march and evacuated China.
As seen from the vantage point of the White House, Army and Navy Intelligence, and the State Department, the events following 26 July made manifest Japan's aggressive intentions. Because we were in possession of our future enemy's codes for the past several months, we were able to intercept and decipher her consular messages. But what her precise actions were to be we did not know. Hawaii, at any rate, was alerted prior to the Embargo Act. Admiral C. C.Bloch recalled: "Admiral Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advisability of sending out reconnaissance planes with the median line of the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 to 20 degrees. And we sent planes out every morning to 500 miles." The die was cast, and both sides during the remaining four months of peace stalled for time.
Despite the earnest efforts of some Japanese officials to prevent a war. Foreign Minister Toyoda spelled out his country's intentions in an intercepted message to his Washington representative. The message was received by Cordell Hull on 4 August, and stated that Japan "must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Sea. Our empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement by England and the United States." By now the Mid-Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill was over, having resolved that "any further encroachment by Japan in the southwestern PAcific would produce a situation" in which the Allies "would be compelled to take countermeasures even though these might lead to war . . ."
Correspondingly, Japan had set herself a deadline to go "against America, England, and Holland" during the first part of October, unless oil inventories were unfrozen. She could not by any estimate afford to wait. In october, because of dissension at her top echelons, Toyoda resigned and General Tojo formed his cabinet. Several weeks later, Japan's Army and Navy concluded a "Central Agreement" in the event of war, which provided this blueprint of initial attack:
(1) simultaneous landings of amphibious forces in Luzon, Guam, the Malay Peninsula, Hong Kong,
and Miri, British North Borneo, All except the last to be preceded by air attacks;
(2) carrier air attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor;
(3) rapid exploitation of initial successes by the seizure of Manila, Mindanao, Wake Island, the
Bismarcks, Bangkok, and Singapore; and
(4) occupation of the Dutch East Indies and continuation of the war with China
Renewed "negotiations" (Hull termed the initial meeting an ultimatum) were stalemated, and on 24 November, Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, sent this message to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor and Admiral Hart at Manila:
"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility . . . Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action."
Other negotiations followed, with the United States Fleet committed to surveillance in two oceans, simultaneously realizing that Tojo intended to strike somewhere in the Pacific. The "where" of it was the big question. On 27, November, the situation was at its gravest when Stark sent Hart and Kimmel his "war warning" message.
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward
stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased. An aggressive move by Japan is expected
within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of
naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying
out the tasks assigned to WPL 46.
Meanwhile, the two-phase Imperial Japanese Navy's attack operation had already been set in motion. The first phase was opened 7 November, when the Combined Fleet began unobtrusively to rendezvous at Tankan Bay in the Kuriles; the second was executed 22 November when Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's Pearl Harbor Striking Force, built around six aircraft carriers, got underway on its epochal mission. Nevertheless, Tojo's instructions to his diplomats in Washington were to continue negotiations. Although his fleet was Pearl Harbor bound, it was subject to recall; if on the slightest chance the United States capitulated, it would be. Still under theoretical discussion in Japan was the United States' "Basis for Agreement," a final proposal for peace; although Tojo flatly rejected it 29 November, his Washington representatives continued to meet with Mr. Hull over the conference table. On 2 December, however, Tokyo ordered its Washington embassy to burn all codes except one; on the same day, Japan's Honululu consul was ordered to report daily on the disposition and number of warships at Pearl Harbor, and weather they were shielded by protective nets.
Thus, the string had run out. On 6 December, President Roosevelt asked Emperor Hirohito in a personal message for a continuance of peace, begging him in the name of humanity to withdraw his forces threatening "the hundreds of islands of the East Indies," Philippines, Thailand, and Malaya. Hirohito did not reply.
Next day, 7 December, in accordance with instructions from their government, Japanese diplomats asked for a meeting with Hull at 1 P.M., or twenty minutes before the hour of the Pearl Harbor attack. Because of a delay, the meeting was postponed an hour. By this time, hostilities had already commenced.
--S.E. Smith
From: The United States Navy in World War II
Preface to Part I: Last Days of Peace
No comments:
Post a Comment