Daniel Dickel: ABANDON SHIP!

At 10:14 a Yorktown fighter on combat patrol spotted a Kawanishi four-engine flying boat and promptly shot it down. At 10:55 the radar showed a large group of enemy planes approaching from the northeast.

At 11:13 the Lexington's lookout sighted the first of the attackers. The battle was on.

The weather was bright and sunny, with hardly a cloud in the sky. The Japanese had no difficulty in finding us. On the sparkling, tropical sea, we were visible from miles away. Our move to the south the night before had given the enemy this advantage, but it also meant that they had no cloud cover to mask their approach. The clear visibility gave our anti-aircraft guns full play.

Fighter direction was still in its early stage of development. Control was on board the Lexington for all the fighters in the air. There were 17 in all, eight from the Yorktown plus the Lexington's nine, with Lieutenant "Red" Gill as fighter-direction officer. The single, early model radar we had on board picked up the enemy aircraft at a distance of 68 miles, but gave no indication of their altitude. On those old radars it was also difficult to distinguish friendly from enemy planes, We felt that if our fighters were sent far out on interception, they might miss the contact, owing to differences in altitude and thus be wasted. We were also influenced by the belief that the torpedo planes represented the greater hazard and that they would come in low. Accordingly, we kept our fighters close in overhead, at 10,000 feet, ready to attack when the enemy groups arrived at their "Push-over" point. The Dauntless dive bombers on anti-torpedo-plane patrol were stationed at 2,000 feet, 6,000 yards out. We learned in this battle that to break up an air attack it was necessary to intercept it at a much greater distance from the carriers. It must be remembered that this was the first carrier duel in history, and we were learning our tactics by experience. Nevertheless, our defending planes sis a magnificent job.

Five Lexington fighters were vectored out at 11:02 to intercept the oncoming craft. They made contact 20 miles away and reported one group of 50 to 60 planes stacked in layers from 10,000 to 13,000 feet, with torpedo planes in the lowest level, then fighters, then dive bombers, then more fighters. There were approximately 18 torpedo planes, 18 dive bombers, and 24 fighters in this group.

Two of our five fighters had been sent low to look for torpedo planes. The other three fighters in the intercepting unit climbed madly for altitude and dashed in to attack. Engaged by the Zeros, they shot down several but were unable to stop the bombers before they started their dives. The two low fighters attacked the torpedo plans as they dropped down for their part in the battle, but were unsuccessful in stopping them.

The sir fighting now became a melee. Our own planes were mixed in with the enemy and the sky was black with flak bursts. The Japanese spent no time in maneuvering, but dived straight in for the kill. The huge Lexington dwarfed the other ships in the formation and bore the brunt of the attack.

It was beautifully coordinated. From my bridge I saw bombers roaring down in steep dives from many points in the sky, and torpedo planes coming in on both bows almost simultaneously. There was nothing I could do about the bombers, but I could do something to avoid the torpedoes.

As I saw a bomb leave one of the planes, it seemed to be coming straight for where I stood on the bridge. Had I better duck behind the thin armored shield? If it had my name on it, I thought, there was no use dodging, and if not, there was no need to worry. At any rate, I had work to do to try to evade the torpedoes.

The ideal way to drop torpedoes was for groups of planes to let go simultaneously on both bows. In this method, if the target ship turned toward one group to parallel its torpedoes, it presented its broadside to the other. The timing was vital. The enormous Lexington was very slow in returning. It took 30 to 40 seconds just to put the rudder hard over. When she did start to turn, she moved majestically and ponderously in a large circle. Maneuverability was greatly improved in later carriers.

As I saw the enemy torpedo planes coming in on both bows, it seemed to me that those to port were closer than those to starboard. They were approaching in steep glides, faster than we considered practicable for torpedo dropping. The air was full of anti-aircraft bursts and the din was terrific. When the planes to port were about 1,000 yards away, I motioned to the helmsman, Chief Quartermaster McKenzie, for hard left rudder. It seemed an eternity before the bow started to turn, just as the enemy planes started disgorging their fish.

The water in all directions seemed full of torpedo wakes. Bombs were also dropping all around us. Great geysers of water from near misses were going up higher than our masts, and occasionally the ship shuddered from the explosions of the ones that hit.

In less than a minute, the first torpedoes had passed astern. We quickly shifted rudder to head for the second group of planes. These split up to fire on both bows, the hardest maneuver for us to counter. Then it became a matter of wriggling and twisting as best we could to avoid the deadly weapons heading our way. I remember seeing two wakes coming straight for our port beam, and there was nothing I could do about them. The wakes approaching the ship's side, and I braced myself for the explosion. Nothing happened. I rushed to the starboard bridge, and there were the wakes emerging from that side. The torpedoes were running too deep and had passed completely under the ship.

My air officer on the bridge was Commander H. S. Duckworth, "Don't change course, Captain!" he exclaimed. "There's a torpedo on each side of us running parallel!" We held our course with a torpedo 50 yards on either beam and both finally disappeared without hitting.

Enemy planes were being shot down as it hit the water, it's torpedo still slung on its belly. Before it sank, we noticed a peculiar wooden framework around the missile's nose and propeller mechanism. This explained why the Japanese were able to drop their torpedoes at such high speed and altitudes. The cushioning devices permitted them to enter the water without excessive shock to the delicate machinery. It was a scheme still undeveloped by our ordinance experts, and gave the Japanese at least a temporary superiority in torpedo warfare.

Five bombs had landed on the Lexington. Two torpedoes exploded against our port side. The water spouts of three near misses which splashed water on the deck were also thought at first to be from torpedoes, but subsequent examination showed only two actual hits by this weapon.

One bomb had hit the port gun gallery just outside the Admiral's cabin. It wiped out most of the gun crews in that vicinity, and started fires. In addition, it killed Commander Gilmore, our paymaster, and Commander Trojalkowski, our dentist, who were in the passageway just inboard, and communications men in an adjacent room.

Bombs started fires in other parts of the ship, but none was especially serious. Fragments killed men in one of the fire-control stations aloft. One bomb passed between the bridge and the funnel and severed the wire pull on the siren, setting it off to add its sorrowful wail to the ear-shattering din.

Suddenly all was quiet again. It was as though some hidden director had signaled for silence. The Japanese planes were no longer in sight, the guns had stopped shooting for lack of targets. The sea was still dotted with burning planes; our own aircraft were seen in the distance, assembling to be ready for further action. But the enemy were through.

I looked at my watch. The entire attack had lasted just nine minutes. It seemed hours since we had first sighted the enemy planes.

Off in the distance to the southeastward, we could see the Yorktown, a column of black smoke rising from her flight deck. Evidently she too had been damaged. she had been attacked by both torpedo planes and dive bombers, but with her greater maneuverability had managed to evade all torpedoes and was hit only by one large bomb, which had penetrated the flight deck and exploded in a storeroom down below. It had killed 37 men outright and wounded many others. Near misses had caused several fragment holes in the hull along the water line. Otherwise the Yorktown was undamaged.

Taking stock on the Lexington, we found things not so bad as they might have been. The small fires down below were being fought by the damage-control parties, who reported that they would soon have them under control No smoke from the flames was showing above decks. The ship had taken only a seven-degree list from the torpedo hits, and this was rapidly being corrected by shifting water ballast. The engine room reported full power and speed available if I wanted it. Our flight deck was intact. We felt like throwing out our chests at our condition after the attack. But our satisfaction was soon to be changed to apprehension.

We proceeded to land our planes which were in the vicinity, and out of ammunition or gas after their air battles. We replenished the ammunition of our guns and refilled the ammunition hoists to be ready for another attack should one come. Lieutenant Commander H. R. ("Pop") Healy, our Damage Control Officer, was down in the Central Station, below the armored deck, where directions for all damage control were issued and reports received. He had just phoned the bridge to inform me that all damage was under control. "If we have another attack," he said, "I'd like to take it on the starboard side, since both torpedo hits were to port."

At 12:47, the Lexington was suddenly shaken by a terrific internal explosion which seemed to come from the bottom of the ship. It rocked the huge structure more violently than had anything we had received during the battle. Smoke began emerging from around the edges of the elevator on the flight deck.

We called Central Station on the telephone but found the connection broken. The rudder indicator on the bridge was also out. All telephones were dead except a sound-powered one to the engine room. However, reports of huge fires breaking out in the vicinity of Central Station were soon received. The station itself was an inferno. A few men had escaped from it; others were rescued by volunteers who risked their lives in the flames, but the majority, including Healy, had been killed outright by the terrific explosion. Its cause was later established as the insidious accumulation of gasoline vapor, leaking unsuspected from our gasoline storage tanks, which had been weakened by the torpedo hits. It was an unexpected blow, but as yet we had no idea that it was to cost us the ship.

Raging fires, fed by gasoline, broke out from ruptured vents and risers. The main was broken in the area of the explosion, making the work of combating the flames extremely difficulty. Long hoses had to be led from the far after part of the ship, and only very low water pressure could be maintained. It was a losing battle from the beginning, but we did not know it then. We fully expected to save the carrier.

I remained on the bridge to direct the handling of the ship and to receive reports. Commander Mort Seligman, the executive officer, was everywhere, advising and encouraging the fire fighters. Small explosions of ammunition were occurring frequently in the vicinity of the fires, and Seligman was more than once blown like a cork out of a bottle from watertight doors through which he was passing. He brought to the bridge frequent reports of conditions down below. All lights were out and the damage-control men toiled in complete darkness expect for hand flashlights. The decks where they were working would grow hot from fires on the decks beneath.

Despite the loss of our rudder indicator on the bridge, we were able to steer from there for a while. It was during this period that we landed the torpedo squadron which returned so late and which we had feared was lost. Then the electric steering gear went completely out and we had to steer by maneuvering the engines, giving orders to the engine room over the one telephone still working. We were unable to use the hand steering in the station below for lack of communications to give the steersman there his course.

The fire continued to spread. More frequent explosions were occurring, and the surface of the elevator in the flight deck was beginning to glow a dull red. A report came from the engine control room that the forward engine-room bulkhead was getting white hot, and that the temperature in that vicinity had risen to 160 degrees. They asked permission, which I promptly granted, to abandon the forward engine room and use only the after engineroom space.

Then the one telephone began to get weaker. It was apparent that it was only a matter of time until it would go out completely. when it did, I realized, there would be no way to get the men out of the engine rooms. Unless I ordered them to leave, they would stay there, trapped by fire all around them, and hemmed in by red-hot bulkheads, until they perished. Over the weakening phone, I ordered these men to secure the engineering plant and get up on deck. Although we were unable to hear any reply, presently the sound of steam escaping form the safety valves assured me they had received the message. Eventually all of them found their way through the encircling fires to safety on the topside.

We now had no power and the ship lay dead in the water. Without pressure on the main, we were helpless even to fight the fire. I called a destroyer alongside to send over it's hoses, but the fire pumps on the small vessels in those early days were of such low capacity that only a trickle of water could be obtained from this source. It seemed outrageous that we could do nothing to put out the fire and save our ship.

At this time, about 17:00, Admiral Fitch, unperturbed and efficient, leaned over the flag bridge and told me I had better "get the boys off the ship." It was heartbreaking, but it seemed to be the only thing left to do. Reluctantly I gave the order to abandon ship. It was the hardest thing I have ever done. Nevertheless, if we could not prevent the loss of the Lexington, saving the lives of her crew was of utmost importance.

The officers and men were as reluctant to leave as I was. We had to order then to go. Most of the wounded were lowered to a destroyer alongside, the remainder going directly into small boats from the other ships. Some of the crew, while waiting to disembark, went below to the service store, which was not in the fire area. They filled their helmets with ice cream and stood around on the flight deck eating it. Knotted ropes were dropped over the side for the men to slide down into the water. Some of them lined up their shoes in orderly fashion on the deck before they left, as if they expected to return. There was not the slightest panic or disorder. I was proud of them.

I noticed one crowd waiting to go over the side at the port after gun gallery. As I approached to see what was delaying them, the men led by Marine Sergeant Peyton, gave "three cheers for the Captain." Their loyalty was inspiring.

Finally, just after sunset, all the crew were off. The water around the ship was black with bobbing heads of swimmers. Small boats from our escorts, cruisers and destroyers were busy picking men out of the water and transferring them to the other ships. After making a last inspection to insure that there were no stragglers, I stood with Commander Seligman at the stern. I directed him to leave, as it was my duty and privilege to be the last one to go. He went down into the water. I stood on the great ship alone.

While I was pausing there, a tremendous explosion took place amidships by the elevator. Planes and debris of all kinds went high into the air. Ducking under the edge of the flight deck to avoid the falling pieces, I decided t was time to go, and slid down the rope to do my stint of swimming until my turn came to be picked up by the rescue boats.

-Admiral Frederick C. Sherman

From: The United States Navy in World War II

Compiled and edited by: S.E. Smith

Part III: Chapter 4 Abandon Ship!

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USS Yorktown:

Career (United States)
USS Yorktown in July 1937
Name:	USS Yorktown (CV-5)
Namesake:	The Battle of Yorktown
Ordered:	3 August 1933
Builder:	Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.
Laid down:	21 May 1934
Launched:	4 April 1936
Sponsored by:	Eleanor Roosevelt
Commissioned:	30 September 1937
In service:	1937
Out of service:	1942
Struck:	2 October 1942
Honors and awards:	3 battle stars American Defense Service Medal ("A" device)/American Campaign Medal / Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal (3 stars) / World War II Victory Medal
Fate:	Sunk 7 June 1942 in the Battle of Midway, 141 men killed.
General characteristics
Class & type:	Yorktown-class aircraft carrier
Type:	Aircraft carrier
Displacement:	As built: 19,800 long tons (20,100 t) light 25,500 long tons (25,900 t) full load
Length:	As built: 770 ft (230 m) (waterline @ design draft) 824 ft 9 in (251.38 m) overall
Beam:	As built: 83 ft 3 in (25.37 m) (waterline) 109 ft 6 in (33.38 m) (overall)
Draft:	25 ft 11.5 in (7.912 m) (as built)
Propulsion:	9 × Babcock & Wilcox boilers, 4 × Parsons geared turbines, 120,000 shp (89 MW) 4 × screws
Speed:	32.5 knots (37.4 mph; 60.2 km/h)
Range:	12,500 nautical miles (23,200 km; 14,400 mi) at 15 knots (17 mph; 28 km/h)
Complement:	2,217 officers and men (1941)
Sensors and processing systems:	CXAM RADAR from 1940^[1]
Armament:	As built: 8 × single 5 in/38 cal guns 4 × quad 1.1 in/75 cal guns 24 × .50 caliber machine guns From February 1942: 8 × 5 in/38 cal 4 × Quad 1.1 in/75 cal 24 20mm Oerlikon guns 24 × .50 caliber machine guns
Armor:	As built: 2.5-4 inch belt 60 lb protective decks 4 inch bulkheads 4 inch side and 3 inch top round conning tower 4 inch side over steering gear
Aircraft carried:	As built: 90 aircraft 3 × elevators 2 × flight deck hydraulic catapults 1 × hangar deck hydraulic catapults

USS Yorktown (CV-5) was an aircraft carrier commissioned in theUnited States Navy from 1937 until she was sunk at the Battle of Midway in June 1942. She was named after the Battle of Yorktown in 1781 and the lead ship of the Yorktown class which was designed after lessons learned from operations with the large converted battlecruiser Lexington class and the smaller purpose-built Ranger. She represented the epitome of U.S. pre-war carrier design.

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Early career[edit]

Yorktown's ship's insignia

Yorktown was laid down on 21 May 1934 at Newport News, Virginia, by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.; launched on 4 April 1936; sponsored by Eleanor Roosevelt; and commissioned at the Naval Operating Base(NOB), Norfolk, Virginia, on 30 September 1937, Capt. Ernest D. McWhorter in command.

After fitting out, the aircraft carrier trained in Hampton Roads, Virginiaand in the southern drill grounds off the Virginia capes into January 1938, conducting carrier qualifications for her newly embarked air group.

Yorktown sailed for the Caribbean on 8 January 1938 and arrived atCulebra, Puerto Rico, on 13 January. Over the ensuing month, the carrier conducted her shakedown, touching at Charlotte Amalie, St Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands; Gonaïves, Haiti; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Cristóbal, Panama Canal Zone. Departing Colon Bay, Cristobal, on 1 March, Yorktown sailed for Hampton Roads, arrived on 6 March, and shifted to the Norfolk Navy Yard the next day for post-shakedown availability.

After undergoing repairs through the early autumn of 1938, Yorktownshifted from the navy yard to NOB Norfolk on 17 October and soon headed for the Southern Drill Grounds for training.

Yorktown operated off the eastern seaboard, ranging from Chesapeake Bay to Guantanamo Bay, into 1939. As flagship for Carrier Division 2, she participated in her first war game - Fleet Problem XX - along with her sister-ship USS Enterprise (CV-6) in February 1939. The scenario for the exercise called for one fleet to control the sea lanes in the Caribbean against the incursion of a foreign European power while maintaining sufficient naval strength to protect vital American interests in the Pacific. The maneuvers were witnessed, in part, by PresidentFranklin Delano Roosevelt, embarked in the heavy cruiserUSS Houston (CA-30).

The critique of the operation revealed that carrier operations - a part of the scenarios for the annual exercises since the entry ofUSS Langley (CV-1) into the war games in 1925 - had achieved a new peak of efficiency. Despite the inexperience of Yorktown and Enterprise- comparative newcomers to the Fleet - both carriers made significant contributions to the success of the problem. The planners had studied the employment of carriers and their embarked air groups in connection with convoy escort, antisubmarine defense, and various attack measures against surface ships and shore installations. In short, they worked to develop the tactics that would be used when war actually came.

Pacific Fleet[edit]

Following Fleet Problem XX, Yorktown returned briefly to Hampton Roads before sailing for the Pacific on 20 April 1939. Transiting thePanama Canal a week later, Yorktown soon commenced a regular routine of operations with the Pacific Fleet. The Second World War started on 1 September 1939, but the USA was not yet involved. Operating out of San Diego, California into 1940, the carrier participated in Fleet Problem XXI that April. Yorktown was one of six ships to receive the new RCA CXAM RADAR in 1940.^[1]

Fleet Problem XXI - a two-part exercise - included some of the operations that would characterize future warfare in the Pacific. The first part of the exercise was devoted to training in making plans and estimates; in screening and scouting; in coordination of combatant units; and in employing fleet and standard dispositions. The second phase included training inconvoy protection, the seizure of advanced bases, and, ultimately, the decisive engagement between the opposing fleets. The last pre-war exercise of its type, Fleet Problem XXI contained two exercises (comparatively minor at the time) where air operations played a major role. Fleet Joint Air Exercise 114A prophetically pointed out the need to coordinate Army and Navy defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, and Fleet Exercise 114 proved that aircraft could be used for high altitude tracking of surface forces - a significant role for planes that would be fully realized in the war to come.

With the retention of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters after the conclusion of Fleet Problem XXI, Yorktown operated in the Pacific off the west coast of the United States and in Hawaiian waters until the following spring, when the success of German U-boats preying upon British shipping in the Atlantic required a shift of American naval strength. Thus, to reinforce the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, the Navy transferred a substantial force from the Pacific including Yorktown, Battleship Division Three (the New Mexico-class battleships), three light cruisers, and 12 accompanying destroyers.

Neutrality patrol[edit]

Yorktown prepares to get underway in June, 1940.

The Yorktown is refueled by theUSS Brazos (AO-4) mid-Pacific in July 1940.

Yorktown departed Pearl Harbor on 20 April 1941 in company with destroyersUSS Warrington (DD-383), USS Somers (DD-381), and USS Jouett (DD-396); headed southeast, transited the Panama Canal on the night of 6–7 May, and arrived at Bermuda on 12 May. From that time until the United States entered the war,Yorktown conducted four patrols in the Atlantic, ranging from Newfoundland to Bermuda and logging 17,642 miles (28,392 km) steamed while enforcing American neutrality.

Although Adolf Hitler had forbidden his submarines to attack American ships, the men who manned the American naval vessels were not aware of this policy and operated on a wartime footing in the Atlantic.

On 28 October, while Yorktown, battleship USS New Mexico (BB-40), and other American warships were screening a convoy, a destroyer picked up a submarine contact and dropped depth charges while the convoy itself made an emergency starboard turn, the first of the convoy's three emergency changes of course. Late that afternoon, engine repairs to one of the ships in the convoy, Empire Pintail, reduced the convoy's speed to 11 knots (13 mph; 20 km/h).

During the night, the American ships intercepted strong German radio signals, indicating submarines probably in the vicinity reporting the group. Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, commanding the escort force, sent a destroyer to sweep astern of the convoy to destroy the U-boat or at least to drive him under.

The next day, while cruiser scout planes patrolled overhead, Yorktown andUSS Savannah (CL-42) fueled their escorting destroyers, finishing the task as dusk fell. On 30 October, Yorktown was preparing to fuel three destroyers when other escorts made sound contacts. The convoy subsequently made 10 emergency turns while USS Morris (DD-417) and USS Anderson (DD-411) dropped depth charges, and USS Hughes (DD-410) assisted in developing the contact. Anderson later made two more depth charge attacks, noticing "considerable oil with slick spreading but no wreckage."

The short-of-war period was becoming more like the real thing as each day went on. Elsewhere on 30 October, more than a month before Japanese planes attacked Pearl Harbor, U-552 torpedoed the destroyer USS Reuben James (DD-245), sinking her with a heavy loss of life, the first loss of an American warship in World War II.

After another Neutrality Patrol stint in November, Yorktown put into Norfolk on 2 December and was there five days later during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 which triggered full US entry into the Second World War.

World War II[edit]

Battle of the Coral Sea[edit]

Main article: Battle of the Coral Sea

At 15:17 the next afternoon, two Dauntlesses from VS-5 sighted a Japanese submarine, running on the surface. Three Devastators took off from Yorktown, sped to the scene, and carried out an attack that only succeeded in driving the submarine under.

On the morning of 3 May, TF11 and TF17 were some 100 miles (160 km) apart, engaged in fueling operations. Shortly before midnight, Fletcher received word from Australian-based aircraft that Japanese transports were disembarking troops and equipment at Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. Arriving soon after the Australians had evacuated the place, the Japanese landed to commence construction of a seaplane base there to support their southward thrust.

Yorktown accordingly set course northward at 27 knots (31 mph; 50 km/h). By daybreak on 4 May, she was within striking distance of the newly established Japanese beachhead and launched her first strike at 0701-18 F4F-3's of VF-42, 12 TBD's of VT-5, and 28 SBD's from VS and BY-5. Yorktown's air group made three consecutive attacks on enemy ships and shore installations at Tulagi and Gavutu on the south coast of Florida Island in the Solomons. Expending 22 torpedoes and 76 1,000 pound bombs in the three attacks, Yorktown's planes sank the destroyer Kikuzuki, three minecraft and four barges. In addition, Air Group 5 destroyed five enemy seaplanes, all at the cost of two F4F's lost (the pilots were recovered) and one TBD (whose crew was lost).

Meanwhile, that same day, TF 44, a cruiser-destroyer force under Rear Admiral Crace (RN), joined Lexington's TF11, thus completing the composition of the Allied force on the eve of the crucial Battle of the Coral Sea.

Elsewhere, to the northward, eleven troop-laden transports - escorted by destroyers and covered by the light carrier Shōhō, four heavy cruisers, and a destroyer - steamed toward Port Moresby. In addition, another Japanese task force - formed around the two Pearl Harbor veterans, carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku, and screened by two heavy cruisers and six destroyers - provided additional air cover.

On the morning of 6 May, Fletcher gathered all Allied forces under his tactical command as TF17. At daybreak on the 7th, he dispatched Crace, with the cruisers and destroyers under his command, toward the Louisiade archipelago to intercept any enemy attempt to move toward Port Moresby.

While Fletcher moved north with his two flattops and their screens in search of the enemy, Japanese search planes located the oiler USS Neosho (AO-23) and her escort, USS Sims (DD-409) and misidentified the former as a carrier. Two waves of Japanese planes — first high level bombers and then dive bombers — attacked the two ships. Sims, her antiaircraft battery crippled by gun failures, took three direct hits and sank quickly with a heavy loss of life. Neosho was more fortunate in that, even after seven direct hits and eight near-misses, she remained afloat until, on the 11th, her survivors were picked up byUSS Henley (DD-391) and her hulk sunk by the rescuing destroyer.

Yorktown in drydock after the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Neosho and Sims had performed a valuable service, drawing off the planes that might otherwise have hit Fletcher's carriers. Meanwhile, Yorktown and Lexington'splanes found Shōhō and sank her. One of Lexington's pilots reported this victory with the radio message, "Scratch one flattop".

That afternoon, Shōkaku and Zuikaku - still not located by Fletcher's forces - launched 27 bombers and torpedo planes to search for the American ships. Their flight proved uneventful until they ran into fighters from Yorktown and Lexington, who proceeded to down nine enemy planes in the ensuing dogfight.

Near twilight, three Japanese planes incredibly mistook Yorktown for their own carrier and attempted to land. The ship's gunfire, though, drove them off; and the enemy planes crossed Yorktown's bow and turned away out of range. Twenty minutes later, when three more enemy pilots made the mistake of trying to get into Yorktown's landing circle, the carrier's gunners splashed one of the trio.

However, the battle was far from over. The next morning, 8 May, a Lexington search plane spotted Admiral Takeo Takagi's carrier striking force - including Zuikaku and Shōkaku. Yorktown planes scored two bomb hits on Shōkaku, damaging her flight deck and preventing her from launching aircraft; in addition, the bombs set off explosions in gasoline storage tanks and destroyed an engine repair workshop. Lexington's Dauntlesses added another hit. Between the two American air groups, the hits killed 108 Japanese sailors and wounded 40 more.

While the American planes were occupying the Japanese flattops, however, Yorktown and Lexington - alerted by an intercepted message which indicated that the Japanese knew of their whereabouts - were preparing to fight off a retaliatory strike, which came shortly after 11:00.

American CAP Wildcats downed 17 planes, though some managed to slip through the defenses. "Kates" launched torpedoes from both sides of Lexington's bows. Two "fish" tore into "Lady Lex" on the port side; "Val" dive bombers added to the destruction with three bomb hits. Lexington developed a list, with three partially flooded engineering spaces. Several fires raged below decks, and the carrier's elevators were put out of commission.

Meanwhile Yorktown was having problems of her own. Maneuvered by Captain Elliott Buckmaster, her commanding officer, the carrier dodged eight torpedoes. Attacked then by "Vals", the ship managed to evade all but one bomb. That one, however, penetrated the flight deck and exploded below decks, killing or seriously injuring 66 men.

Lexington's damage control parties brought the fires under control, and the ship was still able to continue flight operations despite the damage. The air battle itself ended shortly before noon on the 8th; within an hour, the carrier was on an even keel, although slightly down by the bow. However, an explosion caused by the ignition of gasoline vapors later caused a fire and tore apart the inside. Lexington was abandoned at 17:07, and later sunk by USS Phelps.

The Japanese had won a tactical victory, inflicting comparatively heavier losses on the Allied force, but the Allies, in stemming the tide of Japan's conquests in the South and Southwest Pacific, had achieved a strategic victory. Yorktown had not achieved her part in the victory without cost, and had suffered enough damage to cause experts to estimate that at least three months in a yard would be required to put her back in fighting trim. However, there was little time for repairs, because Allied intelligence - most notably the cryptographic unit at Pearl Harbor - had gained enough information from decoded Japanese naval messages to estimate that the Japanese were on the threshold of a major operation aimed at the northwestern tip of the Hawaiian chain - two islets in a low coral atoll known as Midway.

Kawanishi flying boat:

H8K

Kawanishi H8K2 at Kanoya museum, Japan
Role	Four engine long-range flying boat
Manufacturer	Kawanishi
Designer	Shizuo Kikuhara
First flight	January 1941
Introduction	February 1942
Retired	1945
Primary user	IJN Air Service
Produced	1941-1945
Number built	167 131 of Type 2 Flying boat 36 of Seiku

The Kawanishi H8K (二式飛行艇, Nishiki Hikōtei, Type 2 Flying Boat. Commonly called as 二式大型飛行艇 Nishiki Ōgata Hikōtei, 二式大艇Nishiki Daitei or Nishiki Taitei, Type 2 Large-sized Flying Boat) was anImperial Japanese Navy flying boat used during World War II formaritime patrol duties. The Allied reporting name for the type was "Emily".

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Design and development[edit]

At the same time the type's predecessor, the Kawanishi H6K, was going into service in 1938 the Navy ordered the development of a larger, longer-ranged patrol aircraft under the designation Navy Experimental 13-Shi Large-size Flying Boat.^[1]^[2] The result was a large, shoulder-winged design that is widely regarded as the best flying boat of the war.^[3]^[4]^[5] Despite this, initial development was troublesome, with the prototype displaying terrible handling on the water. Deepening of the hull, redesigning of the planing bottom and the addition of spray strips under the nose rectified this^[6] Two further prototypes — actually pre-production aircraft — joined the development program in December 1941.

The IJNAF accepted the first production version as the H8K1, Navy Type 2 Flying Boat, Model 11, of which 14 would be built.

The improved H8K2 variant soon appeared, and its extremely heavy defensive armament earned it deep respect among Allied aircrews.^[7] The H8K2 was an upgrade over the H8K1, having more powerful engines, slightly revised armament, and an increase in fuel capacity. This was to be the definitive variant, with 112 produced.

36 examples of a dedicated transport version, the H8K2-L, were also built, capable of carrying 62 troops. This aircraft was also known as Seiku (晴空, "Clear Sky"). The side defensive blisters, ventral defensive hatch, and dorsal turret were discarded. To increase the available space within the aircraft, its hull tanks were removed, thus reducing its range.

Operational history[edit]

H8K1 supplementary prototype #2 taking off in February 1942

The H8K entered production in 1941 and first saw operational use on the night of 4 March 1942 in a second raid on Pearl Harbor. Since the target lay out of range for the flying boats, this audacious plan involved a refuelling by submarine at French Frigate Shoals, some 900 km (560 mi) north-west of Hawaii, en route. Two planes from the Yokohama Kōkūtai (Naval Air Corps)^[8] attempted to bomb Pearl Harbor, but, due to poor visibility, did not accomplish any significant damage.^[9]

Six days after the second Pearl harbor raid one of the Emilys was sent on a daylight photo-recon mission of Midway Atoll. It was intercepted by radar directed Brewster Buffalo fighters of Marine Corps squadron VMF-221 and shot down. All aboard were killed including Lt. Hashizume Hisao, the lead pilot of the second Pearl Harbor raid.^{[citation needed]}

H8K2s were used on a wide range of patrol, reconnaissance, bombing, and transport missions throughout the Pacific war. The H8K2 was given the Allied code name "Emily".

Variants[edit]

A Kawanishi H8K2 Flying Boat ashore.

An H8K2 51-085 of the 851st Kōkutai in flight, before being shot down by a U.S. Navy PB4Y-1, 2 July 1944.

A H8K3 (work number 597) in running, 26 December 1942.

^[10]^[11]^[12]

H8K1 Experimental Type 13 Large-sized Flying boat (13試大型飛行艇 13-Shi Ōgata Hikōtei): One prototype and four supplementary prototypes. Prototype was mounted Mitsubishi Mk4A Kasei 11 engines, supplementary prototype was mounted Mitsubishi MK4B Kasei 12 engines. Supplementary prototypes were renamedType 2 Flying Boat Model 11 on 5 February 1942. Prototype was rebuilt to H8K1-L in November 1943.
H8K1 Type 2 Flying boat, Model 11 (二式飛行艇11型 Nishiki Hikōtei 11-gata): Developed on 5 February 1942. First operative model of series, 12 produced. Mounted Mitsubishi MK4B Kasei 12 engines.

H8K1-L Type 2 Transport Flying Boat (二式輸送艇 Nishiki Yusōtei): Rebuilt from H8K1 prototype. Fitted augment exhausts. Up to 41 passengers.

H8K2 Type 2 Flying boat, Model 12 (二式飛行艇12型 Nishiki Hikōtei 12-gata): Developed on 26 June 1943. Mounted Mitsubishi MK4Q Kasei 22 engines and improved tail gun turret. Latter batch was equipped with Air-to-Surface-Vesselsearch radar, and removed side gun blisters. 112 produced.^[13]

H8K2-L Seikū ("Clear Sky"), Model 32 (晴空32型 Seikū 32-gata): Transport version of H8K2. Initial named Type 2 Transport Flying Boat, Model 32. Armaments were 1 × forward-firing 20 mm cannon and 1 × rearward-firing 13 mm machine gun. Up to 64 passengers.

H8K3 Provisional name Type 2 Flying Boat, Model 22 (仮称二式飛行艇22型Kashō Nishiki Hikōtei 22-gata): Experimental version, H8K2 modified. Equipped with retractable floats in wingtips, fowler flaps, sliding hatch side gun locations in place of the blisters and a retractable dorsal turret, all in an effort to increase speed, two prototypes only (work number 596 and 597).
H8K4 Provisional name Type 2 Flying Boat, Model 23 (仮称二式飛行艇23型 Kashō Nishiki Hikōtei 23-gata): H8K3 re-engined with 1,825 hp MK4T Mitsubishi Kasei 25b engines, two converted from H8K3.

H8K4-L Provisional name Seikū, Model 33 (仮称晴空33型 Kashō Seikū 33-gata): Transport version of H8K4. Only a project, because all H8K4s were lost in March 1945.

G9K: Proposed land-based attack bomber variant, only a project.

Operators[edit]

H8K1 N1-13 of the 802nd Kōkūtaiand seaplane tender Akitsushima,Shortland Island in 1942.

H8K2-L 11Ko-21 of the 11th Naval Air Arsenal, postwar.

Japan^[11]^[14]

Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service
Miscellaneous
Kamikaze
- Azusa group (picked from 801st Kōkutai, guidance only)

Survivors[edit]

A captured Japanese Kawanishi H8K Emily taking off at the U.S. Navy Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River, Maryland (USA), in 1946-47.

Four aircraft survived until the end of the war. One of these, an H8K2 (work number 426), was captured by U.S. forces at the end of the war and was evaluated before being eventually returned to Japan in 1979. It was on display at Tokyo's Museum of Maritime Science until 2004, when it was moved to Kanoya Air Base in Kagoshima.

The submerged remains of an H8K can be found off the west coast ofSaipan, where it is a popular scuba diving attraction known erroneously as the "B-29", or the "Emily". Another wrecked H8K lies in Chuuk Lagoon, Chuuk, in Micronesia. This aircraft is located off the south-western end of Dublon Island.

Specifications (Kawanishi H8K2)[edit]

Kawanishi H8K3

Data from Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of World War II^[15]

General characteristics

Crew: 10
Length: 28.15 m (92 ft 4 in)
Wingspan: 38.00 m (124 ft 8 in)
Height: 9.15 m (30 ft)
Wing area: 160 m² (1,721 ft²)
Empty weight: 18,380 kg (40,436 lb)
Loaded weight: 24,500 kg (53,900 lb)
Max. takeoff weight: 32,500 kg (71,500 lb)
Powerplant: 4 × Mitsubishi Kasei 22 radial engines, 1,380 kW (1,850 hp) each

Performance

Maximum speed: 465 km/h (290 mph)
Range: 7,150 km (4,440 mi)
Service ceiling: 8,760 m (28,740 ft)
Rate of climb: 8.1 m/s (1,600 ft/min)
Wing loading: 153 kg/m² (31 lb/ft²)
Power/mass: 0.22 kW/kg (0.14 hp/lb

The tail gunner position (without gun)

)Armament

Guns:
- 5× 20 mm Type 99 cannon (one each in bow, dorsal, and tail turrets, plus one each in two waist blisters)
- 5× 7.7 mm (.303 in) Type 92 machine guns in fuselage hatches
Bombs: 2× 800 kg (1,764 lb) torpedoes or 1,000 kg (2,205 lb) of bombs or depth charges

Avionics

Mark VI Model 1 ASV radar

USS Lexington: Coordinates:

15°20′S 155°30′E

Career (United States)
Aerial view of Lexington on 14 October 1941
Name:	USS Lexington
Namesake:	Battle of Lexington
Ordered:	1916 (as battlecruiser) 1922 (as aircraft carrier)
Builder:	Fore River Ship and Engine Building Co., Quincy, Massachusetts
Laid down:	8 January 1921
Launched:	3 October 1925
Christened:	Mrs. Theodore Douglas Robinson
Commissioned:	14 December 1927
Reclassified:	As aircraft carrier, 1 July 1922
Struck:	24 June 1942
Identification:	Hull number: CC-1, then CV-2
Nickname:	"Lady Lex"
Fate:	Sunk during the Battle of the Coral Sea, 8 May 1942
General characteristics (as built)
Class & type:	Lexington-class aircraft carrier
Displacement:	36,000 long tons (37,000 t) (standard) 47,700 long tons (48,500 t) (deep load)
Length:	888 ft (270.7 m)
Beam:	107 ft 6 in (32.8 m)
Draft:	32 ft 6 in (9.9 m) (deep load)
Installed power:	180,000 shp (130,000 kW)
Propulsion:	4 shafts, 4 sets turbo-electric drive 16 water-tube boilers
Speed:	33.25 knots (61.58 km/h; 38.26 mph)
Range:	10,000 nmi (19,000 km; 12,000 mi) at 10 kn (19 km/h; 12 mph)
Complement:	2,791 (including aviation personnel) in 1942
Armament:	4 × 2 – 8-inch guns 12 × 1 – 5-inch anti-aircraft guns
Armor:	Belt: 5–7 in (127–178 mm) Deck: .75–2 in (19–51 mm) Gun turrets: .75 in (19 mm) Bulkheads: 5–7 in (127–178 mm)
Aircraft carried:	78
Aviation facilities:	1 Aircraft catapult

USS Lexington (CV-2), nicknamed "Lady Lex",^[1] was an early aircraft carrier built for the United States Navy. She was the lead ship of theLexington class; her only sister ship, Saratoga, was commissioned a month earlier. Originally designed as a battlecruiser, she was converted into one of the Navy's first aircraft carriers during construction to comply with the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, which essentially terminated all new battleship and battlecruiser construction. The ship entered service in 1928 and was assigned to the Pacific Fleetfor her entire career. Lexington and Saratoga were used to develop and refine carrier tactics in a series of annual exercises before World War II. On more than one occasion these included successfully staged surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The ship's turbo-electric propulsion system allowed her to supplement the electrical supply of Tacoma, Washington, during a drought in late 1929 to early 1930. She also delivered medical personnel and relief supplies to Managua, Nicaragua, after an earthquake in 1931.

Lexington was at sea when the Pacific War began on 7 December 1941, ferrying fighter aircraft to Midway Island. Her mission was cancelled and she returned to Pearl Harbor a week later. After a few days, she was sent to create a diversion from the force en route to relieve thebesieged Wake Island garrison by attacking Japanese installations in the Marshall Islands. The island was forced to surrender before the relief force got close enough, and the mission was cancelled. A planned attack on Wake Island in January 1942 had to be cancelled when a submarine sank the oiler required to supply the fuel for the return trip.Lexington was sent to the Coral Sea the following month to block any Japanese advances into the area. The ship was spotted by Japanese search aircraft while approaching Rabaul, New Britain, and her aircraft shot down most of the Japanese bombers that attacked her. Together with the carrier Yorktown, she successfully attacked Japanese shipping off the east coast of New Guinea in early March.

Lexington was briefly refitted in Pearl Harbor at the end of the month and rendezvoused with Yorktown in the Coral Sea in early May. A few days later the Japanese began Operation Mo, the invasion of Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, and the two American carriers attempted to stop the invasion forces. They sank the light aircraft carrier Shōhō on 7 May during the Battle of the Coral Sea, but did not encounter the main Japanese force of the carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku until the next day. Aircraft from Lexington and Yorktown succeeded in badly damagingShōkaku, but the Japanese aircraft crippled Lexington. Vapors from leaking aviation gasoline tanks sparked a series of explosions and fires that could not be controlled, and Lexington had to be scuttled by an American destroyer during the evening of 8 May to prevent her capture.

[hide]

Design and construction[edit]

Lexington was the fourth US Navy ship named after the 1775 Battle of Lexington, the first battle of the Revolutionary War.^[2]She was originally authorized in 1916 as a Lexington-class battlecruiser, but construction was delayed so that higher-priorityanti-submarine vessels and merchant ships, needed to ensure the safe passage of personnel and materiel to Europe during Germany's U-boat campaign, could be built. After the war the ship was extensively redesigned, partially as a result of British experience.^[3] Given the hull number of CC-1, Lexington was laid down on 8 January 1921 by Fore River Shipbuilding Company of Quincy, Massachusetts.^[2]

Before the Washington Naval Conference concluded, the ship's construction was suspended in February 1922,^[4] when she was 24.2 percent complete.^[5] She was re-designated and re-authorized as an aircraft carrier on 1 July 1922.^[2] Her displacement was reduced by a total of 4,000 long tons (4,100 t), achieved mainly by the elimination of her main armament of eight 16-inch (406 mm) guns in four twin turrets (including their heavy turret mounts, their armor, and other equipment).^[6]^[7] The main armor belt was retained, but was reduced in height to save weight.^[8] The general line of the hull remained unaltered, as did the torpedo protection system, because they had already been built, and it would have been too expensive to alter them.^[9]

The ship had an overall length of 888 feet (270.7 m), a beam of 106 feet (32.3 m), and a draft of 30 feet 5 inches (9.3 m) atdeep load. Lexington had a standard displacement of 36,000 long tons (36,578 t) and 43,056 long tons (43,747 t) at deep load. At that displacement, she had a metacentric height of 7.31 feet (2.2 m).^[6]

Christened by Mrs. Theodore Douglas Robinson, the wife of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Lexington was launched on 3 October 1925. She was commissioned on 14 December 1927 with Captain Albert Marshall in command.^[2] By 1942, the ship had a crew of 100 officers and 1,840 enlisted men and an aviation group totaling 141 officers and 710 enlisted men.^[6]

Flight deck arrangements[edit]

Lexington's ship's insignia

The ship's flight deck was 866 feet 2 inches (264.01 m) long and had a maximum width of 105 feet 11 inches (32.28 m).^[6] When built, her hangar "was the largest single enclosed space afloat on any ship"^[10] and had an area of 33,528 square feet (3,114.9 m²). It was 424 feet (129.2 m) long and 68 feet (20.7 m) wide. Its minimum height was 21 feet (6.4 m), and it was divided by a single fire curtain just forward of the aft aircraft elevator. Aircraft repair shops, 108 feet (32.9 m) long, were aft of the hangar, and below them was a storage space for disassembled aircraft, 128 feet (39.0 m) long. Lexington was fitted with two hydraulically powered elevators on her centerline. The forward elevator's dimensions were 30 by 60 feet (9.1 m × 18.3 m) and it had a capacity of 16,000 pounds (7,300 kg). The aft elevator had a capacity of only 6,000 pounds (2,700 kg) and measured 30 by 36 feet (9.1 m × 11.0 m).^[10] Avgas was stored in eight compartments of the torpedo protection system, and their capacity has been quoted as either 132,264 US gallons (500,670 l; 110,133 imp gal) or 163,000 US gallons (620,000 l; 136,000 imp gal).^[11]

Lexington was initially fitted with electrically operated arresting gear designed by Carl Norden that used both fore-and-aft and transverse wires. The longitudinal wires were intended to prevent aircraft from being blown over the side of the ship while the transverse wires slowed them to a stop. This system was authorized to be replaced by the hydraulically operated Mk 2 system, without longitudinal wires, on 11 August 1931. Four improved Mk 3 units were added in 1934, giving the ship a total of eight arresting wires and four barriers intended to prevent aircraft from crashing into parked aircraft on the ship's bow. After the forward flight deck was widened in 1936, an additional eight wires were added there to allow aircraft to land over the bow if the landing area at the stern was damaged.^[12] The ship was built with a 155-foot (47.2 m), flywheel-powered, F Mk II aircraft catapult, also designed by Norden, on the starboard side of the bow.^[6]^[10] This catapult was strong enough to launch a 10,000-pound (4,500 kg) aircraft at a speed of 48 knots (89 km/h; 55 mph). It was intended to launch seaplanes, but was rarely used; a 1931 report tallied only five launches of practice loads since the ship had been commissioned. It was removed during the ship's 1936 refit.^[13]

Lexington was designed to carry 78 aircraft, including 36 bombers,^[14] but these numbers increased once the Navy adopted the practice of tying up spare aircraft in the unused spaces at the top of the hangar.^[15] In 1936, her air group consisted of 18 Grumman F2F-1 and 18 Boeing F4B-4 fighters, plus an additional nine F2Fs in reserve. Offensive punch was provided by 20 Vought SBU Corsair dive bombers with 10 spare aircraft and 18 Great Lakes BG torpedo bombers with nine spares. Miscellaneous aircraft included two Grumman JF Duck amphibians, plus one in reserve, and three active and one spareVought O2U Corsair observation aircraft. This amounted to 79 aircraft, plus 30 spares.^[6]

Propulsion[edit]

The Lexington-class carriers used turbo-electric propulsion; each of the four propeller shafts was driven by two 22,500-shaft-horsepower (16,800 kW) electric motors. They were powered by four General Electric turbo generators rated at 35,200 kilowatts (47,200 hp). Steam for the generators was provided by sixteen Yarrow boilers, each in its own individual compartment.^[16] Six 750-kilowatt (1,010 hp) electric generators were installed in the upper levels of the two main turbine compartments to provide power to meet the ship's hotel load (minimum electrical) requirements.^[17]

The ship was designed to reach 33.25 knots (61.58 km/h; 38.26 mph),^[6] but Lexington achieved 34.59 knots (64.06 km/h; 39.81 mph) from 202,973 shp (151,357 kW) during sea trials in 1928.^[16] She carried a maximum of 6,688 long tons (6,795 t) of fuel oil, but only 5,400 long tons (5,500 t) of that was usable, as the rest had to be retained as ballast in the port fuel tanks to offset the weight of the island and main guns.^[18] Designed for a range of 10,000 nautical miles (19,000 km; 12,000 mi) at a speed of 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph),^[6] the ship demonstrated a range of 9,910 nmi (18,350 km; 11,400 mi) at a speed of 10.7 knots (19.8 km/h; 12.3 mph) with 4,540 long tons (4,610 t) of oil.^[18]

Armament[edit]

Lexington firing her eight-inch guns, 1928

The Navy's Bureau of Construction and Repair was not convinced when the class was being designed that aircraft could effectively substitute as armament for a warship, especially at night or in bad weather that would prevent air operations.^[19]Thus the carriers' design included a substantial gun battery of eight 55-caliber Mk 9 eight-inch guns in four twin gun turrets. These turrets were mounted above the flight deck on the starboard side, two before the superstructure, and two behind the funnel, numbered I to IV from bow to stern.^[20] In theory the guns could fire to both sides, but it is probable that if they were fired to port (across the deck) the blast would have damaged the flight deck.^[21] They could be depressed to −5° and elevated to +41°.^[22]

The ship's heavy anti-aircraft (AA) armament consisted of twelve 25-caliber Mk 10 five-inch guns which were mounted on single mounts, three each fitted on sponsons on each side of the bow and stern.^[23]No light AA guns were initially mounted on Lexington, but two sextuple .30-caliber (7.62 mm) machine gun mounts were installed in 1929.^[24] They were unsuccessful and were replaced by two .50-caliber (12.7 mm) machine guns by 1931, one each on the roof of the superfiring eight-inch turrets. During a refit in 1935, platforms mounting four .50-caliber machine guns were installed on each corner of the ship, and an additional platform was installed that wrapped around the funnel. Six machine guns were mounted on each side of this last platform. In October 1940, four 50-caliber Mk 10 three-inch AA guns were installed in the corner platforms; they replaced two of the .50-caliber machine guns which were remounted on the tops of the eight-inch gun turrets. Another three-inch gun was added on the roof of the deckhouse between the funnel and the island. These guns were just interim weapons until the quadruple 1.1-inch gun mount could be fielded, which occurred in August 1941.^[25]

In March 1942, Lexington's eight-inch turrets were removed at Pearl Harbor and replaced by seven quadruple 1.1-inch gun mounts. In addition 22 Oerlikon 20 mm cannon were installed, six in a new platform at the base of the funnel, 12 in the positions formerly occupied by the ship's boats in the sides of the hull, two at the stern and a pair on the aft control top. When the ship was sunk in May 1942, her armament consisted of 12 five-inch, 12 quadruple 1.1-inch, 22 Oerlikons and at least two dozen .50-caliber machine guns.^[26]

Fire control and electronics[edit]

Each eight-inch turret had a Mk 30 rangefinder at the rear of the turret for local control, but they were normally controlled by two Mk 18 fire-control directors, one each on the fore and aft spotting tops.^[20] A 20-foot (6.1 m) rangefinder was fitted on top of the pilothouse to provide range information for the directors.^[22] Each group of three five-inch guns was controlled by a Mk 19 director, two of which were mounted on each side of the spotting tops.^[23] Lexington received a RCA CXAM-1 radarin June 1941 during a brief refit in Pearl Harbor. The antenna was mounted on the forward lip of the funnel with its control room directly below the aerial, replacing the secondary conning station formerly mounted there.^[27]

Armor[edit]

The waterline belt of the Lexington-class ships tapered 7–5 inches (178–127 mm) in thickness from top to bottom and angled 11° outwards at the top. It covered the middle 530 feet (161.5 m) of the ships. Forward, the belt ended in a bulkheadthat also tapered from seven to five inches in thickness. Aft, it terminated at a seven-inch bulkhead. This belt had a height of 9 feet 4 inches (2.8 m). The third deck over the ships' machinery and magazine was armored with two layers of special treatment steel (STS) totaling 2 inches (51 mm) in thickness. The steering gear, however, was protected by two layers of STS that totaled 3 inches (76 mm) on the flat and 4.5 inches (114 mm) on the slope.^[28]

The gun turrets were protected only against splinters with .75 inches (19 mm) of armor. The conning tower was 2–2.25 inches (51–57 mm) of STS, and it had a communications tube with two-inch sides running from the conning tower down to the lower conning position on the third deck. The torpedo defense system of the Lexington-class ships consisted of three to six medium steel protective bulkheads that ranged from .375 to .75 inches (10 to 19 mm) in thickness. The spaces between them could be used as fuel tanks or left empty to absorb the detonation of a torpedo's warhead.^[28]

Service history[edit]

After fitting out and shakedown cruises, Lexington was transferred to the West Coast of the United States and arrived atSan Pedro, California, part of Los Angeles, on 7 April 1928. She was based there until 1940 and mainly stayed on the West Coast, although she did participate in several Fleet Problems (training exercises) in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea.^[2] These exercises tested the Navy's evolving doctrine and tactics for the use of carriers. During Fleet Problem IX in January 1929, Lexington and the Scouting Force failed to defend the Panama Canal against an aerial attack launched by her sister ship Saratoga.^[29] Future science fiction author Robert A. Heinlein reported aboard on 6 July as a newly mintedensign under Captain Frank Berrien.^[30] Heinlein experienced his first literary rejection when his short story about a case of espionage discovered at the Naval Academy failed to win a shipboard writing contest.^[31]

In 1929, western Washington state suffered a drought which resulted in low levels in Lake Cushman that provided water forCushman Dam No. 1. The hydro-electric power generated by this dam was the primary source for the city of Tacoma and the city requested help from the federal government once the water in the lake receded below the dam's intakes during December. The U.S. Navy sent Lexington, which had been at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, to Tacoma, and heavy electric lines were rigged into the city's power system. The ship's generators provided a total of 4,520,960 kilowatt hours from 17 December to 16 January 1930 until melting snow and rain brought the reservoirs up to the level needed to generate sufficient power for the city.^[18] Two months later, she participated in Fleet Problem X, which was conducted in the Caribbean. During the exercise, her aircraft were judged to have destroyed the flight decks and all the aircraft of the opposing carriers Saratoga and Langley. Fleet Problem XI was held the following month and Saratoga returned the favor, knocking out Lexington's flight deck for 24 hours, just as the exercise came to a climax with a major surface engagement.^[32]

Captain Ernest J. King, who later rose to serve as the Chief of Naval Operations during World War II, assumed command on 20 June 1930. Lexington was assigned, together with Saratoga, to defend the west coast of Panama against a hypothetical invader during Fleet Problem XII in February 1931. While each carrier was able to inflict some damage on the invasion convoys, the enemy forces succeeded in making a landing. Shortly afterward, all three carriers transferred to the Caribbean to conduct further maneuvers. The most important of these was when Saratoga successfully defended the Caribbean side of the Panama Canal from an attack by Lexington. Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves baited a trap for King with a destroyer and scored a kill on Lexington on 22 March while the latter's aircraft were still searching for Saratoga.^[33]

Lexington launching Martin T4Mtorpedo bombers in 1931

On 31 March 1931, Lexington, which had been near Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, was ordered to aid survivors of an earthquake that devastated Managua, Nicaragua.^[34] By the following day, the ship was close enough to launch aircraft carrying supplies and medical personnel to Managua.^[35] During Grand Joint Exercise No. 4, Lexington and Saratoga were able to launch a massive airstrike against Pearl Harbor on Sunday, 7 February 1932 without being detected. The two carriers were separated for Fleet Problem XIII which followed shortly afterward.Lexington was assigned to Black Fleet, defending Hawaii and the West Coast against Blue Fleet and Saratoga. On 15 March, Lexington caught Saratoga with all of her planes still on deck and was ruled to have knocked out her flight deck and have badly damaged the carrier, which was subsequently ruled sunk during a night attack by Black Fleet destroyers shortly afterward. Lexington's aircraft were judged to have badly damaged two of Blue Fleet's battleships.^[36]

Before Fleet Problem XIV began in February 1933, the Army and the Navy conducted a joint exercise simulating a carrier attack on Hawaii. Lexington and Saratoga successfully attacked Pearl Harbor at dawn on 31 January without being detected. During the actual fleet problem, the ship attempted to attack San Francisco, but was surprised in heavy fog by several defending battleships at close range and sunk. Fleet Problem XV returned to the Gulf of Panama and the Caribbean in April–May 1934, but the participating ships of the Pacific Fleet remained in the Caribbean and off the East Coast for more training and maneuvers until they returned to their home bases in November. Most notably during Fleet Problem XVI, April–June 1935, Lexington ran low on fuel after five days of high-speed steaming and this led to experiments with underway replenishment that later proved essential to combat operations during the Pacific War. During Fleet Problem XVII in 1936,Lexington and the smaller carrier Ranger routinely refueled their plane guard destroyers.^[37]

Admiral Claude C. Bloch limited Lexington to support of the battleships during Fleet Problem XVIII in 1937 and consequently the carrier was crippled and nearly sunk by surface gunfire and torpedoes.^[38] The following July, the ship participated in the unsuccessful search for Amelia Earhart.^[39] The 1938 Fleet Problem again tested the defenses of Hawaii and, again, aircraft from Lexington and her sister successfully attacked Pearl Harbor at dawn on 29 March. Later in the exercise, the two carriers successfully attacked San Francisco without being spotted by the defending fleet. Fleet Problem XX, held in the Caribbean in March–April 1939, was the only time before October 1943 that the Navy concentrated four carriers (Lexington,Ranger, Yorktown, and Enterprise) together for maneuvers. This exercise also saw the first attempts to refuel carriers and battleships at sea. During Fleet Problem XXI in 1940, Lexington caught Yorktown by surprise and crippled her, althoughYorktown's aircraft managed to knock out Lexington's flight deck. The fleet was ordered to remain in Hawaii after the conclusion of the exercise in May.^[40]

World War II[edit]

Admiral Husband Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, ordered Task Force (TF) 12—Lexington, three heavy cruisers and five destroyers—to depart Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 to ferry 18 U.S. Marine Corps Vought SB2U Vindicator dive bombers of VMSB-231 to reinforce the base at Midway Island.^[41] At this time she embarked 65 of her own aircraft, including 17 Brewster F2A Buffalo fighters. On the morning of 7 December, the Task Force was about 500 nautical miles (930 km; 580 mi) southeast of Midway when it received news of the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. Several hours later, Rear Admiral John H. Newton, commander of the Task Force, received orders that cancelled the ferry mission and ordered him to search for the Japanese ships while rendezvousing with Vice Admiral Wilson Brown's ships 100 miles (160 km) west of Niihau Island. Captain Frederick Sherman needed to maintain a continuous Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and recover the fuel-starved fighters which were on patrol. With the Marine aircraft aboard, Lexington's flight deck was very congested and he decided to reverse the phase of the ship's electric propulsion motors and steam full speed astern in order to launch a new CAP and then swap back to resume forward motion to recover his current CAP. This unorthodox action allowed him to maintain a continuous CAP and recover his aircraft without the lengthy delay caused by moving the aircraft on the flight deck from the bow to the stern and back to make space available for launch and recovery operations.Lexington launched several scout planes to search for the Japanese that day and remained at sea between Johnston Islandand Hawaii, reacting to several false alerts, until she returned to Pearl Harbor on 13 December.^[42] Kimmel had wanted to keep the ships at sea for longer, but difficulties refueling at sea on 11 and 12 December meant that the task force was low on fuel and was forced to return to port.^[43]

Lexington in the early morning of 8 May 1942, prior to launching her aircraft during the Battle of the Coral Sea

Re-designated as Task Force 11, and reinforced by four destroyers, Lexington and her consorts steamed from Pearl Harbor the next day to raid the Japanese base onJaluit in the Marshall Islands to distract the Japanese from the Wake Island relief force led by Saratoga. For this operation, Lexington embarked 21 Buffalos, 32Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers, and 15 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers, although not all aircraft were operational. Vice Admiral William S. Pye, acting commander of the Pacific Fleet, canceled the attack on 20 December and ordered the Task Force northwest to cover the relief force. The Japanese, however, landed on Wake and forced it to surrender on 23 December before Saratoga and her consorts could get there. Pye, reluctant to risk any carriers against a Japanese force of unknown strength, ordered both task forces to return to Pearl.^[44]

Lexington arrived back at Pearl Harbor on 27 December, but was ordered back to sea two days later. She returned on 3 January, needing repairs to one of her main generators. It was repaired four days later when TF 11 sailed with the carrier as Brown's flagship. The Task Force's mission was to patrol in the direction ofJohnston Atoll. It was spotted by the submarine I-18 on 9 January and several other submarines were vectored to intercept the Task Force. Another submarine was spotted on the surface the following morning about 60 nautical miles (110 km; 69 mi) south of the carrier by two Buffalos who reported it without alerting the submarine to their presence. That afternoon it was spotted again, further south, by a different pair of fighters, and two Devastators carrying depth charges were vectored to the submarine's position. They claimed to have damaged it before it could fully submerge, but the incident is not mentioned in Japanese records. The putative victim was most likely I-19, which arrived at Kwajalein Atoll on 15 January.Lexington and her consorts returned to Pearl Harbor on the following day without further incident.^[45]

Task Force 11 sailed from Pearl Harbor three days later to conduct patrols northeast of Christmas Island. On 21 January, Admiral Chester Nimitz, the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, ordered Brown to conduct a diversionary raid on Wake Island on 27 January after refueling from the only available tanker, the elderly and slow oiler Neches en route to Brown. The unescorted tanker was torpedoed and sunk by I-72 on 23 January, forcing the cancellation of the raid. The task force arrived back in Pearl two days later. Brown was ordered back to sea on 31 January to escort the fast oiler Neosho to its rendezvous with Halsey's task force returning from its attack on Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands. He was then supposed to patrol near Canton Island to cover a convoy arriving there on 12 February. The task force was reconfigured with only two heavy cruisers and seven destroyers; the eighteen Grumman F4F Wildcats of VF-3, redeployed from the torpedoed Saratoga, replaced VF-2 to allow the latter unit to convert to the Wildcat. One of the Wildcats was severely damaged upon landing on the carrier. Nimitz cancelled the rendezvous on 2 February after it became apparent that Halsey did not need Neosho's fuel and ordered Brown to proceed to Canton Island. On 6 February, Nimitz ordered him to rendezvous with the ANZAC Squadron in the Coral Sea to prevent Japanese advances that might interfere with the sea-lanes connecting Australia and the United States. In addition, he was to protect a troop convoy bound for New Caledonia.^[46]

Attempted raid on Rabaul[edit]

For more details on this topic, see Action off Bougainville.

The heavy cruiser San Francisco and two destroyers reinforced the task force on 10 February and Brown rendezvoused with the ANZAC Squadron six days later. Even after emptying Neosho of her oil there was not enough fuel for the ANZAC Squadron to join Brown's proposed raid on Rabaul and they were forced to remain behind. Brown was reinforced by the heavy cruiser Pensacola and two destroyers on 17 February and tasked these ships to bombard Rabaul in addition to the attack by Lexington's aircraft. While still some 453 nautical miles (839 km; 521 mi) northeast of Rabaul, the task force was spotted by a Kawanishi H6K "Mavis" flying boat on the morning of 20 February. The snooper was detected by Lexington's radar and was shot down by Lieutenant Commander Jimmy Thach and his wingman, but not before it radioed its spot report. Another H6K was vectored in to confirm the first aircraft's report, but it was detected and shot down before it could radio its report. Brown's plan had depended on the element of surprise and he canceled the raid, although he decided to proceed toward Rabaul to lure Japanese aircraft into attacking him.^[47]

A Mitsubishi G4M torpedo bomber photographed from Lexington's flight deck on 20 February 1942

Rear Admiral Eiji Gotō, commander of the 24th Air Flotilla, launched all 17 of his long-range Mitsubishi G4M1 "Betty" torpedo bombers, although no torpedoes were available at Rabaul and they made do with a pair of 250-kilogram (550 lb) bombs apiece. To better search for the Americans, the Japanese split their aircraft into two groups and Lexington's radar acquired one of these at 16:25. At this time, the ship was rotating its CAP aircraft and the newly launched aircraft barely had time to reach the altitude of the Japanese before they arrived. Lexington had 15 fully fueled Wildcats and Dauntlesses on her forward flight deck that had been moved forward to allow the CAP fighters to land. They represented a serious fire hazard, but they could not be launched until all aircraft on the flight deck were moved aft. Cognizant of the danger, the deck crews succeeded in respotting the aircraft and the fueled aircraft were able to take off before the Japanese attacked.^[48] Per Commander Herbert Duckworth, "It was as if some great hand moved all the planes aft simultaneously."^[49] Only four of the nine G4Ms in the first wave survived to reach Lexington, but all of their bombs missed and they were all shot down afterward, including one by a Dauntless. The honors were not all one-sided as they shot down two of the defending Wildcats. The second wave of eight bombers was spotted at 16:56, while all but two of the Wildcats were dealing with the first wave. Lieutenant Edward O'Hare and his wingman, Lieutenant (junior grade) Marion Dufilho, were able to intercept the bombers a few miles short of Lexington, but Dufilho's guns jammed before he could fire a shot. O'Hare was able to shoot down three G4Ms and damage two others before the bombers were able to drop their bombs, none of which struck the wildly maneuvering carrier. Only three of the G4Ms reached base as those Wildcats and Dauntlesses with enough fuel pursued and shot down several others.^[50]

Lae-Salamaua Raid[edit]

The task force changed course after dark for its rendezvous with the tanker Platte, scheduled for 22 February. One Japanese Aichi E13A "Jake" floatplane succeeded in tracking the task force for a short time after dark, but six H6Ks launched after midnight were unable to locate the American ships. Brown rendezvoused with Platte and the escorting ANZAC Squadron on schedule and he requested reinforcement by another carrier if another raid on Rabaul was desired.^[51]Nimitz promptly responded by ordering Yorktown's Task Force 17, under the command of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, to rendezvous with Brown north of New Caledonia on 6 March to allow the latter to attack Rabaul. The initial plan was to attack from the south in the hope of avoiding Japanese search aircraft, but this was changed on 8 March when word was received that Rabaul harbor was empty as the Japanese had invaded Papua New Guinea and all the shipping was anchored off the villages of Lae and Salamaua. The plan was changed to mount the attack from a position in the Gulf of Papua, even though this involved flying over the Owen Stanley Mountains. The two carriers reached their positions on the morning of 10 March and Lexington launched eight Wildcats, 31 Dauntlesses and 13 Devastators. They were the first to attack the 16 Japanese ships in the area and sank three transports and damaged several other ships before Yorktown's aircraft arrived 15 minutes later. One Dauntless was shot down by anti-aircraft fire while a Wildcat shot down a Nakajima E8N floatplane. A H6K spotted one carrier later that afternoon, but the weather had turned bad and the 24th Air Flotilla decided not to attack. Task Force 11 was ordered to return to Pearl and Lexington exchanged six Wildcats, five Dauntlesses and one Devastator for two Wildcats from Yorktown that needed overhaul before she left. The task force arrived at Pearl Harbor on 26 March.^[52]

The ship was given a short refit, during which her eight-inch gun turrets were removed and replaced by quadruple 1.1-inch (28 mm) anti-aircraft guns. Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch assumed command of Task Force 11 on 1 April and it was reorganized to consist of Lexington and the heavy cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans as well as seven destroyers. The task force sortied from Pearl Harbor on 15 April, carrying 14 Buffalos of VMF-211 to be flown off at Palmyra Atoll. After flying off the Marine fighters, the task force was ordered to train with the battleships of Task Force 1 in the vicinity of Palmyra and Christmas Island. Late on 18 April, the training was cancelled as Allied codebreakers had figured out that the Japanese intended to invade and occupy Port Moresby and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands (Operation Mo). Therefore, Fitch's ships, acting on a command from Nimitz, rendezvoused with TF 17 north of New Caledonia on 1 May, after refueling from the tanker Kaskaskia on 25 April to thwart the Japanese offensive. At this time, Lexington's air group consisted of 21 Wildcats, 37 Dauntlesses and 12 Devastators.^[53]

Battle of the Coral Sea[edit]

Main article: Battle of the Coral Sea

Preliminary actions[edit]

Both Task Forces needed to refuel, but TF 17 finished first and Fletcher took Yorktown and her consorts northward toward the Solomon Islands on 2 May. TF 11 was ordered to rendezvous with TF 17 and TF 44, the old ANZAC Squadron, further west into the Coral Sea on 4 May.^[54] The Japanese opened Operation Mo by occupying Tulagi on 3 May. Alerted by Allied reconnaissance aircraft, Fletcher decided to attack Japanese shipping there the following day. The air strike on Tulagi confirmed that at least one American carrier was in the vicinity, but the Japanese had no idea of its location.^[55] They launched a number of reconnaissance aircraft the following day to search for the Americans, but without result. One H6K flying boat spotted Yorktown, but was shot down by one of Yorktown's Wildcat fighters before she could radio a report. US Army Air Force (USAAF) aircraft spotted Shōhō^{[Note 1]} southwest of Bougainville Island on 5 May, but she was too far north to be attacked by the American carriers, which were refueling.^[57] That day, Fletcher received Ultra intelligence that placed the three Japanese carriers known to be involved in Operation Mo near Bougainville Island, and predicted 10 May as the date of the invasion. It also predicted airstrikes by the Japanese carriers in support of the invasion several days before 10 May. Based on this information, Fletcher planned to complete refueling on 6 May and to move closer to the eastern tip of New Guinea to be in a position to locate and attack Japanese forces on 7 May.^[58]

Another H6K spotted the Americans during the morning of 6 May and successfully shadowed them until 1400. The Japanese, however, were unwilling or unable to launch air strikes in poor weather or without updated spot reports.^[59] Both sides believed they knew where the other force was, and expected to fight the next day.^[60] The Japanese were the first to spot the Americans when one aircraft found the oiler Neosho escorted by the destroyer Sims at 0722, south of the Strike Force. They were misidentified as a carrier and a cruiser so the fleet carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku launched an airstrike forty minutes later that sank Sims and damaged Neosho badly enough that she had to be scuttled a few days later. The American carriers were west of the Japanese carriers, not south, and they were spotted by other Japanese aircraft shortly after the carriers had launched their attack on Neosho and Sims.^[61]

American reconnaissance aircraft reported two Japanese heavy cruisers northeast of Misima Island in the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern tip of New Guinea at 07:35 and two carriers at 08:15. An hour later Fletcher ordered an airstrike launched, believing that the two carriers reported were Shōkaku and Zuikaku. Lexington and Yorktown launched a total of 53 Dauntlessess and 22 Devastators escorted by 18 Wildcats. The 08:15 report turned out to be miscoded, as the pilot had intended to report two heavy cruisers, but USAAF aircraft had spotted Shōhō, her escorts and the invasion convoy in the meantime. As the latest spot report plotted only 30 nautical miles (56 km; 35 mi) away from the 08:15 report, the aircraft en route were diverted to this new target.^[62]

Lexington photographed from a Japanese aircraft on 8 May after she had already been struck by bombs

Shōhō and the rest of the Main Force were spotted by aircraft from Lexington at 10:40. At this time, Shōhō's CAP consisted of two Mitsubishi A5M "Claudes" and oneMitsubishi A6M Zero. The dive bombers of VS-2 began their attack at 1110 as the three Japanese fighters attacked the Dauntlesses in their dive. None of the dive bombers hit Shōhō, which was maneuvering to avoid their bombs; one Dauntless was shot down by the Zero after it had pulled out of its dive; several other Dauntlesses were also damaged. The carrier launched three more Zeros immediately after this attack to reinforce its CAP. The Dauntlesses of VB-2 began their attack at 11:18 and they hit Shōhō twice with 1,000-pound (450 kg) bombs. These penetrated the ship's flight deck and burst inside her hangars, setting the fueled and armed aircraft there on fire. A minute later the Devastators of VT-2began dropping their torpedoes from both sides of the ship. They hit Shōhō five times and the damage from the hits knocked out her steering and power. In addition, the hits flooded both the engine and boiler rooms. Yorktown's aircraft finished the carrier off and she sank at 11:31. After his attack, Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Dixon, commander of VS-2, radioed his famous message to the American carriers: "Scratch one flat top!"^[63]

After Shōkaku and Zuikaku had recovered the aircraft that had sunk Neosho and Sims, Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara, commander of the 5th Carrier Division, ordered that a further air strike be readied as the American carriers were believed to have been located. The two carriers launched a total of 12 Aichi D3A "Val" dive bombers and 15 Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo bombers late that afternoon. The Japanese had mistaken Task Force 44 for Lexington and Yorktown, which were much closer than anticipated, although they were along the same bearing. Lexington's radar spotted one group of nine B5Ns at 17:47 and half the CAP was directed to intercept them while additional Wildcats were launched to reinforce the CAP. The intercepting fighters surprised the Japanese bombers and shot down five while losing one of their own. One section of the newly launched fighters spotted the remaining group of six B5Ns, shooting down two and badly damaging another bomber, although one Wildcat was lost to unknown causes. Another section spotted and shot down a single D3A. The surviving Japanese leaders cancelled the attack after such heavy losses and all aircraft jettisoned their bombs andtorpedoes. They had still not spotted the American carriers and turned for their own ships, using radio direction finders to track the carrier's homing beacon. The beacon broadcast on a frequency very close to that of the American ships and many of the Japanese aircraft confused the ships in the darkness. A number of them flew right beside the American ships, flashing signal lights in an effort to confirm their identity, but they were not initially recognized as Japanese because the remaining Wildcats were attempting to land aboard the carriers. Finally they were recognized and fired upon, by both the Wildcats and the anti-aircraft guns of the task force, but they sustained no losses in the confused action. One Wildcat lost radio contact and could not find either of the American carriers; the pilot was never found. Only 18 Japanese aircraft successfully returned to their carriers, beginning at 20:00.^[64]

8 May[edit]

Lexington burning during the Battle of the Coral Sea

On the morning of 8 May, both sides spotted each other about the same time and began launching their aircraft about 09:00. The Japanese carriers launched a total of 18 Zeros, 33 D3As and 18 B5Ns. Yorktown was the first American carrier to launch her aircraft and Lexington began launching hers seven minutes later. These totaled nine Wildcats, 15 Dauntlesses and 12 Devastators. Yorktown's dive bombers disabled Shōkaku's flight deck with two hits and Lexington's aircraft were only able to further damage her with another bomb hit. None of the torpedo bombers from either carrier hit anything. The Japanese CAP was effective and shot down three Wildcats and two Dauntlesses for the loss of one Zero.^[65]

The Japanese aircraft spotted the American carriers around 11:05 and the B5Ns attacked first because the D3As had to circle around to approach the carriers from upwind. The CAP shot down three of the torpedo bombers before they could drop their torpedoes, but 11 survived long enough to hit Lexington twice on the port side at 11:20, although two of the B5Ns were shot down by anti-aircraft fire after dropping their torpedoes. The shock from the first torpedo hit at the bow jammed both elevators in the up position and started small leaks in the port avgas storage tanks. The second torpedo hit her opposite the bridge, ruptured the primary port water main, and started flooding in three port fire rooms. The boilers there had to be shut down, which reduced her speed to a maximum of 24.5 knots (45.4 km/h; 28.2 mph), and the flooding gave her a 6–7° list to port. Shortly afterward,Lexington was attacked by 19 D3As. One was shot down by the CAP before it could drop its bomb and another was shot down by the carrier. She was hit by two bombs, the first of which detonated in the port forward five-inch ready ammunition locker, killing the entire crew of one 5-inch AA gun and starting several fires. The second hit struck the funnel, doing little significant damage although fragments killed many of the crews of the .50-caliber machine guns positioned near there. The hit also jammed the ship's siren in the "on" position. The remaining bombs detonated close alongside and some of their fragments pierced the hull, flooding two compartments.^[66]

Confirmed direct hits sustained byLexington during the battle

Fuel was pumped from the port storage tanks to the starboard side to correct the list and Lexington began recovering damaged aircraft and those that were low on fuel at 11:39. The Japanese had shot down three of Lexington's Wildcats and five Dauntlesses, plus another Dauntless crashed on landing. At 12:43, the ship launched five Wildcats to replace the CAP and prepared to launch another nine Dauntlesses. A massive explosion at 12:47 was triggered by sparks that ignited gasoline vapors from the cracked port avgas tanks. The explosion killed 25 crewmen and knocked out the main damage control station. The damage did not interfere with flight deck operations, although the refueling system was shut down. The fueled Dauntlesses were launched and six Wildcats that were low on fuel landed aboard. Aircraft from the morning's air strike began landing at 13:22 and all surviving aircraft had landed by 14:14. The final tally was three Wildcats shot down, plus one Wildcat, three Dauntlesses and one Devastator that were forced to ditch.^[67]

Another serious explosion occurred at 14:42 that started severe fires in the hangar and blew the forward elevator 12 inches (300 mm) above the flight deck. Power to the forward half of the ship failed shortly afterward. Fletcher sent three destroyers to assist, but another major explosion at 15:25 knocked out water pressure in the hangar and forced the evacuation of the forward machinery spaces. The fire eventually forced the evacuation of all compartments below the waterline at 16:00 andLexington eventually drifted to a halt. Evacuation of the wounded began shortly afterward and Sherman ordered "abandon ship" at 17:07. A series of large explosions began around 18:00 that blew the aft elevator apart and threw aircraft into the air. Sherman waited until 18:30 to ensure that all of his crewmen were off the ship before leaving himself. Some 2,770 officers and men were rescued by the rest of the task force. The destroyer Phelps was ordered to sink the ship and fired a total of five torpedoes between 19:15 and 19:52. Immediately after the last torpedo hit, Lexington, down by the bow but nearly on an even keel finally sank^[68] at 15°20′S 155°30′E
.^[2] Some 216 crewmen were killed and 2,735 were evacuated.^[69]

Honors and legacy[edit]

Lexington received two battle stars for her World War II service.^[2] She was officially struck from the naval register on 24 June 1942.

In June 1942, shortly after the Navy's public acknowledgment of the sinking, workers at the Quincy shipyard, where the ship had been built twenty-one years earlier, cabled Navy Secretary Frank Knox and proposed a change in the name of one of the new Essex-class fleet carriers currently under construction there to Lexington (from Cabot).^[70] Knox agreed to the proposal and the carrier was renamed as the fifth Lexington on 16 June 1942.^[71] On 17 February 1943, her successor was formally commissioned as USS Lexington (CV-16), which served as the flagship of Task Force 58 (TF 58) during the Battle of the Philippine Sea and remained in service until 1991.

Sherman, Frederick C. Admiral:

Frederick Carl Sherman
Vice Admiral Frederick C. Sherman
Nickname(s)	"Ted"
Born	May 27, 1888 Port Huron, Michigan
Died	July 27, 1957 (aged 69) San Diego, California
Allegiance	United States of America
Service/branch	United States Navy
Years of service	1910-1947
Rank	Vice Admiral
Commands held	USS Lexington (CV-2) Fifth Fleet
Battles/wars	World War I World War II Battle of Coral Sea Battle of Midway Battle of Guadalcanal Battle of the Philippine Sea Battle of Leyte Gulf Battle of Iwo Jima Battle of Okinawa
Awards	Navy Cross (3) Distinguished Service Medal (3) Legion of Merit
Other work	author

Frederick Carl Sherman (May 27, 1888 – July 27, 1957) was a highly decorated admiral of the United States Navy during World War II.

[hide]

Biography[edit]

Sherman was born in Port Huron, Michigan in 1888. His grandfather, Loren Sherman, was the longtime editor and publisher of The Daily Times in Port Huron. His father, Frederick Ward Sherman, sold the newspaper in 1907 and moved to California, where he was editor and publisher of The Daily Independent in Santa Barbara in 1911.

Sherman graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1910. He served as commanding officer of submarines H-2 and O-2 during World War I.

After becoming a naval aviator, Sherman served as executive officer ofUSS Saratoga (CV-3) in 1937, and of Naval Air Station San Diego to 1938. He commanded USS Lexington (CV-2) from 1940 until her loss in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Promoted to rear admiral, he served as assistant chief of staff to COMINCH Admiral Ernest King until the end of 1942. He served in the Fast Carrier Task Force, as Commander,Carrier Division 2 in 1943, and as Commander, Task Group 38.3 in 1944–45.

Sherman was a three-time winner of the Navy Cross. On 11 January 1961, Frederick C. Sherman Field at San Clemente Island, Californiawas dedicated in honor of Vice Admiral Sherman. Promoted to vice admiral in 1945, he became Commander, United States Fifth Fleet in 1946.

Sherman retired in 1947, and died on 27 July 1957 at San Diego, California.

Sherman wrote Combat Command, a history of the Pacific Theater of World War II, drawing on his personal experiences. Combat Commandwas published in 1950 by E.P. Dutton Inc, and again by Bantam Books in 1982.

Decorations[edit]

Here is the ribbon bar of Vice Admiral Frederick C. Sherman:

Naval Aviator Badge
Submarine Warfare insignia
1st Row	Navy Cross with two Gold Stars		Navy Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars
2nd Row	Legion of Merit with "V" Device	Navy Commendation Medal		Nicaraguan Campaign Medal	Mexican Service Medal
3rd Row	World War I Victory Medalwith Submarine clasp	American Defense Service Medal with Fleet Clasp		American Campaign Medal	Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medalwith five Service stars
4th Row	World War II Victory Medal	Navy Occupation Service Medal		Companion of the Order of the British Empire	Philippine Liberation Medalwith two bronze stars

Daniel Dickel

Saturday, July 12, 2014

ABANDON SHIP!

Contents

Early career[edit]

Pacific Fleet[edit]

Neutrality patrol[edit]

World War II[edit]

Battle of the Coral Sea[edit]

Contents

Design and development[edit]

Operational history[edit]

Variants[edit]

Operators[edit]

Survivors[edit]

Specifications (Kawanishi H8K2)[edit]

Contents

Design and construction[edit]

Flight deck arrangements[edit]

Propulsion[edit]

Armament[edit]

Fire control and electronics[edit]

Armor[edit]

Service history[edit]

World War II[edit]

Attempted raid on Rabaul[edit]

Lae-Salamaua Raid[edit]

Battle of the Coral Sea[edit]

Preliminary actions[edit]

8 May[edit]

Honors and legacy[edit]

Contents

Biography[edit]

Decorations[edit]

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