The way to victory is long
The going will be hard
We will do the best we can with what we've got
We must have more planes and ships--at once
Then it will be our turn to strike
We will win through--in time.
By contrast Nimitz, the kindly, soft-spoken Texan who restored confidence to the Pacific Fleet, was beloved by seamen and admirals alike; it was he who implemented King's policy. One of his first bold strokes, which went a long way to restore confidence, was the Marshalls operation of 1, February. While it was not calculated to drive the enemy out of the Pacific, Nimitz knew perfectly well the effect such an offensive operation would have on our sagging national morale. The plan, which gave a delighted Halsey (on Enterprise) a free hand, was this:
Halsey was to deliver a strike and bombardment on Maloelap and Wotje, enemy seaplane bases in the eastern Marshalls; the big punch was to be a torpedo-bomber strike on the Japanese stronghold of Kwajalein. At the same time, Fletcher (on Yorktown) was assigned to carry out raids on Jaluit, Makin, and Mili to the southeast. Two bombardment groups were to work over Maloelap and Wotje from the sea. The raid, while not an unqualified success because of heavy mists which shrouded one objective, resulted in seven small enemy ships sunk and three others, including the light cruiser Katori, damaged. For our part (the American forces numbered two hundred warships), damage was sustained aboard the light cruiser Chester when the enemy sent over eight twin-engined bombers. A light bomb penetrated the main deck and killed eight men and wounded eleven.
Aboard one of the heavy cruisers, Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance's flagship, Northampton, was the gifted Chicago Daily News war correspondent Robert J. Casey, who chronicled the strike.
--S.E. Smith
From: The United States Navy in World War II
Preface to Part I: Chapter 7: First Blood: A War Correspondent tells of the Marshalls Raid
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Ernest Joseph King | |
|---|---|
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN
| |
| Nickname | "Ernie" "Rey" |
| Born | 23 November 1878 Lorain, Ohio |
| Died | 25 June 1956 (aged 77) Kittery, Maine |
| Allegiance |  United States of America |
| Service/branch |  United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1901–1956[1] |
| Rank |  Fleet Admiral |
| Commands held | United States Fleet |
| Battles/wars | World War II |
| Awards | Navy Cross Navy Distinguished Service Medal Sampson Medal |
| Other work | Naval Historical Foundation, President |
Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph King (23 November 1878 – 25 June 1956) was Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (CINCUS) and Chief of Naval Operations (COMINCH-CNO) during World War II. As COMINCH, he directed the United States Navy's operations, planning, and administration and was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was the U.S. Navy's second most senior officer after Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, and the second admiral to be promoted to five star rank. As COMINCH, he served under Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and later under James Forrestal.
King's career was resurrected by his friend, CNO Admiral Harold "Betty" Stark, who realized King's talent for command was being wasted on the General Board. Stark appointed King as Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet in the fall of 1940, and he was promoted to admiral in February 1941. On 30 December 1941 he became Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. On 18 March 1942, he was appointed Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), relieving Stark. He is the only person to hold this combined command. After turning 64 on 23 November 1944, he wrote a message to President Roosevelt to say he had reached mandatory retirement age. Roosevelt replied with a note reading "So what, old top?".[29] On 17 December 1944 he was promoted to the newly created rank of fleet admiral. He left active duty on 15 December 1945 but was recalled as an advisor to the Secretary of the Navy in 1950.
After retiring, King lived in Washington, D.C.. He was active in his early post-retirement (serving as president of the Naval Historical Foundation from 1946 to 1949), but suffered a debilitating stroke in 1947, and subsequent ill-health ultimately forced him to stay in naval hospitals at Bethesda, Maryland, and at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine. He died of a heart attack in Kittery on 26 June 1956 and was buried in the United States Naval Academy Cemetery at Annapolis, Maryland.
| Chester William Nimitz | |
|---|---|
Nimitz during his tenure as a Fleet Admiral
| |
| Birth name | Chester William Nimitz |
| Born | 24 February 1885 Fredericksburg, Texas, U.S. |
| Died | 20 February 1966 (aged 80) Yerba Buena Island, California, U.S. |
| Buried at | Golden Gate National Cemetery San Bruno, California, U.S. |
| Allegiance |  United States of America |
| Service/branch | United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1905–1966[1] |
| Rank | Fleet Admiral |
| Service number | 5572 |
| Commands held | USS Chicago (CA-14) USS Rigel (AR-11) USS Augusta (CA-31) Bureau of Navigation United States Pacific Fleet andPacific Ocean Areas Chief of Naval Operations |
| Battles/wars | |
| Awards | Navy Distinguished Service Medal(4) Army Distinguished Service Medal Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (United Kingdom) Legion of Honor (France) |
| Other work | Regent of the University of California |
| Signature |  |
Chester William Nimitz GCB (24 February 1885 – 20 February 1966) was a Fleet Admiral of the United States Navy. He held the dual command ofCommander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet (CinCPac), for U.S. naval forces and Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA), for U.S. and Allied air, land, and sea forces during World War II.[2]
Nimitz was the leading U.S. Navy authority on submarines, as well as Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Navigation in 1939. He served as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1945 until 1947. He was the United States' last surviving Fleet Admiral.
| William Frederick Halsey, Jr. | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Nickname |
"Bull" Halsey (in the press)
"Bill" (to his family, friends, and Navy colleagues) |
| Born | October 30, 1882 Elizabeth, New Jersey |
| Died | August 16, 1959 (aged 76) |
| Place of burial | Arlington National Cemetery |
| Allegiance | United States of America |
| Service/branch | United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1904–1959[1] |
| Rank | Fleet Admiral |
| Commands held | USS Shaw USS Wickes USS Dale USS Saratoga NAS Pensacola Carrier Division 2 Task Force 16 South Pacific Area United States Third Fleet |
| Battles/wars |
World War I
World War II
|
| Awards |
Navy Cross
World War II Victory MedalNavy Distinguished Service Medal Army Distinguished Service Medal Presidential Unit Citation Mexican Service Medal World War I Victory Medal American Defense Service Medal Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal |
Fleet Admiral William Frederick Halsey, Jr., GBE (October 30, 1882 – August 16, 1959)[2] (commonly referred to as "Bill" or "Bull" Halsey), was an American Fleet Admiral in the United States Navy. He commanded the South Pacific Area during the early stages of the Pacific War against Japan. Later he was commander of the Third Fleet through the duration of hostilities.
Early Pacific carrier raids[edit]
Vice Admiral Halsey and Enterprise slipped back into Pearl Harbor on the evening of December 8. Surveying the wreckage of the Pacific Fleet, he remarked, "Before we're through with them, the Japanese language will be spoken only in hell."[11] Halsey was an aggressive commander. Above all else, he was an energetic and demanding leader who had the ability to invigorate the U.S. Navy's fighting spirit when most required.[12] In the early months of the war, as the nation was rocked by the fall of one western bastion after another, Halsey looked to take the fight to the enemy. Serving as commander, Carrier Division 2 aboard his flagship Enterprise, Halsey led a series of hit-and-run raids against the Japanese, striking the Gilbert and Marshall islands in February, Wake Island in March, and carrying out the Doolittle Raid in April against targets on the Japanese homeland. Halsey's slogan, "Hit hard, hit fast, hit often" soon became a byword for the Navy.
Class: Yorktown Class Aircraft Carrier
Registry: CV-6
Launched: 3, October 1936
USS Enterprise (CV-6), was the seventh U.S. Navy vessel to bear the name. Colloquially referred to as the "Big E", she was the sixth aircraft carrier of theUnited States Navy. A Yorktown class carrier, she was launched in 1936 and was one of only three American carriers commissioned prior to World War II to survive the war (the others being Saratoga and Ranger). She participated in more major actions of the war against Japan than any other US ship. These actions included the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, various other air-sea engagements during the Guadalcanal campaign, the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and theBattle of Leyte Gulf. On three separate occasions during the Pacific War, the Japanese announced that she had been sunk in battle, earning her the name "The Grey Ghost". Enterprise earned 20 battle stars, the most for any U.S. warship in World War II.
_in_Puget_Sound,_September_1945.jpg) USS Enterprise CV-6 | |
| Career (United States) |  |
|---|---|
| Name: | USS Enterprise (CV-6) |
| Ordered: | 1933 |
| Builder: | Newport News Shipbuilding |
| Laid down: | 16 July 1934 |
| Launched: | 3 October 1936 |
| Commissioned: | 12 May 1938 |
| Decommissioned: | 17 February 1947 |
| Nickname: |
|
| Honors and awards: |
|
| Fate: | Scrapped 1958–1960 |
| General characteristics | |
| Class & type: | Yorktown-class aircraft carrier |
| Displacement: |
As built:
From October 1943:
|
| Length: |
As built:
From July 1942:
|
| Beam: |
As built:
From October 1942:
From October 1943:
|
| Draft: | 25 ft 11.5 in (7.912 m) |
| Propulsion: |
|
| Speed: | 32.5 knots (37.4 mph; 60.2 km/h) |
| Range: | 12,500 nautical miles (23,150 km; 14,380 mi) at 15 knots (17 mph; 28 km/h) |
| Complement: | 2,217 officers and men (1941) |
| Sensors and processing systems: | CXAM-1 RADAR[1] |
| Armament: |
As built:
From April 1942:
From mid-June 1942 to mid-Sept 1942:
From Mid-Sept. 1942:
From October 1943:
From September 1945:
|
| Armor: |
|
| Aircraft carried: | 90 aircraft |
| Aviation facilities: |
|
.svg){kind=small}
On 1 February, Enterprise's Task Force 8 raided Kwajalein, Wotje, andMaloelap in the Marshall Islands, sinking three ships, damaging eight, and destroying numerous airplanes and ground facilities. Enterprise received only minor damage in the Japanese counterattack, as her group retired to Pearl Harbor.
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The Marshalls–Gilberts raids were tactical airstrikes and naval artilleryattacks by United States Navy aircraft carrier and other warship forces against Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) garrisons in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands on 1 February 1942. The Japanese garrisons were under the overall command of Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the 4th Fleet. Japanese aircraft in the islands belonged to the IJN's 24th Air Flotilla under Rear Admiral Eiji Gotō. The U.S. warship forces were under the overall command of Vice Admiral William Halsey, Jr.
Raids[edit]
The raids were carried out by two separate U.S. carrier task forces. Aircraft from Task Force 17 (TF 17), commanded by Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher and centered on the carrier USS Yorktown, attacked Jaluit, Mili, andMakin (Butaritari) islands. The Yorktown aircraft inflicted moderate damage to the Japanese naval installations on the islands and destroyed three aircraft. Seven Yorktown aircraft were lost, as well as a floatplane from one of TF 17's cruisers.
Aircraft from TF 8, commanded by Halsey and centered on the carrierUSS Enterprise, struck Kwajalein, Wotje, and Taroa. At the same time,cruisers and destroyers bombarded Wotje and Taroa. The strikes inflicted light to moderate damage on the three islands' naval garrisons, sank three small warships and damaged several others, including the light cruiser Katori, and destroyed 15 Japanese aircraft. The heavy cruiser USS Chester was hit and slightly damaged by a Japanese aerial bomb, and six Enterprise aircraft were lost. TFs 8 and 17 retired from the area immediately upon completion of the raids.
Aftermath and significance[edit]
The raids had little long-term strategic impact. The IJN briefly sent two aircraft carriers to chase TFs 16 and 17, but quickly abandoned the pursuit and continued their support for the ongoing, successful conquests of thePhilippines and Netherlands East Indies. The raids, however, did help lift the morale of the U.S. Navy and American public, still reeling from the Pearl Harbor attack and loss of Wake Island. The raids also provided valuable experience in carrier air operations, which hardened the U.S. carrier groups for future combat against Japanese forces.[1] For their part, the Japanese apparently did not realize that their concept of a perimeter defense using dispersed island garrisons had serious flaws in that the garrisons were too far apart to be sufficiently mutually supporting to prevent penetration by enemy carrier forces. The raids, along with the Doolittle Raid in April 1942, helped convince the IJN's Combined Fleet commander,Isoroku Yamamoto, that he needed to draw the American carriers into battle as soon as possible in order to destroy them. Yamamoto's plan to do so resulted in the Battle of Midway.
| Frank Jack Fletcher | |
|---|---|
 
Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, USN Photographed aboardUSS Saratoga (CV-3), September 17, 1942. Official U.S. Navy Photograph
| |
| Born | April 29, 1885 Marshalltown, Iowa |
| Died | April 25, 1973 (aged 87) Bethesda, Maryland |
| Place of burial | Arlington National Cemetery |
| Allegiance | United States of America |
| Service/branch | United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1906-1947 |
| Rank |  Admiral |
| Battles/wars | Mexican Revolution –Battle of Veracruz World War I –Battle of the Atlantic World War II –Battle of the Coral Sea –Battle of Midway –Guadalcanal campaign –Tulagi –Eastern Solomons |
| Awards | Medal of Honor Navy Cross Navy Distinguished Service Medal |
| Relations | Nephew of Frank Friday Fletcher |
Frank Jack Fletcher (April 29, 1885 – April 25, 1973) was an admiral in theUnited States Navy during World War II. Fletcher was the operational commander at the pivotal Battles of Coral Sea and of Midway. He was the nephew of Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher.
Class: Yorktown Class Aircraft Carrier
Registry: CV-5
Launched: 4, April 1936
USS Yorktown (CV-5) was an aircraft carrier commissioned in the United States Navy from 1937 until she was sunk at the Battle of Midway in June 1942. She was named after the Battle of Yorktown in 1781 and the lead ship of the Yorktown class which was designed after lessons learned from operations with the large converted battlecruiser Lexington class and the smaller purpose-built Ranger. She represented the epitome of U.S. pre-war carrier design.
_Jul1937.jpg) USS Yorktown in July 1937 | |
| Career (United States) | |
|---|---|
| Name: | USS Yorktown (CV-5) |
| Namesake: | The Battle of Yorktown |
| Ordered: | 3 August 1933 |
| Builder: | Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. |
| Laid down: | 21 May 1934 |
| Launched: | 4 April 1936 |
| Sponsored by: | Eleanor Roosevelt |
| Commissioned: | 30 September 1937 |
| In service: | 1937 |
| Out of service: | 1942 |
| Struck: | 2 October 1942 |
| Honors and awards: | 3 battle stars American Defense Service Medal ("A" device)/American Campaign Medal / Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal (3 stars) / World War II Victory Medal |
| Fate: | Sunk 7 June 1942 |
| General characteristics | |
| Class & type: | Yorktown-class aircraft carrier |
| Type: | Aircraft Carrier |
| Displacement: | As built: 19,800 long tons (20,100 t) light 25,500 long tons (25,900 t) full load |
| Length: | As built: 770 ft (230 m) (waterline @ design draft) 824 ft 9 in (251.38 m) overall |
| Beam: | As built: 83 ft 3 in (25.37 m) (waterline) 109 ft 6 in (33.38 m) (overall) |
| Draft: | 25 ft 11.5 in (7.912 m) (as built) |
| Propulsion: | 9 × Babcock & Wilcox boilers, 4 × Parsons geared turbines, 120,000 shp (89 MW) 4 × screws |
| Speed: | 32.5 knots (37.4 mph; 60.2 km/h) |
| Range: | 12,500 nautical miles (23,200 km; 14,400 mi) at 15 knots (17 mph; 28 km/h) |
| Complement: | 2,217 officers and men (1941) |
| Sensors and processing systems: | CXAM RADAR from 1940[1] |
| Armament: |
As built:
From February 1942:
|
| Armor: | As built: 2.5-4 inch belt 60 lb protective decks 4 inch bulkheads 4 inch side and 3 inch top round conning tower 4 inch side over steering gear |
| Aircraft carried: | As built: 90 aircraft 3 × elevators 2 × flight deck hydraulic catapults 1 × hangar deck hydraulic catapults |
_during_the_Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea,_April_1942.jpg)
The early news from the Pacific was bleak: the Pacific Fleet had taken a beating. With the battle line crippled, the undamaged American carriers assumed great importance. There were, on 7 December, only three in the Pacific: USS Enterprise (CV-6), USS Lexington (CV-2), and USS Saratoga (CV-3). USS Ranger (CV-4), USS Wasp (CV-7), and the recently commissioned USS Hornet (CV-8) remained in the Atlantic, Yorktown departed Norfolk on 16 December 1941 for the Pacific, her secondary gun galleries studded with new Oerlikon 20 mm guns. She reached San Diego 30 December 1941 and soon became flagship for Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's newly formed Task Force 17.
The carrier's first mission in her new theater was to escort a convoy carrying Marine reinforcements to American Samoa. Departing San Diego on 6 January 1942, Yorktown and her consorts covered the movement of marines to Pago Pago in Tutuila to augment the garrison already there.
Having safely covered that troop movement, Yorktown, in company with sister ship Enterprise, departed Samoan waters on 25 January. Six days later, Task Force 8 (built around Enterprise), and TF 17 (around Yorktown) parted company. The former headed for the Marshall Islands, the latter for the Gilberts, each to take part in some of the first American offensives of the war, the Marshalls-Gilberts raids.
 Katori | |
| Career (Japan) |  |
|---|---|
| Name: | Katori |
| Namesake: | Katori Shrine |
| Ordered: | 1938 Fiscal Year |
| Laid down: | 24 August 1938 |
| Launched: | 17 June 1939 |
| Commissioned: | 20 April 1940[1] |
| Struck: | 31 March 1944 |
| Fate: | sunk 19 February 1944 by USS Iowa (BB-61) off Truk 07°45′N 151°20′E |
| General characteristics | |
| Class & type: | Katori class cruiser |
| Displacement: | 5,890 tons (standard) 6,180 tons (full load) |
| Length: | 129.77 meters |
| Beam: | 15.95 meters |
| Draught: | 5.75 meters |
| Propulsion: | 2-shaft geared turbines plus diesel motors; 3 Kampon boilers; 8,000 shp |
| Speed: | 18 knots (33 km/h) |
| Range: | 9,000 nautical miles (17,000 km) at 10 knots (19 km/h) |
| Complement: | 315 |
| Armament: |
|
| Aircraft carried: | 1 x floatplane, 1 catapult |
Katori (香取) was the lead ship of the Katori class of three light cruiserswhich served with the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II. It is named after the noted Shinto Katori Shrine in Chiba prefecture, Japan.
On 1 February 1942, Katori came under attack at Kwajalein by Douglas "Dauntless" SBDs of VB-6 and VS-6 and TBD Devastatorsfrom the USS Enterprise (CV-6). Vice Admiral Shimizu was wounded in the raid, and Katori sustained enough damage to warrant a return to Yokosuka for repairs.
Class: Northampton Class Heavy Cruiser
Registry: CA-27
Launched: 3, July 1929
_Mare_Island_Oct_1943.jpg) USS Chester (CA-27) | |
| Career (United States) | |
|---|---|
| Name: | USS Chester (CA-27) |
| Namesake: | Chester, Pennsylvania |
| Builder: | New York Shipbuilding Company ofCamden, New Jersey |
| Laid down: | 6 March 1928 |
| Launched: | 3 July 1929 |
| Commissioned: | 24 June 1930 |
| Decommissioned: | 10 June 1946 |
| Honors and awards: |   11 Battle stars |
| Fate: | Sold for scrap on 11 August 1959 |
| General characteristics | |
| Class & type: | Northampton-class heavy cruiser |
| Displacement: | 9,200 tons |
| Length: | 570 ft (170 m) (waterline); 600 ft 3 in (182.96 m) (overall) |
| Beam: | 66 ft 1 in (20.14 m) |
| Draft: | 16 ft 6 in (5.03 m) (mean); 23 ft (7.0 m) (maximum) |
| Propulsion: | 4 × Parsons geared turbines, 8 × White-Forster boilers, 4 × shafts, 107,000 ihp (80,000 kW) |
| Speed: | 32.7 kn (37.6 mph; 60.6 km/h) |
| Range: | 13,000 nmi (15,000 mi; 24,000 km) @ 15 kn (17 mph; 28 km/h) |
| Capacity: | Fuel oil: 1,500 tons |
| Complement: | 1,100 Officers: 105 Enlisted: 995[1] |
| Sensors and processing systems: | RCA CXAM RADAR |
| Armament: | 9 × 8 in (200 mm)/55 cal guns (3x3), 8 × 5 in (130 mm)/25 cal AA guns, 32 × 40 mm AA guns, 27 × 20 mm AA cannons |
| Armor: | |
| Aircraft carried: | 4 × SOC Seagull scout-observationseaplanes |
| Aviation facilities: | 2 × catapults |
USS Chester (CA-27), a Northampton-class heavy cruiser, was the second ship of the United States Navy named after the city of Chester, Pennsylvania.
Chester was launched on 3 July 1929 by New York Shipbuilding Company, Camden, New Jersey; sponsored by Miss J. T. Blain; commissioned on 24 June 1930, Captain Arthur Fairfield in command; and reported to the Atlantic Fleet.
| Raymond Spruance | |
|---|---|
Spruance in April 1944
| |
| Born | July 3, 1886 Baltimore, Maryland |
| Died | December 13, 1969 (aged 83) Pebble Beach, California |
| Allegiance | United States of America |
| Service/branch | United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1907 — 1948 |
| Rank | Admiral |
| Commands held | United States Pacific Fleet |
| Battles/wars | |
| Awards | Navy Cross Navy Distinguished Service Medal(3) Army Distinguished Service Medal |
| Other work | Ambassador to the Philippines |
Raymond Ames Spruance (July 3, 1886 – December 13, 1969) was a United States Navy admiral in World War II.
Spruance commanded US naval forces during two of the most significant naval battles that took place in the Pacific theater, the Battle of Midway and the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The Battle of Midway was the first major victory for the United States over Japan and is seen by many as the turning point of the Pacific war. The Battle of the Philippine Sea was also a significant victory for the US. The Navy's official historian said of the Battle of Midway "...Spruance's performance was superb...(he) emerged from this battle one of the greatest admirals in American naval history".[1] After the war, Spruance was appointed President of the Naval War College, and later served as American ambassador to the Philippines.
Spruance was nicknamed "electric brain" for his calmness even in moments of supreme crisis: a reputation enhanced by his successful tactics at Midway.
In the first months of World War II in the Pacific, Spruance commanded four heavy cruisers and support ships that made up Cruiser Division Five. Spruance’s division was under a task force built around the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise commanded by Admiral William Halsey, Jr. Halsey led a series of hit and run raids against the Japanese, striking the Gilbert and Marshall islands in February, Wake Island in March, and carrying out the Doolittle Raid in April against targets on the Japanese homeland. The raids were important to morale, setting a tone of aggressive initiative taking, and also provided invaluable experience for the US Navy.
Class: Northampton Class Heavy Cruiser
Registry: CA-26
Launch Date: 5, September 1929
| Career (United States) | |
|---|---|
| Name: | USS Northampton (CA-26) |
| Builder: | Bethlehem Steel Corp.'s Fore River Shipyard of Quincy, Mass. |
| Laid down: | 12 April 1928 |
| Launched: | 5 September 1929 |
| Commissioned: | 17 May 1930 |
| Honors and awards: | Six battle stars |
| Fate: | Sunk Battle of Tassafaronga on 30 November 1942. |
| General characteristics | |
| Type: | Northampton-class heavy cruiser |
| Displacement: | 9,050 tons |
| Length: | 600 ft 3 in (182.96 m) |
| Beam: | 66 ft 1 in (20.14 m) |
| Draft: | 16 ft 4 in (4.98 m) |
| Propulsion: |
|
| Speed: | 32.7 kn (37.6 mph; 60.6 km/h)[1] |
| Complement: |
|
| Sensors and processing systems: | RCA CXAM RADAR |
| Armament: | 9 × 8 in (200 mm)/55 cal Mk 10/11 guns(3x3), 8 × 5 in (130 mm)/25 cal Mk 10 guns (4x1) , 9 × 21 in (530 mm) torpedo tubes (3x3), 24 × 40 mm/56 cal Mk 1/2 Bofors AA cannons (6x4), 28 × 20 mm/70 cal Mk 2/3/4 Oerlikon AA cannons (28x1) |
| Armor: |
|
| Aircraft carried: | 2 × floatplanes |
USS Northampton (CA-26) was a heavy cruiser in service with the United States Navy. She was the lead ship of her class and commissioned in 1930. During World War II she served in the Pacific and was sunk by Japanese torpedoes during the Battle of Tassafaronga on 30 November 1942.
_entering_Pearl_Harbor_8_Dec_1941.jpg)
Northampton was at sea with Admiral William Halsey, Jr. inEnterprise during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, returning to port the next day. On 9 December, the force sortied to search northeast ofOahu, then swept south toJohnston Island, then north again to hunt the enemy west of Lisianski Island and Midway Atoll. On 11 December, Craven was damaged when it collided with Northampton during underway refueling.[4]
Through January 1942, Northampton joined in such searches until detached with Salt Lake City to bombard Wotje on 1 February. The bombardment not only demolished buildings and fuel dumps on the island, but also sank two Japanese ships. A similar assault was fired against Wake Island on 24 February when, despite serious enemy counterfire, the guns of Northampton and her force started large fires on the island and sank a dredge in the lagoon. As Northampton retired from the island, enemy seaplanes, landbased planes, and patrol craft attacked, but all were destroyed or repulsed.
At 1830 January 31st, the task group consisting of the Northampton, Salt Lake City, and Dunlap, Rear Admiral Spruance commanding, proceeded toward Wotje Island on course 258° true at a speed of 17.3 knots.
At 0620 February 1st, the ships were turned into the wind for launching the aircraft. Just after the cruiser planes were catapulted the presence of our task force was signaled to the shore by a rocket fired from a patrol boat of about 800 tons. The Dunlap was designated to sink the boat which went zigzagging away. Only the bow gun of the destroyer would bear, so she had some difficulty hitting her fleeing, low-freeboard target.
Upon completion of the launching, the planes from the Salt Lake City and Northampton rendezvoused as a unit and proceeded to the north of the island of Wotje. The reconnaissance and photographic planes broke off and headed south to photograph the straits and reconnoiter, passing clockwise around the atoll. At 0653 the antiaircraft guns on the island opened fire on the fighters from theEnterprise and a few minutes later shifted fire to the spotting planes. Spotting stations first were taken up north of the island.
At about 0655 the ships of the task group sighted land on the starboard bow. It consisted of numerous low-lying islands, with the island to the extreme right, Wotje, having what appeared to be two radio towers of medium height and various fire control and lookout masts. Upon closer observation one large ship was seen in the lagoon and within a very few minutes the stacks of about five others came into view. Many of the ships were showing black smoke indicating that they were lighting off. An initial report of "three ships and no shore batteries" was received from the reconnaissance group. Subsequently, it was learned that actually eight ships and five batteries were present. Such incomplete information could have caused disaster.
When the range to Wotje was about 24,000 yards, three large freighter type ships could be seen. The left-hand ship was clearly visible and was the normal target for the Northampton. The Salt Lake City control officer designated the right-hand auxiliary ship for his target.
At the commencement of the bombardment at 0715, 13 minutes after sunrise, the cruisers were in column on course 270°, with theDunlap screening ahead and having under fire the Japanese patrol vessel. Thereafter, the Dunlap operated independently, sinking the patrol vessel, then searching to the westward for two submarines reported to be standing out of the lagoon, and finally following the cruisers on a northeasterly course, bombarding Wotje Island.
The Northampton opened fire with a full salvo. The control officer on the Salt Lake City had been ordered by his captain to follow the movements of the flagship in either single turret or full salvo fire. About 20 seconds later the Salt Lake City opened with a full salvo, slow fire. After the second salvo, it was observed that theNorthampton was firing single-turret salvos, so the Salt Lake Citycontrol ordered single turret salvos, slow fire, to economize ammunition.
The targets for our cruisers for the next 55 minutes were cruisers in the lagoon. Target designations against the enemy ships in the harbor partially hidden by high spots of land, some getting underway, and all changing relative positions with his own ship's movement, proved a difficult problem for our control officers. Our air spotter had trouble attaining good spotting positions because of clouds and enemy antiaircraft fire. Rangefinders, due to their varying heights, had different views of the partially hidden ships. The problem of locating target designations was finally solved by giving the plane spotter the best possible description of the target in order to identify it.
An example of the difficulty that confronted Admiral Spruance's Task Group can be shown by relating what happened when an enemy ship was placed under fire at about 0753 by the Salt Lake City.
When one of the Salt Lake City's targets became hidden from view, fire was shifted to a ship of about 4,000 to 5,000 tons which was pouring black smoke from its funnel and obviously trying to escape from the lagoon. The enemy's speed was between 12 and 15 knots. It seemed that this vessel might be either a submarine tender or seaplane tender. Apparently she had three small deck guns which were being fired. In opening on this ship, the Salt Lake City crossed fire with the Northampton who at that time was shooting at a target farther to the right, but this was believed best in order to prevent the ship's escape. The target maneuvered radically, seeking as often as possible to place an island of the atoll between our cruiser and herself. While behind an island she would often reverse her course. The plane spotter for the Salt Lake City was having difficulty with clouds, so that each time the ship again came into view there would be another rangekeeper set-up necessary. Each time the target got behind an island, fire was checked.
At about 0803, the Salt Lake City and the Northampton reversed course from 270° to 060°, and the target came into clear view. Also, by this time, the plane spotter had obtained good spotting position over the lagoon and sent in satisfactory information on the target maneuvers and spots. Control ordered full 10-gun salvos, but maintained slow fire. The gun range was 15,900 yards. The first salvo landed on in deflection and just over, the spot D 300, left 1 mil. The next was a perfect straddle. The next salvo was a similar straddle. The enemy ship was extremely fortunate to live through those two salvos. The plane observers later reported that it was unbelievable that she was still visible when the splashes cleared away. The next salvo landed 7 mils right but was not spotted. The next was another perfect straddle. The target commenced to go down by the bow; however, she then appeared to steady and hold her own, so the Salt Lake City control officer ordered, "Give her another good one." This fell slightly off to the right in deflection and control ordered, "One more and make it good." No spot was made when this final salvo landed, but the target was perfectly centered in the splashes. Just before this salvo hit, the target commenced to go down rapidly by the bow and when this salvo landed a great flash appeared in the superstructure just below the bridge. The final gun range was 13,850 yards. The target sank at 0812.
During this time return fire from shore batteries and some of the enemy auxiliaries was observed, but their shots landed short of our vessels.
At about 0810 the Northampton and the Salt Lake City shifted their fire to shore objectives on Wotje. The extent and perfection of the camouflage used by the Japanese on their shore installations made spotting from the ships very difficult. Gasoline tanks were painted green and were covered on top with sod. Other installations such as buildings were often painted to resemble sand dunes. Many of these buildings were discovered only because of the shadow they cast in the sunlight.
The distinct handicap under which a task force operates when there is no prior specific information known regarding objectives for bombardment can be shown by relating in some detail the account of the Salt Lake City's shelling of a group of aircraft installations.
A group of buildings, some of which appeared to be hangars, were observed some distance from the beach. Eight buildings, painted to resemble sand dunes, were counted by the spotter with no trouble. However, the director pointer and trainer, with lower powered optics than the spotter, could not pick up any of these buildings through their telescopes. To the right of these sand-colored buildings was a group of smaller buildings painted a deep green. Since the director pointer and trainer were able to see these green buildings, they were ordered to use the left group of the green buildings as a point of aim. An arbitrary spot of left 5 was put on the rangekeeper to cause the shots to fall in this aviation center. But, the rangekeeper operator was not notified that the target had been shifted, and the left 5 was applied to a left deflection accumulated spot remaining from the previous target, so the first salvo landed well to the left of the hangars. There was no observation on that salvo. Another was fired with the same set up and a rich orange flame leaped into the air from among the palm trees to the left of the aviation buildings. Then the error on the rangekeeper was corrected and the next salvo was a little off to the right and another heavy fire was observed to start. The control officer next ordered full 10-gun salvos. The first landed among the aviation buildings followed by another salvo close to the same place, and it is believed considerable damage was done. A spot of right 03 was given, and our shells landed among the green buildings that were being used as the point of aim. The gun range at this time was averaging 11,800 yards. Later reports from the aviators revealed that this salvo did immense damage to industrial plants.
The enemy opened fire at 0721, using guns on one of the ships in the atoll. It was not until 0842, however, that shore batteries began to be effective. At that time shells burst close to the Salt Lake City. The ship increased speed and turned away but shells from two guns, probably 5 inchers, burst just astern. At 0848, the Northampton was straddled but although the enemy continued firing for another hour, his efforts were ineffective.
U.S.S. Enterprise
Attack on the Marshall Islands, Ships track Jan. 31 to Feb. 2, 1942.
U.S.S. Chester
Bombardment of Taroa, Ships track during action, February 1, 1942.
At 0852 the flagship ordered "Cease Firing" and the planes from the Northampton and Salt Lake City were ordered to attack the remaining objectives with the two 100-pound bombs that each plane carried.
The task group withdrew and commenced recovering their aircraft at 0955. During recovery one plane from the Salt Lake City crashed into the side of the ship. The Dunlap rescued the pilot and his radio man uninjured and then sank the plane with machine gun and rifle fire.
Rendezvous was made with the Enterprise at 1230 and course of 070° was steered at a speed of 25 knots. At 1335 and again at 1535 the task group opened fire on enemy planes that were making an attack on the Enterprise.
This task force suffered no damage or casualties as a result of enemy action. The 5-inch No. 8 gun on the Salt Lake City was damaged by a shell bursting in the muzzle and a slight bulge was found in gun No. 6 when the 5-inch guns were bore-gauged on February 2d.
(See chart opposite)
Four Chester planes were launched at 0600, two for spot and two for reconnaissance. Taroa Island was sighted at 0649, range 28,500 yards.
At 0659, two enemy dive bombers attacked, dropping their bombs well clear. Shore batteries fired at the Chester at 0710. Their location could not be discerned, but the splashes indicated 5- or 6-inch guns. Fighters from the Enterprise could be seen strafing the island.
At 0715, the Chester opened fire with the main battery, using the towers on the northwest corner of the island as the point of aim. No air spot was available as our spotters were under attack. Almost immediately a second attack by enemy dive bombers was made. After 0715 the shore batteries kept the Chester under scattered fire. Suddenly, when the point of aim was shifted to the shore batteries, the range dropped to 12,000 yards, well within the range of shore batteries. The group immediately turned away 30° to open range. Lack of topographical knowledge of the island had thus brought about a potentially dangerous situation. Five additional salvos were fired at the shore batteries apparently silencing one, while the ship was under air attack.
With the Chester still in range of the shore batteries and only two small auxiliaries visible in the lagoon, a left turn was ordered at 0731 to reverse the course. On the new course the main batteries resumed fire on the shore-line batteries, working north toward the hangar and airfields. The Balch was taking the center of the island under effective fire.
Nine minutes later eight twin-engined bombers were seen taking off from the island and a speedy retirement was now in order. Course was changed to 130° and then to 184°, speed was increased to all possible, and the main battery was ordered to cease fire and send personnel to assist the antiaircraft battery.
Until 0900 many dive-bombing and strafing attacks were made on the group, with the Chester being the principal target. The cruiser was able to avoid the bombs by changing courses until 0820 when one 134-pound bomb hit the well deck near the port catapult tower. The narrowest escape from serious damage or sinking came at 0841 when eight bombers dropped 500-pound bombs from 12,000 feet. These fell about 100 yards astern. Thereafter, air attacks slackened. Maximum speed was maintained, but no attempt was made to close the Enterprise since it was necessary to avoid indicating her direction to the enemy. At 1130 the Chester's four aircraft were recovered.
The following damage was inflicted by this task group:
- One plane destroyed in dog fight over the island, one probably destroyed by antiaircraft fire.
- Three shore batteries and one antiaircraft battery silenced.
- Three or four fires started, one probably an oil tank.
- Several buildings and one observation tower destroyed.
- One radio tower damaged.
Damage and losses sustained by this group:
- Casualties - 8 killed, 2 seriously injured, 9 injured and 23 slightly injured.
- The bomb which hit the Chester, estimated to have weighed 134 pounds, made a hole 9 by 4 feet in the main deck and did much superficial damage to blower screens, ventilation trunks, catapult catwalk, deck stanchions, and practically all light bulkheads in the line of the blast. It also dished in the catapult foundation about 1 foot, seriously damaged the port motor whaleboat, and started a fire in the cork insulation of the exhaust duct from the forward engine room.
The enemy lacked aggressiveness and failed to press their attacks home. In most instances, the dives made against the Chester were at about a 45° angle. Release was high (about 4,000 feet) and recovery was made by an abrupt pull-out with a steep turn. The enemy reluctance to close in for
attack in the face of our (antiaircraft) fire resulted in erratic bombing. A few planes were seen to jettison their bombs at some distance from our ships. Only one determined dive was seen. The enemy came in at 70° or better. His plane pulled out at about a 1,000-foot altitude. This plane scored the only hit. The same plane had previously made a very steep dive that resulted in a near miss. He then pulled out, climbed rapidly, executed a split "S" and returned for his hit.
The enemy dive bombers used cloud concealment at about 8,000 feet altitude very effectively in making their approach.
On all attacks on the Chester's reconnaissance planes, the Japanese fighters maneuvered to gain position directly overhead. They executed a half roll and steep dive. In no instance did they close to effective range. Their pull-outs were high and abrupt, resulting in scattered and inaccurate fire.
Enterprise retirement.
Combat patrols were flown throughout the day, covering the retirement of the Enterprise. During the early afternoon, five twin-engined bombers (some persons who saw the attack insist a sixth plane peeled off from the formation and dropped bombs in the vicinity of the Salt Lake City) were intercepted by the combat patrol. The enemy approach was made from the starboard bow from a position angle of 25°. The planes broke through the clouds, in a glide attack of about 20°. The first range finder range, about 3 seconds after breaking through the clouds, was 3,500 yards, altitude 6,000 feet. The enemy bombs were dropped at about 3,000 to 4,000 feet and the planes passed over the Enterprise at about 1,500 feet after dropping. The planes simultaneously dropped three bombs each, of about 100 to 200 kilograms. The nearest bomb hit about 30 feet from the port side of the Enterprise and it was later found that there were about 13 holes in the gasoline line in the vicinity of this near hit. A great quantity of gasoline from the punctured fuel line sprayed out on the walkway, saturating the rubber mats which burnt like cellophane. One of the enemy bombers peeled off from the formation after passing over the ship and made an effort to either strafe the planes on deck or crash into them; the pilot was either killed or lost control of his plane due to the heavy machine-gun fire, and crashed onto the deck and over the side. His wings struck the tail of one of our planes, damaging it so severely that it was partially stripped and shoved overboard.
At about 1500 a twin-float seaplane was intercepted and the plane was disabled by machine-gun fire. The pilot of the enemy plane attempted to parachute, but crashed into the sea.
In the late afternoon two two-engined medium bombers were discovered making an attack at high altitude (14,000 feet) in level flight, speed 140 knots. These planes were originally sighted on the starboard quarter at a range of more than 50,000 yards. They were tracked all the way to the port quarter, range about 70,000 yards. They then made their approach from the sun and through large scattered clouds. At the time they were sighted coming in, the range finder was unable to get a range due to the smoke gasses. Fire was opened using the set-up obtained from tracking, the position angle when opening fire was about 45°, and slant range 6,500 yards. Two bombs, each weighing 500 pounds or more, were dropped from each plane simultaneously. One of the fighter patrol planes, which was close to the enemy, reported that our shots were short. A spot of Out 500 was applied, and a report was then received that Enterprise guns were on. A long trail of smoke was still visible when the plane disappeared into the clouds. The other enemy bomber was shot down in flames by our fighter plane patrol.
The performance of our ship's antiaircraft batteries, on the occasion of the first attack to which she was exposed, was expectedly erratic; nevertheless, the effectiveness was so negligible as to give rise to grave anxiety. In the case of the first attack on the Enterprise particularly, properly controlled antiaircraft fire should have taken a heavy toll of the attacking planes.
The combat patrol was landed at 1902. Sunset had been at 1845.
Summary of enemy damage.
Ships damaged or sunk:
| Wotje | Four or five auxiliary or cargo vessels of 4,000-5,000 tons and three or four small "bird" class. (At 1130, only two ships were visible above water, one beached and badly damaged and the other damaged but still afloat.) | |
| Kwajalein | Two SS sunk - 500-pound bomb direct hits. One large Yawata class - Three 500-pound bomb direct hits. One torpedo. |
| One modern CA or CL - Two 500-pound direct hits. One torpedo hit. One possible torpedo hit. Three large AO's - One had two 500-pound direct hits. Two had one 500-pound direct hits. One had two torpedo hits. One had one torpedo hit. Two AK's - Damaged by near misses of 500-pound. One sufficiently damaged to require beaching. One torpedo hit. One PG - Damaged and aground. |
Shore installations destroyed or damaged:
| Wotje | The entire installation was apparently destroyed. This includes two hangars, fuel oil tanks, gasoline stowage, warehouses, shops, and barracks. Two antiaircraft batteries and all coastal defense guns were silenced or abandoned. | |
| Taroa | Two hangars destroyed, several buildings hit and afire in industrial area; both fuel tanks were ablaze. The radio station on Ollet Island destroyed. | |
| Roi | Two hangars destroyed. Ammunition dump blown up and fuel fire left burning. Radio building demolished. All store and warehouses demolished by explosion resulting from bombing. Fire in town on island east of Roi. | |
| Kwajalein | Large compound received three direct hits. | |
| Gugegwe | Four buildings destroyed. |
Enemy planes destroyed:
| Roi | Three VF shot down. Six VSB destroyed on ground. One twin-engined bomber destroyed on ground. | |
| Kwajalein | Two PSP (four-engined) destroyed on water. | |
| Wotje | None. | |
| Taroa | Seven VF shot down. Five scout bombers on ground. One twin-engined bomber destroyed on ground. One VF damaged in air. | |
| At sea | Three twin-engined bombers shot down. One twin-float single engine monoplane shot down. |
The above totals include 12 vessels and 35 planes confirmed losses. In addition it is considered that between 4 and 7 ships suffered damage of indeterminate degree, at least 2 of which (Wotje) were in a sinking condition, and that an indeterminate number of planes were destroyed or damaged in the hangars and dispersal parks adjacent to the fields at Roi and Taroa.
Summary of our losses.
Casualties to personnel:
| Plane squadrons | Killed or missing: Six officers, includes take-off crash, and five enlisted men. Wounded: Two officers and two enlisted men. | |
| Enterprise | Killed: One enlisted man. Wounded: One officer and five enlisted men. | |
| Chester | Killed: One officer and seven enlisted men. Wounded: One officer and 33 enlisted men. |
Damage to ships:
| Chester | This vessel was struck by a bomb in the well deck between frames 67 and 70 on the port side of the main deck about 14 feet inboard. | |
| Enterprise | This vessel was hit by bomb fragments from a near miss on port quarter. Only superficial damage received although there was some damage to degaussing cable and a gasoline fire was started. |
Planes lost or damaged:
| Lost | Damaged | ||
| Fighting squadron | 0 | 7 | |
| Torpedo squadron | 0 | 3 | |
| Bombing squadron | 1* | 11 | |
| Scouting squadron | 4* | 12 |
* Shot down or missing.
In addition one fighter plane crashed on take-off and was lost. One scout bomber was damaged on deck. One Salt Lake Cityreconnaissance plane was damaged during recovery, and was abandoned and sunk.
U.S.S. Yorktown
Attack on Jaluit, Makin, and Mili.
Robert J. Casey: Robert Joseph Casey was born March 14, 1890, in Beresford, South Dakota, and attended St. Mary's College in St. Mary's, Kansas from 1907 to 1911. Casey enlisted in the Army in 1918 and served at Verdun and Meuse-Argonne as an artilleryman. He earned three citations for bravery in combat before his discharge as a captain in 1919. In 1927, Casey wrote (anonymously) The Cannoneers Have Hairy Ears; A Diary of the Front Lines about his wartime experiences, and this book was acclaimed for its gritty and realistic depictions of an American soldier in World War I. In 1920 Casey joined the Chicago Daily News, where he worked as a columnist and foreign correspondent for twenty-seven years. In Chicago, Casey wrote features, chronicled the gang wars of the era, and compiled "slice of life" stories which were published in the paper under column titles "Vest Pocket Anthology," "Such Interesting People," and "More Interesting People." During the 1920s and 1930s, Casey also traveled through Indochina, Cuba, Pitcairn Islands and Easter Island, and many other sites, and wrote about his adventures in newspaper columns and books. In 1940, Casey covered the blitz in London and its aftermath; he was also in Hawaii and the Pacific right after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December, 1941. After his coverage of World War II in France, Africa, and the Pacific, Casey came back to Chicago to write. He had been married to Marie Driscoll, who died in 1945; in 1946 Casey married Hazel MacDonald, a reporter and fellow Chicago-based foreign correspondent he first met in 1933. After Casey's retirement from the Daily News in 1947, he continued to write books and freelance newspaper articles. In 1955 he was named Press Veteran of the Year by the Chicago Press Veterans Association. After being under treatment for several years for a heart condition and high blood pressure, Casey died of a stroke on Dec. 5, 1962 at St. Francis Hospital, Evanston, at the age of 72.
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