Now let us look back at the other American warships. When the battle opened, Task Force 64’s favorite target was Goto’s unsuspecting flagship, Aoba, which was promptly inundated with forty large-caliper shells. The Japanese admiral was mortally wounded and Captain Kijuma, the flagship’s commanding officer, took over. Meanwhile, destroyers Furutaka and Fubuki were holed and sunk, while Duncan (soon to be abandoned) was caught in a crossfire: shells ripped into the chart house, bridge and gun director, killing everyone there, while others battered her communications center and radar plotting rooms; the forward third of the ship became a glut of flames. More shells landed below in her forward engine room, and all power was lost. At the same time American destroyer Fahrenholt, victim of a communication failure, was caught in a crossfire. Shells ripped through her thin-skinned hull, flooded her gun plot, and wrecked her fire control wiring; others struck below, causing a loss of power and releasing a murderous jet of steam. Salt Lake City absorbed a few hits while engaging an enemy cruiser, and San Francisco, leader of the group which had pumped heavy fire into Kinugasa and Aoba, came away relatively unscathed.
While the battle was a clear-cut American victory, removing some of the sting of Savo, the Japanese reinforcement groups did manage to land their troops and supplies on the island. Nevertheless, the Navy’s fortunes were in the ascendancy.
Only two nights after Scott’s victory, Japan sent down a mighty bombardment group formed around the battleships Haruna and Kongo to maul the defenders of Henderson Field. While the Marines cowered in their foxholes, some nine hundred 14-inch shells pummeled the airstrip in the worst assault of the campaign. For eighty uninterrupted minutes the Japanese ranged with impunity along the coast hurling their explosives, until a squadron of newly arrived PT boats sneaked out of Tulagi to give battle, much as a mosquito tangling with a whale. However, Admiral Takeo Kurita was so annoyed that he broke off his bombardment. In his wake he left a burning, chewed-up airstrip and a good number of thoroughly shaken Marines.
So desperate was the situation that Nimitz in Pearl Harbor observed: “It now appears that we are unable to control the area in the sea around the Guadalcanal area. Thus our control of the positions will only be done at great expense to us. The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical.”
Scarcely a fortnight after Cape Esperance another major confrontation appeared imminent as Yamamoto’s forces, numbering four carriers, five battleships, fourteen cruisers and forty-four destroyers, were poised for the capture of Henderson Field. Opposing the Japanese armada were two carriers, two battleships, nine cruisers, and twenty-four destroyers divided into three groups. On 23 October United States forces were off the Santa Cruz Islands, east of the Solomons, when a PBY flying boat “snooped” an enemy carrier and reported her position. Task Force 16, under Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid in battle-scarred Enterprise, launched a combined search and strike. Heavy weather, however, prevented accurate reconnaissance and the battle did not break out until the morning of 26 October. Although in the ensuing engagement the United States lost carrier Hornet and suffered damage to several other warships, enemy carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku were so heavily damaged that they were out of the war for months. But, most important, the battle was a tactical American victory, for the thrust on Guadalcanal was decisively turned back and we gained precious time to reinforce and prepare.
Commander Edward P. Stafford, biographer of Enterprise, narrates the event of Santa Cruz.
From: The United States Navy in World War II
Compiled and edited by: S. E. Smith
Compiled and edited by: S. E. Smith
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