The submarine war . . . has been a matter of primary concern since the outbreak of hostilities. Maintenance of the flow of ocean traffic has been, and continues to be, a vital element of all war plans.
Operating on exterior lines of communication on almost every front, the United Nations have been dependent largely upon maritime transportation. The success of overseas operations, landing attacks, the maintenance of troops abroad and the delivery of war materials to Russia and other Allies concerned primarily with land operations has depended to a large extent upon the availability of shipping and the ability to keep it moving. Shipping potentialities have been the major factor--often the controlling factor--in most of the problems with which the Allied High Command has had to deal.
The principal menace to shipping has been the large fleet of submarines maintained by Germany. Our enemies have employed the submarine on a world-wide scale, but the area of greatest intensity has always been the Atlantic Ocean where the bulk of German U-boats have operated.
The German U-boat campaign is a logical extension of the submarine strategy of World War I which almost succeeded in starving Great Britain into submission. Unable to build up a powerful surface fleet in preparation for World War II, Germany planned to repeat her submarine campaign on a greater scale and to this end produced a U-boat fleet of huge size. The primary mission of this underwater navy was to cut the sea routes to the British Isles, and the enemy undersea forces went to work on this task promptly and vigorously.
The United States became involved in the matter before we were formally at war, because our vessels were being sink in the transatlantic traffic routes. Consequently, in 1941, we took measures to assist the Royal Navy to protect our shipping. As stated in more detail elsewhere in this report these measures included the transfer of 50 old destroyers to the British, and--in the latter part of 1941--the assignment of our own naval vessels to escort our merchant shipping on threatened trans-Atlantic routes.
The submarine situation was improving as 1941 drew toward a close. Escort operations on threatened convoy routes were becoming more and more effective. British aviation had become a potent factor, by direction action against the U-boats, and also by bringing under control the German over-water air effort that had augmented the submarine offense. Our resources were stretched, however, and we could not, for a time, deal effectively with the change in the situation brought about by our entry into the war on 7 December 1941. Our whole merchant marine then became a legitimate target, and the U-boats, still remaining full pressure on the trans-Atlantic routes, had sufficient numbers to spread their depredations into the wide areas hitherto immune. Our difficulty was that such part of the Atlantic Fleet as was not already engaged in escort duty was called upon to protect the troop movements that began with our entry into the war, leaving no adequate force to cover the many maritime traffic areas newly exposed to possible U-boat activity.
The Germans were none too quick in taking advantage of their opportunity. It was not until more than a month after the declaration of war that U-boats began to expand their areas of operation. The first move took the form of an incursion into our coastal waters in January 1942. We had prepared for this by gathering on our eastern seaboard our scant resources in coastal antisubmarine vessels and aircraft, consisting chiefly of a number of yachts and miscellaneous small craft taken over by the Navy in 1940 and 1941. To reinforce this group the Navy accelerated its program of acquiring such fishing boats and pleasure craft as could be used and supplied them with such armaments as they could carry. For patrol purposes we employed all available aircraft--Army as well as Navy. The help of the Civil Air Patrol was gratefully accepted. This heterogeneous force was useful in keeping lookout and in rescuing survivors of sunken ships. It may have interfered, too, to some extent with the freedom of U-boat movement, but the heavy losses we suffered in coastal waters during the early months of 1942 gave abundant proof of the already well known fact that stout hearts in little boats can not handle an opponent as tough as the submarine.
The Navy was grateful for the assistance so eagerly volunteered by the men who courageously risked their lives in order to make the best available means, but there had to be better means, and to provide them no effort was spared to build up an anti-submarine force of adequate types. Submarine chasers, construction of which had been initiated before the war, began to come into service early in 1942. The British and Canadian Navies were able to assign some anti-submarine vessels to work with our coastal forces. Ocean escorts were robbed to reinforce coastal areas. These measures made it possible to establish a coastal convoy system in the middle of May 1942. Antisubmarine aviation had concurrently improved in quality and material and training of personnel. The Army Air Force had volunteered the services of the First Bomber Command which was especially trained and outfitted for antisubmarine warfare.
The effect of these measures was quickly felt in the Eastern Sea Frontier (the coastal waters from Canada to Jacksonville) where they were first applied. With the establishment of the initial coastal convoy (under the command of Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier) in the middle of May 1942, sinkings in the vital traffic lanes of the Eastern Sea Frontier dropped off nearly to zero and have so remained. While it has not been possible to clear those routes completely--there is evidence that nearly always one or more U-boats haunt our Atlantic Coast--submarines in that area long ago ceased to be a serious problem.
When the Eastern Sea Frontier became "too hot," the U-boats began to spread further afield. The coastal convoy system was extended as rapidly as possible to meet them in the Gulf of Mexico (under the command of Rear Admiral J.L. Kauffman, Commander Gulf Sea Frontier), the Caribbean Sea, (Under the command of Vice Admiral J.H. Hoover, Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier), and along the Atlantic Coast of South America. The undersea craft made a last bitter stand in the Trinidad area in the fall of 1942. Since then coastal waters have been relatively safe.
The problem was more difficult to meet in the open sea. The submarine chasers that do well enough in coastal waters are too small for ocean escort duty. Destroyers and other ocean escort types could not be produced as rapidly as the smaller craft. Aircraft capable of long overseas patrol were not plentiful, nor were aircraft carriers. In consequence, protection of ocean shipping lagged to some extent. By the end of 1942, however, this matter began to come under control, as our forces slowly increased, and there has been a steady improvement ever since.
The Atlantic antisubmarine campaign has been a closely integrated international operation. In the early phases of our participation, there was a considerable mixture of forces, as the needs of the situation were met as best they could be. For a time some British and Canadian vessels operated in our coastal escorts, while our destroyers were brigaded with British groups in the Atlantic and even occasionally as far afield as north Russian waters. As Allied strength improved in power and balance, it became possible to establish certain areas of national responsibility wherein the forces are predominately of one nation. This simplifies the problem of administration and operation, but there still are--and probably always will be--some areas where forces of two or more nations work together in a single command, and always there is close coordination in deploying the forces of the several Allies.
There is constant interchange of information between the large organizations maintained in the Admiralty and in the United States Fleet Headquarters (in the form of the Tenth Fleet which coordinates United States anti-U-boat activities in the Atlantic) to deal with the problems of control and protection of shipping. These organizations, also, keep in intimate touch with the War Shipping Administration in the United States and with the corresponding agency in Great Britain.
Command of antisubmarine forces--air and surface--that protect shipping in the coastwise sea lanes of the United States and within the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico is exercised by sea frontier commanders, each assigned to a prescribed area. The command is naval except in the Panama area where the naval sea frontier commander is under the Commanding General at Panama.
Since aircraft and surface combatant ships are most effective when working as a closely knit team, it is the policy--in antisubmarine as well as other naval operations--to weld together air and surface forces in a single command in each area.
In the Atlantic Ocean, beyond the coastal area, antisubmarine forces--air and surface--are part of the Atlantic Fleet under the command of Admiral Ingersoll. One of the units of Admiral Ingersoll's fleet is the South Atlantic Force (Vice Admiral Ingram commanding) which guards shipping in the coastal waters south of the Equator and throughout the United States area of South Atlantic. Vice Admiral Ingram's command includes highly efficient surface and air units of Brazil, which country has wholeheartedly joined our team of submarine hunters. This team, incidentally, turns its guns on surface raiders and other bigger game when the enemy provides the opportunity.
It is appropriate to express her appreciation of the surfaces of Netherlands antisubmarine vessels which have operated with exemplary efficiency as part of the United States Naval Caribbean Force ever since we entered the war.
Antisubmarine warfare is primarily a naval function, but, in accordance with the general policy of working together, Army and Navy forces that are available turn to together on the enemy when need arises. Thus it happens that there are instances in which Army aircraft join in the submarine hunt. The assistance of the Army Air Force has been of great value, particularly in the early phases of the war, when naval resources were inadequate. An example of this is the formation of the Army Air Force Anti-Submarine Command in the spring of 1942, which was given the equipment and training necessary to make its members antisubmarine specialists. It operated, under the command of Brigadier General (now Major General) T. W. Larson, in the United States and abroad until last November (1943), when the Navy obtained enough equipment to take over the tasks so well performed by this command.
It is regretted that it is not possible at this time to go into the details of our antisubmarine operations in this report. It would be a great pleasure to recount the many praise-worthy exploits of our antisubmarine forces, but to do so now would jeopardize the success of future operations. The U-boat war has been a war of wits. The submarine is a weapon of stealth, and naturally enough the German operations have been shrouded in secrecy. It has been of equal importance to keep our counter measures from becoming known to the enemy. There is a constant interplay of new devices and new tactics on the part of forces working against submarines as well as on the part of the submarines themselves, and an important element of our success has been the ability to keep the enemy from knowing what we are doing and what we are likely to do in the future. It is, also, of the utmost importance to keep our enemies from learning our antisubmarine technique, lest they turn it to their own advantage in operations against our submarines.
--Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
From: The United States Navy in World War II
Compiled and edited by: S.E. Smith
Part II: Chapter 6: Cominch Takes a Hard Look at the U-Boat Situation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Ernest Joseph King | |
|---|---|
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN
| |
| Nickname | "Ernie" "Rey" |
| Born | 23 November 1878 Lorain, Ohio |
| Died | 25 June 1956 (aged 77) Kittery, Maine |
| Allegiance |  United States of America |
| Service/branch |  United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1901–1956[1] |
| Rank |  Fleet Admiral |
| Commands held | United States Fleet |
| Battles/wars | World War II |
| Awards | Navy Cross Navy Distinguished Service Medal Sampson Medal |
| Other work | Naval Historical Foundation, President |
Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph King (23 November 1878 – 25 June 1956) was Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (CINCUS) and Chief of Naval Operations (COMINCH-CNO) during World War II. As COMINCH, he directed the United States Navy's operations, planning, and administration and was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was the U.S. Navy's second most senior officer after Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, and the second admiral to be promoted to five star rank. As COMINCH, he served under Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and later under James Forrestal.
King's career was resurrected by his friend, CNO Admiral Harold "Betty" Stark, who realized King's talent for command was being wasted on the General Board. Stark appointed King as Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet in the fall of 1940, and he was promoted to admiral in February 1941. On 30 December 1941 he became Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. On 18 March 1942, he was appointed Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), relieving Stark. He is the only person to hold this combined command. After turning 64 on 23 November 1944, he wrote a message to President Roosevelt to say he had reached mandatory retirement age. Roosevelt replied with a note reading "So what, old top?".[29] On 17 December 1944 he was promoted to the newly created rank of fleet admiral. He left active duty on 15 December 1945 but was recalled as an advisor to the Secretary of the Navy in 1950.
After retiring, King lived in Washington, D.C.. He was active in his early post-retirement (serving as president of the Naval Historical Foundation from 1946 to 1949), but suffered a debilitating stroke in 1947, and subsequent ill-health ultimately forced him to stay in naval hospitals at Bethesda, Maryland, and at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine. He died of a heart attack in Kittery on 26 June 1956 and was buried in the United States Naval Academy Cemetery at Annapolis, Maryland.
King was highly intelligent and extremely capable, but controversial. Some consider him to have been one of the greatest admirals of the 20th century;[30] others, however, point out that he never commanded ships or fleets at sea in war time, and that his anglophobia led him to make decisions which cost many Allied lives.[31] Others see as indicative of strong leadership his willingness and ability to counter both British and U.S. Army influence on American World War II strategy, and praise his sometimes outspoken recognition of the strategic importance of the Pacific War.[30] His instrumental role in the decisive Guadalcanal Campaign has earned him admirers in the United States and Australia, and some also consider him an organizational genius.[32] He was demanding and authoritarian, and could be abrasive and abusive to subordinates. King was widely respected for his ability, but not liked by many of the officers he commanded.
He was... perhaps the most disliked Allied leader of World War II. Only British Field Marshal Montgomery may have had more enemies... King also loved parties and often drank to excess. Apparently, he reserved his charm for the wives of fellow naval officers. On the job, he "seemed always to be angry or annoyed."[33]
There was a tongue-in-cheek remark about King, made by one of his daughters, repeated by Naval personnel at the time that "he is the most even-tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage." Roosevelt once described King as a man who "shaves every morning with a blow torch."[34]
It is commonly reported when King was called to be Cominch, he remarked,"When they get in trouble they send for the sons-of-bitches.” However, when he was later asked if he had said this, King replied he had not but would have if he had thought of it.[35] On the other hand, King's view of press relations for the US Navy in World War II is well documented. When asked to state a public relations policy for the Navy, King replied "Don't tell them anything. When it's over, tell them who won." [36]
Response to Operation Drumbeat[edit]
At the start of US involvement in World War II, blackouts on the U.S. eastern seaboard were not in effect, and commercial ships were not travelling under convoy. King's critics attribute the delay in implementing these measures to his Anglophobia, as the convoys and seaboard blackouts were British proposals, and King was supposedly loath to have his much-beloved U.S. Navy adopt any ideas from the Royal Navy. He also refused, until March 1942, the loan of British convoy escorts when the Americans had only a handful of suitable vessels. He was, however, aggressive in driving his destroyer captains to attack U-boats in defense of convoys and in planning counter-measures against German surface raiders, even before the formal declaration of war in December 1941.[37]
Instead of convoys, King had the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard perform regular anti-submarine patrols, but these patrols followed a regular schedule. U-boat commanders learned the schedule, and coordinated their attacks to these schedules. Leaving the lights on in coastal towns back-lit merchant ships to the U-Boats. As a result, there were disastrous shipping losses — two million tons lost in January and February 1942 alone, and urgent pressure applied from both sides of the Atlantic. However, King resisted the use of convoys because he was convinced the Navy lacked sufficient escort vessels to make them effective. The formation of convoys with inadequate escort would also result in increased port-to-port time, giving the enemy concentrated groups of targets rather than single ships proceeding independently. Furthermore, blackouts were a politically sensitive issue – coastal cities resisted, citing the loss of tourism revenue.[citation needed]
It was not until May 1942 that King marshalled resources — small cutters and private vessels that he had previously scorned — to establish a day-and-night interlocking convoy system running from Newport, Rhode Island, to Key West, Florida.[38]
By August 1942, the submarine threat to shipping in U.S. coastal waters had been contained. The U-boats' "second happy time" ended, with the loss of seven U-boats and a dramatic reduction in shipping losses. The same effect occurred when convoys were extended to the Caribbean. Despite the ultimate defeat of the U-boat, some of King's initial decisions in this theatre could be viewed as flawed.[39]
In King's defense, noted naval historian Professor Robert W. Love has stated that "Operation Drumbeat (or Paukenschlag) off the Atlantic Coast in early 1942 succeeded largely because the U.S. Navy was already committed to other tasks: transatlantic escort-of-convoy operations, defending troop transports, and maintaining powerful, forward-deployed Atlantic Fleet striking forces to prevent a breakout of heavy German surface forces. Navy leaders, especially Admiral King, were unwilling to risk troop shipping to provide escorts for coastal merchant shipping. Unscheduled, emergency deployments of Army units also created disruptions to navy plans, as did other occasional unexpected tasks. Contrary to the traditional historiography, neither Admiral King’s unproven yet widely alleged Anglophobia, an equally undocumented navy reluctance to accept British advice, nor a preference for another strategy caused the delay in the inauguration of coastal escort-of-convoy operations. The delay was due to a shortage of escorts, and that resulted from understandably conflicting priorities, a state of affairs that dictated all Allied strategy until 1944.
Eastern Sea Frontier: The Eastern Sea Frontier (EASTSEAFRON) was a United States Navy operational command during World War II, that was responsible for the coastal waters from Canada to Jacksonville, Florida, extending out for a nominal distance of two hundred miles. The Commander was designated Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier (COMEASTSEAFRON).
The commander of a Sea Frontier had control and responsibility for convoys within its defined area, had its own vessels for convoy use or other uses as determined by the commander, and worked closely with the U.S. Army Air Force in the defense of the frontier. Usually, offices of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army Air Force officers assigned to the frontier, had their offices side by side in order to create effective two-way communications and expedited reaction to reports of enemy presence. In addition to providing escorts for convoys within its frontier, the frontier was responsible for sea-air rescue, harbor defense, shipping lane patrol, minesweeping, and air operations.
Eastern Sea Frontier's commander also served as commander of the Atlantic Reserve Fleet as of 1937-38.[1]
Eastern Sea Frontier's headquarters were located at 90 Church Street in Lower Manhattan. The commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier, until the closing months of 1943, was Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews whose operational orders could only be appealed to Admiral Ernest King. This frontier was the "parent" of all frontiers, and its authority extended beyond its own frontier.
Vice Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. served as Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, 1965-67, and he was relieved by Admiral Andrew McBurney Jackson, who retired in 1969.
Andrews, Adolphus, Vice Admiral: Vice Admiral Andrews was born in Galveston, Texas, 7 October 1879. During his first year at the University of Texas, he was appointed to the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, from the Sixth District of Texas in September 1897. He was graduated from the Academy on 7 June 1901, and served the two years at sea then required by law before commissioning in the USSMaine operating with the Atlantic Fleet, and was commissioned Ensign on 7 June 1903. He was commissioned Lieutenant (junior grade) and Lieutenant, 7 June 1906, and advanced to Lieutenant Commander 1 July 1913. During World War I he was temporarily advanced to the ranks of Commander and later Captain, and was commissioned in these ranks in 1918 and 1923 respectively. He attained the rank of Rear Admiral 16 January 1934, and served in the rank of Vice Admiral from 13 July 1938, until 1 February 1941, and was appointed Vice Admiral, 1 May 1942. He was transferred to the Retired List of the Navy on 11 November 1943, in the rank of Vice Admiral. He died on 19 June 1948, at the Naval Hospital, Houston, Texas.
Vice Admiral Andrews served as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, DC, with the rank of Rear Admiral, from 30 June 1935 until 11 June 1938. He then served as Commander, Scouting Force, with the accompanying rank of Vice Admiral, from 13 July 1938 until 1 February 1941, when he reverted to the rank of Rear Admiral. On 10 March 1941 he reported for duty as Commandant of the Third Naval District, New York, New York, and Commander of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
On 6 February 1942, Naval Coastal Frontiers were grouped in to Sea Frontiers. The area of the Naval Coastal Frontier formerly under Vice Admiral Andrew's command was merged into the Eastern Sea Frontier and he became its commander. In March 1942 he was relieved of duty as Commandant of the Third Naval District, continuing as Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, with the rank of Vice Admiral. In this capacity he had the task of sweeping the stretch of the Atlantic between Nova Scotia and Florida free of enemy submarines. The submarine menace in this area ceased to be of dangerous proportions in the fall of 1942. For his services in this important command which extended to 1 November 1943, Vice Admiral Andrews was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, with the following citation:
Distinguished Service Medal: "For exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service to the Government of the United States in a position of great responsibility as Commander Eastern Sea Frontier. During a period of intense enemy submarine activities, Vice Admiral Andrews displayed the highest qualities of leadership, judgment, and planning, and initiated and put into effect the anti-submarine organization of this Sea Frontier which proved to be highly effective in driving German submarines from our coastal waters and which became the model for the anti-submarine organization of other sea frontiers.
Vice Admiral Andrews was transferred to the Retired List of the Navy in the rank of Vice Admiral on 1 November 1943. He continued on active duty until the summer of 1945, serving in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, as Chairman of the Navy Manpower Survey Board. In the summer of 1944 he was a member of the Board of Inquiry appointed to investigate the circumstances connected with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
In addition to the Distinguished Service Medal, Vice Admiral Andrews has the Spanish Campaign Medal; the Mexican Service Medal; the Victory Medal, Atlantic Fleet Clasp; the American Defense Service Medal; the American Area Campaign Medal; and the World War II Victory Medal. He also has the decoration and diploma awarded by the Government of Brazil for services as a member of the American delegation to Brazil on the occasion of the anniversary of Brazilian independence, and the decoration Order of Vasco Nunez de Balboa, grade of Commander, awarded him by the Government of Panama on the occasion of the visit of the US Fleet to Panama, 28 April to 2 May 1939.
Gulf Sea Frontier: Organized 6 February 1942 the Gulf Sea Frontier (GULFSEAFRON) was headquartered at Key West, Florida, and was later moved to Miami, Florida on 17 June 1942. Captain Russell S. Crenshaw was Commander, Gulf Sea Frontier (COMGULFSEAFRON) until June 3, 1942, when he was replaced by Rear Admiral James L. Kauffman.[3] It was responsible for protecting the waters of Florida and the Bahamas as well as the Gulf of Mexico, the Yucatan Channel and areas near Cuba.
| John Howard Hoover | |
|---|---|
Admiral John H. Hoover, USN
| |
| Nickname | "Johnny" "Genial John" |
| Born | May 15, 1887 Seville, Ohio |
| Died | December 2, 1970 (aged 83) Washington, DC |
| Allegiance |  United States of America |
| Service/branch |  United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1903–1948 |
| Rank |  Admiral |
| Commands held | Forward Area Central Pacific Carrier Division 4 Task Force 57 Pacific Feet Marianas Pacific Fleet Caribbean Sea Frontier Tenth Naval District, San Juan, PR. |
| Awards | Navy Cross Distinguished Service Medal(three)(United States) |
Admiral John Howard Hoover (May 15, 1887 – December 2, 1970) held several flag commands during World War II most notably those in the Central Pacific under Chester W. Nimitz.[1] Hoover became one of Nimitz's trusted if little known admirals of the Pacific war.
Caribbean Sea Frontier: The Caribbean Sea Frontier (CARIBSEAFRON) was under the command of Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier or COMCARIBSEAFRON, and the responsibility of the frontier was the protection of Allied shipping in the Caribbean Sea and along the Atlantic Coast of South America during World War II. The German U-Boat made a last bitter stand in the Trinidad area in the fall of 1942. Since then, coastal waters continued to be relatively safe of the U-boat menace.
| U.S. Tenth Fleet | |
|---|---|
Tenth Fleet emblem
| |
| Active | May 1943 - June 1945 January 29, 2010 – current |
| Country | United States of America |
| Type | Fleet |
| Garrison/HQ | Fort Meade, Maryland |
| Commanders | |
| Current commander | Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers[1] |
The U.S. Tenth Fleet is a functional formation of the United States Navy. It was first created as an anti-submarine warfare coordinating organization during the Battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War.
Tenth Fleet's mission included the destruction of enemy submarines, the protection of coastal merchant shipping, the centralization of control and routing of convoys, and the coordination and supervision of all USN anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training, anti-submarine intelligence, and coordination with the Allied nations. The fleet was active from May 1943 to June 1945.[4] Tenth Fleet used Commander-in-Chief Atlantic's ships operationally; CinCLANT issued operational orders to escort groups originating in the United States. The Fleet was also responsible for the organization and operational control of hunter-killer groups. Chief of Naval OperationsAdmiral Ernest King was the fleet's commander, with Rear Admiral (RADM) F.S. Low, King's assistant chief of staff for ASW, as fleet chief of staff, Admiral Low was later relieved by RADM Allan Rockwell McCann, who remained in command of 10th Fleet until it was deactivated. Tenth Fleet never put to sea, had no ships, and never had more than about 50 people in its organization. The fleet was disbanded after the surrender of Germany.
The War Shipping Administration (WSA) was a World War II emergency war agency of the US Government, tasked to purchase and operate the civilian shipping tonnage the US needed for fighting the war. Both shipbuilding under the Maritime Commission and ship allocation under the WSA to Army, Navy or civilian needs were closely coordinated though Vice Admiral Emory S. Landwho continued as head of the Maritime Commission while also heading the WSA.
A shortage of vessels further complicated by requirements to take vessels out of service for conversion and armament was of concern at the highest levels, including the President. Particular concern that available shipping would not be used effectively led to his establishment immediately on the nation's active entry into the war of the Strategic Shipping Board composed of the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, Army Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations and Mr. Harry Hopkins reporting directly to the President. Differences between the organizations and lack of decisive authority short of the President limited the board's effectiveness. An additional need was an effective routine interaction with the British Ministry of War Transport, already given management of British merchant shipping, for coordination of all Allied merchant shipping. Upon establishment of the WSA the Strategic Shipping Board continued in existence in a much diminished role under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[3]
On February 7, 1942, WSA was established by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Executive Order No. 9054. February 7, 1942as the U.S. had entered the war. The WSA was administratively split off from the United States Maritime Commission, established in 1936, which oversaw design and construction of merchant type vessels. Those included the production of Liberty ships and Victory ships among other types. The U.S. fleet expanded to some 3,500 dry cargo vessels and over 900 high speed tankers.
On a practical level the The Maritime Commission and the WSA worked closely together under the administration of Vice Admiral Emory S. Land at the head of each. Land described this relationship in his report to The President of WSA's progress through December 31, 1943:
- "Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the United States Maritime Commission was established as an independent agency to direct and control all phases of overseas shipping and shipbuilding. It became apparent immediately when this Nation entered the war that a special agency to deal with the operational problems peculiar to war was necessary to supplement the Maritime Commission. That need brought about the creation of the War Shipping Administration on February 7, 1942, which took over from the Maritime Commission virtually all of the Commission's major statutory functions with the exception of shipbuilding. Thus WSA became the Government's ship operating agency and the Maritime Commission its shipbuilding agency."[2]
The WSA authority was extensive. In the same report to the President, Land describes the responsibility:
- "The responsibility of the WSA under the Executive Order of February 7, 1942, extended to all phases of shipping including the purchase or requisition of vessels for its own use or the use of the Army, Navy, or other Government agencies; the repairing, arming, and degaussing of WSA controlled vessels and Allied vessels under lend-lease provision; conversion of vessels to troop transports, hospital ships, and for other special purposes; training and providing ship personnel, operating, loading, discharging and general control of the movement of these ships; administering and marine and war risk insurance laws and funds, and the control of terminal and port facilities, forwarding and related matters."[2]
Under that authority cargo hulls were allocated to either commerce, Army or Navy. Many of the Army's ships and Naval transports were allocated by WSA. WSA, through its agents, directly operated ships in support of the services and civilian requirements.[4] Among the more notable WSA operated ships were large and fast troop transports able to sail largely without escort with WSA operated Argentina, Brazil, John Ericsson, Lurline, Mariposa, Monterey, andUruguay being among those ships.[5]
In addition, the WSA worked closely with the British Ministry of War Transportthrough the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board in ensuring most efficient use of available ship hulls and cargo carrying capacity.[2][6]
Under the "loading, discharging and general control of the movement of these ships" WSA developed and enforced improved methods of utilizing ship capacity and avoiding inefficient use of ships by commerce and the military services.
| Royal E. Ingersoll | |
|---|---|
Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll
| |
| Born | 20 June 1883 Washington, D.C. |
| Died | 20 May 1976 (aged 92) Bethesda, Maryland[1] |
| Allegiance | United States of America |
| Service/branch | United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1905–1946 |
| Rank | Admiral |
| Commands held |
|
| Battles/wars | |
| Awards | Navy Cross |
| Relations |
|
Royal Eason Ingersoll (1883–1976) was a United States Navy four-star admiral who served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT) from January 1, 1942 to late1944; Commander, Western Sea Frontier from late 1944 to 1946; and Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet/Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCOMINCH/DCNO) from late 1944 to late 1945.
Ingersoll was born in Washington, D.C., on 20 June 1883. He was second in a succession of three generations of U.S. Naval officers: his father, Rear Admiral Royal R. Ingersoll - United States Naval Academy class of 1868, and his son, Lieutenant Royal Rodney Ingersoll II - USNA class of 1934, was killed in a "friendly fire" accident on board the aircraft carrier Hornet (CV-8) on 4 June 1942, during the naval Battle of Midway.
On 16 July 1938, Ingersoll took command of Cruiser Division Six of the Scouting Force, his flag in the cruiser Minneapolis (CA-36). Two years later, he returned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Assistant to the Chief, and on 1 January 1942, with the rank of Vice Admiral, he was designated Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, with the Augusta as his flagship.
Ingersoll was promoted to the rank of Admiral on the following 1 July. Having organized the movements of the thousands of ships across the Atlantic in order to have men and supplies on hand at the precise hour for the North African landings in November 1942, he also had the responsibility of planning the composition of the naval escort forces which insured the troop convoys' safe arrival.
Following the African invasion, the Atlantic Fleet was employed in running troop convoys and transporting stores, munitions, and fuel to the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean. As a side issue, it ran the convoys on the coast of Brazil and continuously waged the anti-submarine war which had been a matter of primary concern since the outbreak of hostilities. Ingersoll is generally credited with solving the U-boat and Atlantic logistics problems. In addition, he had the responsibility of defense of the Western Hemisphere by U.S. naval forces and made changes in the disposition of air and surface forces stationed at various points in North and South America. For his services in this command, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and cited as a "...forceful and resolute leader under the critical conditions existing throughout a period of approximately three years...against a determined and ruthless enemy intent on world domination...."
In November 1944, he was detached from command of the Atlantic Fleet and became Commander Western Sea Frontier, with headquarters at San Francisco. In addition to commanding the naval forces engaged in protecting shipping in coastal waters, he managed the flow of supplies to the Pacific Fleet through West Coast ports. In carrying out this assignment, he had the status of a Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. After the reorganization of the Navy in October 1945, he continued to serve as Commander Western Sea Frontier until 10 April 1946, when he was relieved of all active duty pending his retirement that became official on 1 August 1946.
| Jonas Howard Ingram | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Born | October 15, 1886 Jeffersonville, Indiana |
| Died | September 9, 1952 (aged 65) San Diego, California |
| Allegiance |  United States of America |
| Service/branch |  United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1907-1947 |
| Rank | Admiral |
| Battles/wars | |
| Awards | |
Admiral Jonas Howard Ingram (October 15, 1886 – September 9, 1952) was an officer in the United States Navy during World War I and World War II. He commanded the United States Atlantic Fleet during World War II and was a recipient of the Medal of Honor for his actions in 1914 in Veracruz, Mexico.
In the early years of World War II, Ingram was promoted to Rear Admiral on January 10, 1941 and served as Commander Task Force Three prior to his designation in September 1942 as Commander South Atlantic Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, with the rank of Vice Admiral. This force, with headquarters in Brazil, guarded shipping in the coastal waters south of the Equator and throughout the United States zone of responsibility in the South Atlantic. Admiral Ingram's command included air and surface units of Brazil which were brought to a high state of efficiency through his leadership and coordinating efforts. The ability to develop and maintain harmony and close cooperation with Brazilian naval forces contributed to the control of the South Atlantic achieved by the Allies. He assumed personal responsibility for properly equipping and training the Brazilian Navy and for their combat operations against U-Boats and German raiders and later for the important task of maintaining the air and sea rescue patrol for ultimate deployment in the Pacific. For his services in these important commands, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and a gold award star in lieu of a second.
On November 15, 1944, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, with the rank of Admiral. In this command he played a major role in assuring the steady flow of troops and materials to Europe across the Atlantic during the later phases of World War II. He also directed Atlantic Fleet efforts in containing and destroying the German U-Boat fleet. For exceptionally meritorious service during his command, he was awarded a gold award star in lieu of a third Distinguished Service Medal.
Medal of Honor citation[edit]
Rank and organization: Lieutenant, Junior Grade, U.S. Navy. Born: October 15, 1886, Jeffersonville, Ind. Accredited to: Indiana. G.O. No.: 177, December 4, 1915.
Citation:
For distinguished conduct in battle, engagement of Vera Cruz, 22 April 1914. During the second day's fighting the service performed by him was eminent and conspicuous. He was conspicuous for skillful and efficient handling of the artillery and machineguns of the Arkansas battalion, for which he was specially commended in reports.
| Fourth Fleet | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Active | 1943-1950 2008 - Present |
| Country | United States of America |
| Branch | United States Navy |
| Type | Fleet Command |
| Role | Direct Fleet Operations |
| Part of | U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command U.S. Southern Command(USSOUTHCOM) |
| Garrison/HQ | Naval Station Mayport |
| Commanders | |
| Current commander | Rear Admiral Sinclair M. Harris |
U.S. Fourth Fleet is a United States Navy command operating the Navy component command of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Fourth Fleet is headquartered on Naval Station Mayport in Jacksonville, Florida and is responsible for U.S. Navy ships, aircraft and submarines operating in theCaribbean, and Atlantic and Pacific Oceans around Central and South America.
U.S. Fourth Fleet was a major U.S. Navy command in the South Atlantic Ocean during World War II. It was originally established in 1943 to protect the U.S. against raiders, blockade runners and enemy submarines. In 1950, the Fourth Fleet was disestablished when its responsibilities were taken over by U.S. Second Fleet.
Previous Fourth Fleet Commanders[edit]
- Vice Admiral Jonas H. Ingram (September 1942 - November 11, 1944)[2]
- Vice Admiral William R. Munroe (November 11, 1944 - April 15, 1945)[3]
- Vice Admiral Thomas R. Cooley (1945 - mid 1946) [4]
- Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey (September 1946 - March 1947)[5]
- Vice Admiral Charles McMorris (mid 1947 - July 1948)
| Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command | |
|---|---|
Emblem of I Bomber Command (1943-1946)
| |
| Active | 1942-1946 |
| Country | United States |
| Branch | United States Army Air Forces |
| Type | Antisubmarine Warfare; Command and Control |
| Motto | Guard With Power |
The Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command (AC) was a direct reporting agency of the United States Army Air Forces during World War II. Its mission was to deal with the German Navy U-boat threat.
The USAAF began flying antisubmarine patrols along the Atlantic coast immediately after the Pearl Harbor Attack. Initial patrols over the approaches to New York harbor were flown by First Air Force, I Bomber Command from Mitchel Field. Patrols over Boston were flown from Otis Field. However, despite the Battle of the Atlantic raging for the previous two years, the United States was not prepared for war against U-Boats. The United States lacked ships, aircraft, equipment, trained personnel, and a master plan to counter any serious submarine offensive.
The Navy's air arm in 1941 was as inadequate as its anti-submarine surface fleet. Initially, the Navy had no escort carriers, a type that eventually was very effective against the German submarines. It also lacked aircraft capable of long range patrols over the ocean to attack submarines when sighted. Prewar plans called for the AAF to support naval forces in case of an emergency. To supplement its meager anti submarine forces, the Navy turned to the AAF. Since 1938, however, the Air Corps/Army Air Forces had been restricted from conducting overwater operations beyond a 100-mile limit, and the AAF had no equipment or trained personnel for the specialized job of patrolling against, detecting, and attacking submarines from the air.
Also, the sudden entry of the United States into World War II caught Kriegsmarine Admiral Doenitz by surprise, with no submarines immediately available to send to American coastal waters. Doenitz quickly allocated five long distance submarines, all he could quickly make ready, to Operation DRUMBEAT, his code name for operations against shipping in U.S. coastal sea lanes. These sailed fromLorient, France, between 23 and 27 December 1941.
On 31 December 1941 a Coast Guard cutter reported a periscope in Portland Channel, and on 7 January 1942 an Army plane sighted a submarine off the coast of New Jersey. On that same day the Navy reported the presence of a fleet of U-boats in the waters south ofNewfoundland. The British merchant ship SS Cyclops was sunk off Nova Scotia on 11 January, 125 miles south-east of Cape Sable. Cyclops was the first ship sunk in the German U-boat campaign against the East Coast of North America. Three days later the tanker Norness went down southeast of Nontauk Point, Long Island.
These sinkings of merchant vessels along the Atlantic coast made it clear to the American public the grim realities of war. These attacks on commercial shipping were not only a drain on supply lines of our British Allies, which was perilously thin at best, but the attacks virtually on our Atlantic seaboard threatened the coastal commerce as well. In the remaining days of January 1942, 13 more ships were sunk by U-Boats off the Northeast Atlantic coast.
War had arrived in the territorial waters of the United States.
| Westside Torkel Larson | |
|---|---|
| Born | April 18, 1892 Vernalis, California |
| Died | March 7, 1977 (aged 84) Los Angeles, California |
| Allegiance | United States |
| Service/branch |  United States Air Force |
| Years of service | 1917-1946 |
| Rank |  Major general |
| Commands held | Air Forces Antisubmarine Command Third Air Force |
| Awards | Army Distinguished Service Medal |
Westside Torkel Larson (April 18, 1892 - March 7, 1977) was an American Air Force Major general, who was commandant of the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command during World War II.[1][2] In 1933 he won the Mackay Trophy.
