It was not from lack of material, however much this was at fault, that France was crushed in the disastrous days of 1940. She was badly led and badly inspired, in war and preparation for war, just as the English had been up to that time, though they have learned much since. The material deficiencies that entered into France's defeat have, however, been played up to such a point that they whitewash and hide a far more serious deficiency. There is danger in both England and this country of placing such reliance on material is only for men to use, is given life only for men, and even then has little value without wise and courageous direction of men in command.
It is such truths we must hold in our hearts constantly as we go into the unknown future. We must not, in recognizing one cause for defeat, make material our god–the body rather than the life. We must remember constantly that although material, preparation, and all similar things will aid in winning the war, one thing alone can lose it–weak leadership. We can still have all other elements of strength to the highest degree and fail for lack of leaders. The most stupendous factory output may not be utilized, the strongest military might be allowed to rot away and our proposed colossal material strength be wasted for lack of moral courage in a few men, perhaps in one man, when the day of crisis comes. War is a contest not of machines but of men.
That God is on the side of the strongest battalions, as Napolean once cynically remarked, may or may not be true; but strength is not merely in numbers, as was his fate to prove in his declining years of leadership when, inspiration and wisdom having failed, he came to rely on mass of numbers. That strength is not merely in material was also Napolean's destiny to reveal, glowingly, by his early amazing campaigns in Italy and Austria with ragged, ill-fed, and ill-equipped armies that were irresistible when led by him.
Military strength is not a tangible quality that we can weigh and measure as so many tanks, guns, planes, or even men. This is a difficulty of war games and the error of many people in thinking about our nation's future role in the present world upheaval. In every fateful period of history the ultimate balance of strength (and usually the largest component in it) has come from the integrity of purpose, resolution, and energy of men in posts of high responsibility.
Leadership is the soul of all human endeavor. It is the flame that enabled the French under Clemenceau, Joffre, and Foch to stop an unstoppable German Army in 1914, because these men willed to stop it. It is the magic of German success so far in this war, and of the unexpected Russian resistance. It is for lack of this flame, which had burned low and sooty, that France fell in 1940.
It is upon it that we should lace our first trust, upon man's moral courage, upon his irresistable determination to win, to drive his purposes to a conclusion, to strike on past all hazard with ceaseless concentration of intent that knows no barrier. It will be the power of leadership that must and will direct us into the great future; and it alone will be the decisive and concluding force in this titanic struggle between the faiths of hope and darkness.
France suffered the crushing defeat of 1940 because she was led by men who believed in the power of the defensive. She placed her faith in walls, in blockade and the Maginot Line, which were supposed to sap German strength until economic and spiritual collapse would strike the killing blow. She was fattening herself on an easy war, remaining strong by sitting. She was as fatefully wrong as were Napolean's admirals a century and a half earlier in their struggle against English sea power. Mooring their fleets in port, they thought the English Navy would wear out in use while their own gained strength by idling. How false! How patently untrue to any but a timorous mind. The great heart of man grows on privation and danger. Flabbiness comes to muscles not from use but disuse. Weathering the hardships of continuous sea keeping, the British Fleet grew strong and sinewy and proud of its strength to endure. It was the French Fleet that declined, deteriorated in material, in dicipline, above all in morale and confidence. Under similar conditions the French armies of today weakened sleeping behind the Maginot Line, while the German Army, ceaselessly on the move in drill and attack, gained strength in the school of action. . . .
Man brings his ruin upon himself. Defeat or victory comes out of his own mind. Ruin is always deserved. How fatally a people may in three short generations learn their error, achieve great deeds, and then sink into inaction again! How much the destiny of a whole people, their fortunes, their lives, all their futures hang upon the resolute or indolent souls of a few men . . . !
--Rear Admiral Ernest M. Eller
From: The United States Navy in World War II
Compiled and Edited by: S. E. Smith
Part III: Chapter 2: How Shall We Win?
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Eller, Ernest M., Rear Admiral-
| Ernest McNeill Eller | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Nickname(s) | "Judge" Eller |
| Born | January 23, 1903 Marion, Virginia |
| Died | July 30, 1992 (aged 89) Annapolis, Maryland |
| Allegiance |  United States of America |
| Service/branch |  United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1925-1954 |
| Rank |  Rear Admiral |
| Commands held | Director of Naval History |
| Battles/wars | World War II Korean War |
| Awards | Legion of Merit with Combat “V" |
Ernest McNeill Eller (23 January 1903 – 30 July 1992) was a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy, who served as Director of Naval History, Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations from 1956 to 1970.
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Early Life and education[edit]
Ernest Eller was born on 23 January 1903 in Marion, Virginia. The son of Edward E, Eller and Elizabeth McNeill Eller, he attended North Wilkesboro High School, North Wilkesboro, North Carolina, and North Carolina State College at Raleigh, North Carolina, before entering theUnited States Naval Academy in 1921. As a midshipman he was Managing Editor of The Log, President of the Trident Society, and editor of The Trident, graduating with the Class of 1925. He received a Master of Arts degree in Psychology at George Washington University, Washington, DC, in 1934.
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Graduated and commissioned an Ensign on 4 June 1925, Eller rose to the rank of Captain in 1944, to date from 20 July 1943, and served in the temporary rank of Commodore from 30 September 1946 until 1 December 1947. On 1 April 1954 he was transferred to the Retired List of the US Navy as a Rear Admiral.
He served on USS Utah (BB-31) until 14 June 1926, when he reported to the Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Island, for instruction. On 3 January 1927 he joined USS Texas (BB-35) and served on board that battleship until 28 May 1927. Following instruction in submarines at the Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut, he served successively from February 1928 to April 1932 in USS S-33 and USS Utah. For the next three years he had duty at the United States Naval Academy in the Department of English and History and the Executive Department. During that period, he earned a Master of Arts degree in Psychology at George Washington University, Washington, D.C..
During his next period of sea duty, he organized and conducted the Fleet Machine Gun School in USS Utah, in which he served until May 1938. He then returned to the Naval Academy for duty in the Departments of English and History, and Ordnance and Gunnery. From September 1940 until May 1941 he served as Assistant Naval Attaché in London, England, and as Observer with the British Home Fleet for radar, anti-aircraft, and other wartime technical developments.
After brief duty in the Fleet Training Division and Bureau of Ordnance developing anti-aircraft training and weapons, he was ordered to USS Saratoga (CV-3) and served as her gunnery officer until May 1942. He was on board that aircraft carrier when she made her high-speed run from San Diego, California, to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, with urgently needed plane and pilot replacements immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He was also on board when Saratoga was torpedoed in January 1942 while on her third operational foray into the Marshall Islands and Midway Island areas.
He served for the next three years on the staff Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), as Assistant Gunnery and Anti-submarine Training Officer. In addition, he analyzed actions and wrote CINCPAC’s war reports during the first part of this tour of duty.
He was awarded the Legion of Merit with Combat “V.” The citation follows in part:
For exceptionally meritorious conduct…while attached to the staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, during operations against enemy Japanese forces in the Pacific War Area from May 1942 to April 1945. Analyzing war reports and developing, expanding and supervising all types of training, particularly anti-aircraft, anti-submarine, amphibious and shore bombardment, (he) participated in landings on Makin and Okinawa and in other combat operations which led to improved methods and development of new weapons. In his constant attention to improvements in weapons and armament of his ships and in his supervision of Fleet ammunition supply, he rendered vital service in developing and maintaining the combat readiness of the Fleet…
During the summer and fall of 1945, he commanded the attack transport USS Clay (APA-39), participating in three occupation moves into Japan and China. From late in December 1945 until March 1946, he served as District Public Information Officer, Twelfth Naval District, San Francisco, California. He reported in April 1946 to the Office of Public Information, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., to serve as Deputy Director and on 31 July 1946 assumed the duties of Director of Public Information. He was promoted to the temporary rank of Commodore on 30 September 1946.
Selected to attend the course at the National War College, Washington, D.C., which convened on 30 August 1948, he completed the course and reported in June 1949 for duty in the Staff Planning Section of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this duty he accompanied the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the member countries of NATO establishing plans for the military structure of that organization. A year later, at the outbreak of the Korean War, he became Commander, Middle East Force, in the Persian Gulf – Indian Ocean area. He assumed command of USS Albany (CA-123) on 14 May 1951, and in April 1952 he was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, International Affairs Division. Late in 1953 he was hospitalized and on 1 April 1954 was transferred to the Retired List of the Navy.
On 15 September 1956 he was recalled to active duty as Director of Naval History, Naval History Division and Curator of the Navy Department, Washington, DC, and served as such until relieved of active duty on 23 January 1970.
Admiral Eller died of a heart ailment on 30 July 1992 at his home in Annapolis, Maryland. He was 89.
Awards and decorations[edit]
In addition to the Legion of Merit with Combat “V,” Rear Admiral Eller was awarded the American Defense Service Medal, Fleet Clasp; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal; the American Campaign Medal; the World War II Victory Medal; the Navy Occupation Service Medal, Asia and Europe Clasps; the China Service Medal; and the National Defense Service Medal with bronze star.
Legion of Merit with Combat V
American Defense Service Medal
American Campaign Medal
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal
World War II Victory Medal
Navy Occupation Service Medal, Asia and Europe Clasp
China Service Medal
National Defense Service Medal
In 1967, he received the Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement.
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